

which opened the following year, became a popular gathering place for members of Congress and other prominent persons. Park and Hanna held a birthday party there on Dec. 10, 1973, for Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. (D Mass.), then House majority leader; Vice President Gerald R. Ford attended as a guest.

The source of Park's money was a mystery to his acquaintances. After the Justice Department investigation came to light, Park told reporters in London that he received \$1-million a month from a family-owned Gulf Oil Co. business in Korea. Gulf denied that it paid him any such sum.

According to the federal indictment against Park, it was part of the conspiracy that he was designated the seller's agent for all Korean purchases of U.S. rice, and that some of the money was used to bribe members of Congress.

On Dec. 8, 1973, U.S. customs officials in Alaska had found on Park a list of about 90 members of Congress and other officials, with numbers beside their names under the heading of "contributions." Park reportedly tried to tear up the list, which was not confiscated or copied, so far as was publicly known. Justice Department investigators had to rely on the memory of customs officers as to the contents of the list, which was reported to be a major item of evidence in the case against Park.

House Probe

The House investigation of the Korean lobbying scandal got under way on Jan. 31 when the Standards Committee formally voted to begin looking into the allegations.

At the same time, the committee hired the law firm of Hughes, Hubbard and Reed as outside counsel, with the stipulation that the "contact" counsel for the investigation would be Philip A. Lacovara, former assistant to the Watergate special prosecutor.

The scandal was the fourth major problem to confront the committee in less than two years. From its creation in 1967 until 1975, the committee had been almost moribund, with no record of formal investigations.

Then, in short order, the committee had to grapple with a sex scandal that drove House Administration Committee Chairman Wayne L. Hays (D Ohio) out of office, the leak of a secret report on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and conflict-of-interest charges against Robert L. F. Sikes (D Fla.), a member of the Appropriations Committee. (1976 *Almanac* pp. 23, 330)

The rush of events clearly provided the kind of national attention that the committee chairman, John J. Flynt Jr. (D Ga.), had not sought during his 23 years in the House.

Flynt, a former local prosecutor, had once complained that "it is never pleasant or easy to sit in judgment on one's peers."

House Approval

By a vote of 388-0 (with one member voting "present") the House Feb. 9 adopted a resolution (H Res 252, H Rept 95-10) authorizing the Standards Committee to "conduct a full and complete inquiry to determine whether members of the House of Representatives, their immediate families, or their associates accepted anything of value, directly or indirectly, from the Government of the Republic of Korea or representatives thereof." (Vote 14, p. 6-H)

The resolution granted the committee the authority it sought to gather evidence not only by subpoena but also the

use of depositions and interrogatories. House rules gave all standing committees the right to investigate "by subpoena or otherwise," but they did not specifically mention depositions or interrogatories.

Chairman Flynt said he wanted those powers so that if necessary the committee could gather evidence privately, without jeopardizing the reputations of persons it wanted to question. The committee's request for \$530,000 to conduct the investigation was approved by the House by voice vote March 9 (H Res 233, H Rept 95-46).

Pace Criticized

The committee investigation moved slowly during the spring and summer of 1977. Some members, notably Bruce F. Caputo (R N.Y.), complained that it appeared the Democratic majority was reluctant to pursue an investigation that might turn up damaging information about fellow Democrats.

There were few developments during this period. The committee disclosed on May 13 that it had obtained some of Tongsun Park's records. The shredded papers had been painstakingly reconstructed by reporters who found the scraps in trash Park left behind when he fled the country.

In June the committee sent questionnaires to 718 current and former members since January 1970. They were asked to report visits to Korea, gifts of more than \$100 from Koreans, and social contacts with alleged Korean agents such as Tongsun Park, Suzi Park Thomson or Hancho Kim.

Lacovara Out

At first, Lacovara sided with Flynt in arguing against pressure to conduct public hearings. The pressure came within the committee from Caputo and in petitions from other House members.

But in early July newspaper stories said that Lacovara had sent a confidential memorandum to committee members complaining that the committee was not meeting often enough, and that this was slowing down the approval of subpoenas and the work of the investigators.

Flynt had called one meeting in the three weeks preceding the July 4 recess, but had been unable to get together a quorum of the 12-member committee.

The committee then agreed to meet weekly for the next three weeks. At the first of these sessions, on July 13, most of the committee members were present but Lacovara was absent, vacationing in England.

Two days later, Lacovara resigned. While in London he learned that Flynt in a newspaper interview had questioned his integrity by proposing an audit of a \$35,000 bill the committee had received from Lacovara's law firm, Hughes, Hubbard and Reed, for June work.

Jaworski In

Lacovara's resignation at first was seen as a rebuke that the committee might not survive. He had been the committee's "symbol of credibility," as members of Congress and the press put it.

To restore some of the lost credibility, the committee began searching for a counsel of equal or greater stature.

Some Republicans, seeing a Democratic Watergate in the scandal, unsuccessfully petitioned President Carter for the creation of a special prosecutor. Others urged the committee to reject Lacovara's resignation and keep him as counsel.

But Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. (D Mass.) stepped in and began a strategy that called for the retention of a new counsel of "national reputation" and the drafting of a new "charter of independence" that would assure the new counsel his investigation would not be impeded.

One of O'Neill's first moves was to gain Flynt's consent to this approach, since it would limit the committee or bypass the chairman himself.

O'Neill acted partly in response to an ABC network broadcast, using an anonymous source, that suggested O'Neill and Majority Leader Jim Wright (D Texas) were implicated in the inquiry.

"I categorically deny that I am connected in any way with the Korean scandal...." O'Neill angrily told reporters. "There is absolutely no truth in this matter whatsoever."

By July 20, when the committee met for the first time since Lacovara quit, it appeared likely that Jaworski would be appointed. His name had been floated the day before as the man being sought.

Jaworski accepted on July 20 and the following day the committee, under some pressure from the leadership, agreed that it would issue any subpoenas Jaworski requested and that he could be removed only by a majority vote of the full House, rather than merely by committee action.

At Jaworski's request one of his law partners, Peter A. White, was retained as deputy counsel.

The appointment of Jaworski was warmly greeted on Capitol Hill, with the new special counsel being widely praised for his role in amassing the record that drove President Nixon from office and sent several of his top aides to jail.

Thomson Questioned

Jaworski assumed control of the investigation Aug. 15. Two days later Suzi Park Thomson, the former aide to retired Speaker Albert, refused to answer some questions put to her in private session by Standards Committee investigators.

She reportedly told the committee that she feared her answers would be leaked to the press or otherwise misused, and that she would answer certain questions only in public.

The committee on Aug. 24 made clear to Thomson that she faced a contempt of Congress citation if she did not testify in private. The next day she met privately with committee investigators for five hours.

Efforts to Question Park

The committee's efforts to question a more central witness, Tongsun Park, were hampered throughout the summer by his absence from the country. These efforts were further complicated on Aug. 18 when Park flew from Great Britain, which had an extradition treaty with the United States, to Korea, which had no such treaty that would permit Korean authorities to force Park's return to the United States.

Weeks of high-level diplomatic negotiations failed to obtain Park's return or the taking of his testimony abroad under terms acceptable to U.S. authorities. A Justice Department negotiating team left Korea empty-handed on Oct. 20.

Jaworski told the Standards Committee Oct. 21 that Park's testimony was needed to verify many of the specifics of his activities, including his actual contacts with members of Congress. Jaworski said that Korea, "as our ally and the

beneficiary of our historic friendship, has no right to cover up and obstruct our investigation of any conduct by our public officials."

As Jaworski recommended, the House Oct. 31 adopted, 407-0, a resolution (H Res 868) urging the Republic of Korea to "cooperate fully and without reservation with the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct and with its special counsel...." (*Vote 661, p. 190-H*)

The White House disclosed Nov. 5, in a report to Congress on its efforts to obtain Tongsun Park's cooperation, that the United States had offered to dismiss the indictment against him in exchange for his testimony.

The report said that "delicate discussions" were under way to allow U.S. investigators to interrogate Park.

News dispatches from Seoul on Nov. 30 said that Park was changing his mind about his refusal to come to the United States. A South Korean official was quoted as saying that there might be a breakthrough in the negotiations by Christmas.

Hearings

The Standards Committee began the public phase of its investigation with three days of public hearings Oct. 19-21.

The first round of hearings did not produce the names of members of Congress who may have been compromised. The ground rules prohibited witnesses from naming members. Only the identity and activities of South Korean nationals were discussed.

Jai Hyon Lee, a former Korean embassy official who defected in June 1973, testified that he had seen Kim Dong Jo, then the Korean ambassador, in the spring of 1973 stuffing some "two dozens" of plain white envelopes full of \$100 bills for delivery to "the Capitol."

Nan Elder, a staffer for Rep. Larry Winn Jr. (R Kan.), testified that around September 1972 a man she later discovered to be Ambassador Kim left an envelope full of \$100 bills on Winn's desk. She said the money, "more than I had ever seen," was promptly returned to the Korean ambassador.

The wives of Reps. E. (Kika) de la Garza (D Texas) and John T. Myers (R Ind.) told the committee that during a trip to Korea with their husbands in August 1975 they were handed envelopes containing large amounts of cash. They said the money was returned to the Korean donors.

Kim Sang Keun, a former KCIA agent who defected in the fall of 1976, testified to his role in transferring some \$600,000 to Hancho Kim who, along with Tongsun Park, was one of those charged with conspiracy and bribery.

Code Names Used

Kim Sang Keun said code names such as "Catholic father" and "chief priest of Bulkook Buddhist Temple" were used to channel money secretly to Hancho Kim for influence-buying. Transfers of money were variously coded as "translations," "dictionary" and "diary."

Committee staffers testified that from 1969 to 1976 Tongsun Park had received at least \$9.2-million in commissions on rice sales, and that additional amounts may have been deposited in foreign bank accounts.

Other witnesses included Kim Hyung Wook, former director of the KCIA; B. Y. Lee and Jay Shin Ryu, former employees of Tongsun Park; and three representatives of U.S. associations of rice growers, including former San Francisco Mayor Joseph Alioto.

Albert, Passman Subpoenas

It was disclosed Nov. 30 that the Standards Committee had subpoenaed personal records of former House Speaker Carl Albert (D Okla. 1947-77), some of which pertained to trips Albert took to Korea in 1969 and 1971.

But shortly before the subpoena was issued Nov. 21, Albert had removed some of the documents from the University of Oklahoma repository. Albert denied that any of the documents he withheld were relevant to the congressional investigation. Albert previously had been connected with the Korean investigation through reports that Korean-born Suzi Park Thomson, who was a clerk in his office, was under investigation.

In a related development, Northeast Louisiana University declined to turn over records of former Rep. Otto Passman (D La. 1947-77) to subpoena-bearing staffers of the Standards Committee. Passman was one of the closest congressional allies of Korean businessman Tongsun Park and had helped arrange sales of Louisiana rice to South Korea.

Park reportedly had told friends in London that he gave Passman about \$190,000. Passman denied the allegation.

Related Investigation

Former KCIA Chief Kim Hyung Wook testified June 22 in the related investigation conducted by Fraser's International Relations Subcommittee on International Organizations.

Kim said that in 1971 Tongsun Park had given him a list of 15 to 20 names of House and Senate members who Park said were to receive money. But Kim said he destroyed the list and could not recall any names.

Kim also testified that he had been instrumental in obtaining \$3-million to help Tongsun Park establish the George Town Club.

A \$300,000 budget for the Fraser subcommittee investigation had been approved (H Res 319, H Rept 95-54) by the House by voice vote on March 9, the same day that the Standards Committee budget was approved.

KCIA Plan Revealed

Fraser made public at another set of hearings, Nov. 29-30, a document outlining the KCIA's plan to influence U.S. policy at the highest levels of government.

The chief witness, former KCIA New York station chief Sohn Ho Young, vouched for the authenticity of the document but said he thought it had been "inflated" to impress government officials in Seoul.

"Common sense tells me that this plan was not carried out," Sohn testified. He said it was "unthinkable that such plans are now in progress" in view of all the publicity then being given to the Korean lobbying scandal.

Nevertheless, several references in the document suggested that the KCIA had actively sought to implement parts of the plan. One notation stated that a KCIA agent "has contact with 44 members" and that the KCIA had secured 40 "collaborators" in Congress. In another place the document indicated that the KCIA "firmed up" cooperation from "the policy research committee of the Republican Party" in 1975.

The panel's chief witness, Sohn, did not serve in the KCIA's main U.S. office in Washington and could not verify if any of the activities had been carried out. The committee refused to question Sohn—at least in public session—on the four pages of the document dealing with the KCIA's con-

gressional operations. (The subcommittee's jurisdiction did not extend to congressional wrongdoing, which was being investigated by the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct.)

Although the subcommittee expunged all names and most organizations from copies of the report made public, Fraser indicated that the names would be released later.

Those portions of the report that were made public, however, indicated that the KCIA's idea men were nothing if not thorough. The plan set forth three main areas of KCIA activity in the United States: 1) Operations against North Korean agents operating here; 2) operations to secure the support of Koreans living in this country and 3) operations relating to the U.S. government.

In addition to Congress and the White House, the plan called for "co-optation" and "manipulation" of everyone from the Baptist Church and antiwar left to journalists and academics as well as the FBI, CIA, Defense and State Departments.

Familiar With Congress

The document's congressional scheme suggested that the KCIA's Washington representatives were well-educated in the art of lobbying on Capitol Hill. The plan targeted representatives of both parties, the House and Senate leadership, members of Armed Services, Ways and Means and foreign affairs committees as well as key staff aides.

The plan also called for:

- Hiring three "collaborators" at a cost of "\$18,000 (\$500 X 3 persons X 12 months)," apparently to infiltrate the offices of the Speaker of the House and Senate Majority Leader as well as something called the "office of the secretariat," possibly the Secretary of the Senate.

- Providing \$20,000 in campaign funds for one senator and three representatives identified as "anti-ROK" (Republic of Korea) as well as \$10,800 for contacts with other anti-ROK members and senators.

- Providing \$29,200 for visits to South Korea for "Democratic Party forces" and "key forces of the liberal-progressive faction," \$7,200 for "regular contact" with key Democrats, \$6,000 for "special manipulation," and \$3,000 for a letter-writing campaign against hearings, apparently on human rights.

In all the plan detailed how \$750,000 was to be spent in 1976 to carry out about 170 operations to firm up support for and mollify opposition to the regime of President Park Chung Hee.

Indictments

Tongsun Park. Park was the first person indicted in connection with the Korean lobbying scandal. The secret Aug. 26 indictment, disclosed Sept. 6, charged Park with one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, one count of bribery, one count of offering an illegal gratuity, 29 counts of mail fraud, one count of violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act for failure to register, and two counts of illegal political contributions.

Named as unindicted coconspirators were former Rep. Hanna, and former KCIA directors Kim Hyung Wook and Lee Hu Rak.

The Park indictment mentioned more than 20 members, or former members of Congress as having received money from Park or, in a few cases, as having been induced to write letters or take some other action favorable to Tongsun Park or South Korea or both. (*Box of members, p. 821*)

Hancho C. Kim. Another central figure in the inquiry, businessman Hancho C. Kim, was indicted Sept. 27 for tax evasion, and lying to a federal grand jury.

The Justice Department charged that from 1974 to 1976 Kim received some \$600,000 through the KCIA to pursue an influence-buying operation known as "Operation White Snow."

No members of Congress were mentioned in the Hancho Kim indictment, but the document stated that Kim twice succeeded in having remarks placed in the *Congressional Record* that were favorable to South Korea. The dates in 1974 and 1975 indicated that the remarks had been inserted by former Rep. Vernon W. Thomson (R Wis. 1961-74) and Rep. Tennyson Guyer (R Ohio).

It was reported in late November that Guyer had tried three times, without success, to arrange an appointment between then-President Ford and Hancho Kim.

Kim was a trustee of Findlay College, located in Guyer's hometown of Findlay, Ohio.

The Standards Committee questioned Kim privately for two hours on Nov. 17. He previously had refused to testify.

Richard T. Hanna. Former Rep. Hanna was indicted Oct. 14 and arraigned in Washington Oct. 21, when his trial was set for Jan. 9, 1978.

The 40 counts against Hanna included one conspiracy count, two bribery counts, one acceptance of an illegal gratuity, 35 mail fraud counts and failure to register as a foreign agent.

New allegations in the Hanna indictment said that Reps. Melvin Price (D Ill.) and Edward J. Patten (D N.J.) were among members of Congress who were successfully encouraged to write laudatory letters regarding Tongsun Park to Korean President Park Chung Hee. Both men, at Hanna's urging, submitted pro-Korean statements to 1974 subcommittee hearings on Korean violations of human rights.

Senate Inquiry

Although few senators' names had emerged in connection with the Korean lobbying scheme, the Senate Ethics Committee moved "to get to the bottom of this," in the words of Chairman Adlai E. Stevenson III (D Ill.).

Stevenson disclosed in Chicago Aug. 8 that the committee four days earlier had empowered him to seek a special counsel to oversee the committee's inquiry. On Sept. 19 the committee appointed Victor H. Kramer, a veteran Washington lawyer and law professor, in that capacity.

On Oct. 5 the committee sent questionnaires, similar to the one used for House members, to 155 current and former U.S. senators who held office since 1967. The questionnaire asked three questions concerning:

- Visits to the Republic of Korea by senators, their staffs or members of their immediate families since Jan. 1, 1967.
- Acceptance of gifts valued in excess of \$35 (including travel) by senators, their staffs, immediate families, business and campaign associates from representatives of the South Korean government, from persons suspected of having been agents of the Korean government or from persons affiliated with Korean law firms, corporations or organizations.
- Acceptance of gifts worth \$35 or more from, attendance at functions given by, or business dealings with 13 named Korean individuals and organizations. The individuals included Tongsun Park, Hancho Kim, former Rep. Hanna,

Hanna: 'I Like Koreans'

Richard T. Hanna, a Democratic member of the House for 12 years, never achieved wide recognition or great power as a legislator. Press profiles portrayed him as a gregarious, likeable Californian who was popular with his colleagues and his constituents.

A member of the Banking and Currency and the Science and Astronautics Committees, Hanna's congressional career was marked by a steady and unhidden interest in Asian affairs, particularly those of South Korea.

A congressional patron of the Asian Development Bank, organized in 1966, Hanna took numerous trips relating to the bank and other government-supported development programs; those trips frequently included South Korea on the itinerary. From 1965 to 1974, Hanna took 26 foreign trips, visiting Korea some 13 times, according to Congressional Quarterly records. While some of those trips were at personal expense, most were paid for by the U.S. government.

Those trips became campaign issues in 1970, with Hanna's opponent accusing him of using them to promote a "cultural and trade center" in Anaheim, and raising the prospect of personal gain for Hanna in the project. Hanna denied this, stating his interest in fostering U.S. trade with Asia. Interviewed by the Ralph Nader-sponsored Congress Project in 1972, Hanna candidly defended his numerous Korean trips: "I like Koreans very much. I think I've made some good friends over there for our country."

Hanna's voting record in Congress was somewhat more liberal than would be expected for the district he represented, a conservative array of Orange County suburbs of Los Angeles. He received comparatively favorable ratings from liberal groups such as the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education (COPE). After six victories beginning in 1962, he retired in 1974 at age 60.

and two former Korean ambassadors to the United States.

By year's end "most but not all" of the senators had responded to the questionnaire, a committee spokesman said. He refused to discuss the contents of the responses.

Reorganization Plan No. 2

Congress gave its approval to the President's Reorganization Plan No. 2 to consolidate the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the State Department's Educational and Cultural Affairs Bureau. It was the second of two plans submitted in 1977 under the resurrected Reorganization Act. (*Related stories, pp. 749, 814*)

By a 34-357 vote Nov. 29, the House rejected a resolution (H Res 827) to disapprove the reorganization. (*Vote 680, p. 196-H*)

Passage of a disapproval resolution by either house within 60 days of submission of the reorganization plan, as specified by the 1977 Executive Reorganization Act (PL 95-