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DEVELOPMENT DOSSIER 4



KOREA

ACFOA DEVELOPMENT DOSSIER 4

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Cover Note

The tiger is a fearful and powerful beast.

But in the traditional folk art of Korea, it is often a smiling foolish animal, harassed by little creatures; fearless magpies or rabbits.

NOTE ON SPELLING:

The spelling and capitalisation of Korean names and places is subject to a number of slightly different conventions and systems of Romanisation. We have retained the spellings used by writers rather than attempting to standardise

Editorial

Three events have dominated the world view of Korea in the last two years.

The first of these was the assassination of President Park by the Chief of the KCIA in October 79. The second was the citizen's uprising in Kwangju in May. The third was the death sentence passed on leading opposition politician Kim Dae Jung in September, a sentence commuted in January 1981 to life imprisonment.

These dramatic and public events are analysed in some of the papers presented in this dossier.

While it would be impossible to disregard such spectacular happenings, it is important that they be recognised as only parts of a complex situation. If we study and analyse them, we may learn something about Korea, but they are not the *central* facts, nor are they the *causes* of Korea's present situation.

I shall make a brief attempt here to identify the factors which do seem central ones.

— Korea is a *divided* country. Culturally, and ethnically homogenous for thousands of years, it was divided by the allies after World War II when the Russians took the Japanese surrender north of the 38th parallel and the Americans in the south. From this division developed the mutually hostile administrations of the ROK in the south and the DPRK in the north. Their division was institutionalised by the armistice agreement that ended the Korean War in 1953, and symbolised by the creation of a demilitarised zone as an impenetrable barrier between them.

For north and south, the politics of 're-unification' are diverse and at present incompatible, but people's longing for one united country and their lasting sense of separation and loss are realities which may outlast political and economic differences.

— The second 'key factor' lies in the radically different political character of north and south. Under the auspices of the UN and particularly the USA, the south has been fostered as a political and economic showpiece of the 'free world'. Its survival is bolstered by vast military aid and financed through the adoption of an export-oriented economy, whose initial performance has often been described as an 'economic miracle'. The north, however, has retained some of Korea's old isolationist character. 'The Hermit Kingdom' it was once called. The brand of socialism developed in the DPRK has a strongly nationalistic and independent character but the esteem accorded to the 'great and glorious leader, Kim Il Sung' reflects an ideological style which does not find a sympathetic hearing in international circles. Information about the north is sparse and poorly communicated to the world at large.

— The economic recession of recent months is another factor of immense importance. In the south, the condition of people's lives is affected by inflation, soaring prices, declining demand for industrial products and a slackening demand for labour. Park's assassination took place in a context of worker demonstrations in the industrial cities. Political 'stability' so beloved by foreign investors is seen to be threatened by people's demands for justice. Over the last 18 months such demands were met by attempts at reform, but more recently, silenced by ever-increasing government control.


The economy of the north is less urgently affected by fluctuations in world export markets and less dependent than the south on oil imports. In comparative terms, the continuing economic superiority of the south can no longer be taken for granted.

Understanding of Korea is its relationship to other countries. It is seen as having major strategic importance by the four major powers in the region: the US, Japan, USSR and China. Panmunjom, the village where eastern and western blocs confront one another in the demilitarised zone remains frozen as the last iceberg in the cold war.

For the US, the ROK is less a valued friend than an awkward instrument of strategic and economic policy. Carter initially expressed the intention to withdraw US troops but this plan was abandoned as detente faded gradually in 1979. The Reagan administration is expected to maintain and reinforce a cold war stance. It can be expected that we will hear even more than usual from the ROK military government and their US allies about the long-imagined 'threat from the north'.

In this dossier I have chosen, where possible, Australian views and analyses. We are bound closely to Korea, as trading partners. Together with other 'Western' nations we carry a heavy responsibility for the division of Korea, the maintenance of that division, and the support of the military regime in the ROK. Australians are also connected by many small but powerful links with the Korean people. These links, of friendship and common interest, have been strengthened and renewed by the sufferings of the past year.

Friendship with the Korean people demands of us a strong and informed policy on human rights. It demands an understanding both of the complex national dilemmas which Korea faces, and of the every day condition of people's lives in both north and south. In the long-term it demands the formulation of a foreign policy which looks towards the goal of peaceful reunifi-



Map of Korea

Korea : figuring it out

GEOGRAPHY

Korea is a peninsula projecting south for about 1,000 km from the north-east Asian mainland. To the north, Korea shares borders with the USSR and China. Japan is 200 km to the south. Korea's location gives access to adjacent cultures but also makes it strategically vulnerable.

Korea has a total land mass of about 221,000 sq km. A rugged mountain chain runs like a spine down the entire length.

POPULATION

Korea's population is estimated at about 54.5 million, of whom 16.9 million live in the north and 37.6 million in the south. (*Far Eastern Economic Review Year Book 1980*).

The Koreans are racially and culturally homogeneous people. A very small number of Chinese form the only ethnic minority.

LANGUAGE

The Korean language is quite different from all other Asian languages. Until the fourteenth century it relied on Chinese characters for its written form but the invention of Hangul, the Korean alphabet, provided a scientific and sophisticated writing system.

A COUNTRY DIVIDED

Since the Korean War, which ended in a truce in 1953, Korea has been divided near the 38th parallel into two mutually hostile administrations: the REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) in the south and the DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK) in the North.

GNP

The World Bank's *World Development Report 1980* gives the 1978 per capita annual income as US\$730 in the DPRK and US\$1,160 in the ROK.

MILITARISATION

Korea is one of the most heavily militarised areas of the world with approximately one million soldiers in the regular armies of north and south.

The US maintains a military presence in the south with 40,000 troops, air and naval forces and nuclear weapons.

In Brief




KIM DAE JUNG GETS 'LIFE'

On January 23, South Korea commuted the death sentence of leading opposition politician Kim Dae Jung. The sentence was reduced to life imprisonment.

The Supreme Court upheld the sentence of a military tribunal which convicted Mr Kim on charges of sedition and sentenced him to death.

One hour later, a government spokesman said that the State Council, acting on the instructions of President Chun, had 'concluded it is appropriate to grant commutation to Kim Dae Jung and the others convicted in this case.' Council had noted that 'friendly nations and persons at home and abroad have appealed for clemency from a humanitarian standpoint.'



MARTIAL LAW GOES OUT OF FASHION

Martial Law was officially lifted in South Korea on January 23, but there were no immediate outward signs of change in the capital. A midnight-to-4am curfew remained in effect.

The current spate of Martial Law in Korea has lasted for 15 months. During the regime of Park Chung Hee, Martial Law was introduced in 1972, the same year that Marcos declared Martial Law in the Philippines.

Now, eight years later, within a few days of one another both governments have ended Martial Law. One of Marcos' critics caustically remarks 'The words go, the fact remains.'

A CHANGE OF NAME

The Korean Central Intelligence Agency has been renamed, by President Chun, the 'Agency for National Security Planning'. The KCIA was founded in 1961 and was used extensively by President Park to maintain political control until his assassination by the agency head in 1979.

Korea, North and South

Gavan McCormack

Gavan McCormack visited south Korea in February as guest of the International Cultural Society of Korea (Seoul) and north Korea in May as guest of the Korean Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (Pyongyang). He has been lecturing in history at La Trobe University and is now doing research in Japan.

This article was first published in *Arena* no. 56.

SOUTH Korea, when I visited it in February 1980, was a study in contrasts. Most of the country, even then, was under martial law. Military exercises were common, on occasion calling for the evacuation of all civilians from the streets of Seoul as tanks, armoured cars, and helicopters rounded up putative 'infiltrators' from the north. At the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the Joint Security Area was manned by Americans; the walls of Camp Kittyhawk were festooned with brash and bloodthirsty anti-communist slogans and skull and crossbones, and the sense of gung-ho bravado was strong. Despite the 1975 UN General Assembly vote to 'dissolve the United Nations Command and withdraw all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations', and despite the withdrawal of virtually all other forces, the blue flag of the UN was still flying.

But, despite military exercises and partial martial law, disenchantment among the people of the south with the Yushin system created by the late President, Park Chung Hee, was palpable; the desire for peaceful change in the direction of democracy seemed universal. Government and political party representatives to whom I spoke accepted that wide-ranging democratic reform was necessary and would come. My own university seminar, on 'Democracy and Korean Unification', was followed by the sort of lively, frank, and open discussion I had not thought possible in Seoul.

Kwangju raises question mark over Korea's future

However, on 17 May the crackdown came. Martial Law was extended to the whole country, politicians and students arrested, the National Assembly closed, and troops moved in to strategic urban points. The Kwangju uprising followed. Here, for the first time since the Korean War, the South Korean people seized and distributed weapons, captured and for days actually held the fourth largest city in the country, and resisted state power through armed struggle. They were suppressed in the end only by a full-scale, early morning assault by tanks, artillery, and helicopter-borne troops. Hundreds died in the clashes. According to some reports, a number of the rebels escaped the final army encirclement and took to the hills to prepare for prolonged guerilla-style resistance. Certainly many weapons and much ammunition remained unaccounted for.

More than anything in recent years, this incident raised a question mark over the future of Korea. Of course, it is no coincidence that this regime justified its crackdown, and the abandonment of democratization, on grounds of imminent and grave danger of invasion from the north, just as its predecessor, Park Chung Hee, justified the repressive system of Yushin, and as his predecessor, Syngman Rhee, justified *his* dictatorship.

As it happened, I was in the north at the time of Kwangju. I visited several points along the western sector of the DMZ, and travelled through that strategic corridor in the Kaesong area through which any invasion forces would almost certainly have to come. With the single exception of the medium quality highway between Pyongyang and Kaesong, roads were rutted and unsurfaced, and nowhere did I see a single tank, aircraft, or piece of artillery. It is true that the army in late May was mobilized, but in a most peaceful way: everywhere soldiers were to be seen, trousers rolled up, wading in the well-watered fields helping to transplant rice seedlings. Many workers, from Pyongyang and other cities, were also helping out in the same way. During my ten days visit, it was hard to see in this relaxed and so-evidently thriving country the violent fanaticism and aggressiveness alleged by Seoul to be its basic character.

Korean People's Army (KPA) officers treated with derision the revised US intelligence estimates of 1979, which pushed upward the figure for DPRK military by about 30 per cent to a total of about 700,000 (in a population of less than 18 million). They insisted that the country did not even practice conscription, and my own observations of urban young men whose career plans made no allowance for military service tended to confirm this. Pressed for a figure of approximate strength of DPRK forces, Colonel Li Chan Bok eventually suggested 'somewhere in the vicinity of 350,000 to 400,000', but it was clear that the actual figure was a military secret.

Other officials pointed out that it would be next to impossible to maintain current high levels of economic growth and investment, of which there was evidence aplenty, and at the same time finance the sort of massive military build-up alleged by the United States. They also noted that it would be an act of clear insanity on their part to initiate renewed war with the United States, knowing that whatever the eventual outcome, destruction of much of their industrial and social infrastructure would be swift. A substantial US nuclear arsenal is known to be deployed in the south, and US authorities have made it clear they have no inhibitions about using such weapons



Ten million people, about one in five of the Korean population, have members of their immediate family living in the other half of the country, with whom no contact is possible, or has been possible, for 30 years: no mail, no phone, no border crossings, nothing. Koreans feel the division of their country in 1945 was a deep historical injustice, not to be compared with, for example, the division of Germany.

In Seoul, I asked officials for how long they thought US nuclear and conventional forces would remain necessary to their defence, given that already the south claims a population advantage of two to one and a Gross National Product superiority of three to one. (I might have added, but did not, that the north was also unfortunate in its allies, both of whom had recently invaded other neighbour allies – China into Vietnam and the Soviet Union into Afghanistan – and China must be particularly unreliable since its current line rests so heavily on friendship for the United States.) Lee Kyu Ho, then Minister at the National Unification Board, replied that:

We are now much weaker militarily. If a balance could be reached, we could accept US withdrawal. If political institutions and economic growth were stable and a power balance was achieved, then US troops could be withdrawn.

Unification: What would it mean?

But even if US forces, nuclear and conventional, were withdrawn, the balance of 'equal' states that Mr Lee envisaged was still a long way short of unification. Until some progress can be made on that issue, Korea will remain a highly dangerous armed camp. Quite apart from the US forces, there are about one million Koreans under arms, and all the major powers are involved in Korea, either by alliances or by common borders. Incidents occur constantly; war is always a real possibility. The stability of the crucial North-East Asian region rests on the very fragile basis of the Armistice Agreement of 1953, which was never intended to be anything but temporary. Until it can be converted into something more permanent, the Korean peninsula will remain a major potential focus of world conflict. Both in Seoul and in Pyongyang, I made a point of discussing attitudes to this fundamental question, the national question, with officials, scholars, and ordinary citizens of both sides.

It is clear, first of all, that this is a very live question among Koreans, whether of north or south, or for that matter Koreans in Japan, Europe, or the United States. Ten million people, about one in five of the Korean population, have members of their immediate family living in the other half of the country, with whom no contact is possible, or has been possible, for 30 years: no mail, no phone, no border crossings, nothing. Koreans feel the division of their country in 1945 was a deep historical injustice, not to be compared with, for example, the division of Germany.

The northern proposals for settlement call for the transformation of the Armistice into a permanent treaty of peace with the United States, and for moves toward gradual reunification of north and south via a confederation – a neutral, non-aligned, progressively demilitarized confederation – in which, for the time being at least,

existing political and economic institutions would remain intact. They accept, for example, the continuance in the south of capitalism and of foreign investment. They do not call, and never have called, for the subjugation of the south to their system, though that has often enough been represented to be their position.

The regime in the south, however, is passionately anti-communist. The Vice-speaker of the National Assembly, Koh Heung Moon, went so far as to describe anti-communism as the basic policy of the state. That, I think it is also fair to say, was Park Chung Hee's view too, and is now the view of General Chun Du Hwan. The north's confederation proposal was generally dismissed in official circles in Seoul as unrealistic, but of course it could not but be dismissed if anti-communism is to be maintained as the basic policy of state.


What, then, is the south's strategy on unification? At the talks that have been going on at Panmunjom since early 1980, the south has insisted on the need to 'create trust', a process which, it is implied, will be gradual and will involve sporting or journalistic or postal or commercial exchanges, and some help for separated families. When trust has been restored through the gradual working of humanitarian, economic, and cultural exchanges, a second phase of 'establishing peace', that is dealing with military matters, will follow, and only then will the third stage, the question of unification, or the political matters, be reached.

The north, in reply, says that the problems of reunification cannot be treated as a mathematical problem in which stage one will lead to stage two and then to stage three, but a complex social and political problem, and that cultural, postal and other exchanges cannot in practice be dealt with without at the same time modification of existing military and political structures. To resolve humanitarian matters, a co-ordinating body is necessary and that, according to a spokesman in Pyongyang for the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland, is precisely what they propose.

At root, it is the fundamental anti-communist rationale of the southern regime, in its various ramifications, that is the main stumbling block to progress. So long as the Anti-Communist Law exists in the south, families seeking contact with missing members in the north – even sending letters, let alone attempting to visit them – are in breach of this fundamental law. The north's 1972 proposal – free all Koreans to visit their home villages within a specified time – was breathtakingly radical in its simplicity, but impossible for a southern regime based on anti-communism to consider.

The principle orientation of all southern regimes has, of course, always been towards Washington and Tokyo, and it seems at least plausible that their expressions of commitment to reunification are pre-emptive, arising from the attempt to deny this powerful mobilizing issue to the opposition rather than from any serious desire to accomplish or advance unification.

International competitiveness is weakening, and would certainly be drastically undermined if democratic and trade union rights were accorded to the huge new proletariat fathered by Park's industrialization policies. For a system built on repression there is no easy transition to democracy.



The South Builds a Wall

One striking pointer to this being the case is the fact, so far virtually unreported in the West, of the south's construction of a massive Berlin-type wall, which clearly seems designed to mark a permanent division of the country. This is a wall 240 kilometres in length, completed across the entire country in October 1979, with the sole exception of the Joint Security Area near Panmunjom, presumably because it is to this area alone that Western visitors have regular access. The 'wall' is a reinforced concrete structure parallel to and between 200 and 300 metres south of the Demilitarized Line, that is, well within the DMZ. It is five to seven metres high, ten to twelve metres wide at the base and five to six metres wide at the top, with guard posts and machine gun emplacements every 150 to 200 metres apart. A military supply road runs parallel and just to the south of the wall, and iron grill gates have been built into it at strategic points to allow passage of tank traffic. The wall appears to be a clear infringement of the Armistice agreement, and it is difficult to reconcile with any southern commitment to advance the cause of unification.

It is also the case that politically the southern regime needs division. Under the Park Chung Hee regime it could justify itself, and justify repressions and the denial of democracy, on two grounds: successful economic performance and the exigencies of defence against imminent threat from the north. The first ground was real, though its impact on the lives of many people was very mixed and very uneven. In 1979-80, however, the 'economic miracle' has gone: GNP growth may reach four per cent in 1980, after 15 years at consistently better than ten; the national debt is soaring towards a probable annual total of \$23 billion; deficits on trade have risen constantly and will probably hit \$6 billion in 1980; inflation is rampant and unemployment at an official figure of about six per cent; international competitiveness is weakening, and would certainly be drastically undermined if democratic and trade union rights were accorded to the huge new proletariat fathered by Park's industrialization policies. For a system built on repression there is no easy transition to democracy.

So the second ground is doubly important. The northern danger must serve as justification for the regime and for its denial of democratic rights. For this regime, a reduction in tension would be a *threat*. The current talks at Panmunjom are necessary, since public feeling on the issue remains strong, but they must not be allowed to get anywhere.

Spies, Tunnels and Incidents

In this context, it is necessary to reflect on the 'incidents' which regularly occur between the north and the south. Of course, it may be that the north does dig

tunnels under the DMZ, and send spies and infiltrators across it by land and by sea, the circumstances of division and military confrontation must tempt both sides to espionage or sabotage, but simple application of the *cui bono* principle suggests the need to scrutinize every such incident with great care. Even on the occasion of the abduction of opposition leader Kim Dae Jung from his Tokyo hotel room by South Korean CIA agents in 1973, the attempt to implicate the north was made by leaving northern cigarette packets at the scene. 'Connections with the north', has been used so often as an excuse for the crushing of opposition, even against such patently innocent victims as the Catholic poet Kim Chi Ha, that the charges emanating from the southern regime become less and less credible.

In 1979-80, 'incidents' with the north increased as the political crisis in the south deepened. Between 23 and 27 March three 'incidents' occurred: three armed 'northern infiltrators' were shot and killed in the Han River estuary 20 kilometres northwest of Seoul on 23 May; a northern 'espionage boat' was sunk off Pohang on 25 March; and three 'northern infiltrators' across the DMZ were killed in the central section of the DMZ on 27 March. The incidents served to delay and distract the 'Working Level' North-South contacts towards arranging a Premiers' meeting, which had been taking place at Panmunjom since 6 February, and to justify, on security grounds, restraint on the burgeoning mass movement in the south for democracy. On 12 May, as the mass movement for democracy began to spill from the campuses of universities into the streets, an emergency cabinet meeting in Seoul invoked the threat of 'guerilla infiltration from the north' and the 'movement' of northern armed forces to justify the despatch of tanks and troops to occupy public buildings and universities and newspaper offices; on 17 May Martial Law was extended throughout the country and the Kwangju uprising began. On 18 May the Martial Law command issued a statement claiming that the northern threat necessitated the new repression. As if to demonstrate precisely that point, on June 21 another naval clash took place in the Yellow Sea about 100 kilometres south of Seoul. A 'northern spy ship' was sunk after a 12-hour chase by fighter planes and patrol boats from the south.

The truth of all these incidents may now not be known for a long time, but their effect is clear: reinforcement of the military regime in the south and justification for its delaying tactics in the Panmunjom talks. Since Seoul has always parried the call for democracy with the appeal to the 'threat from the north', and since it is known, on occasions like the Kim Dae Jung abduction affair, to have tried to place the blame on the north for something for which it, the south, bore full responsibility, there would seem to be good reason to treat with considerable doubt the incidents alleged to have occurred between March and June 1980. It is of interest to note that on 13 May the US Defence Department said that

Japanese government both issued statements to the effect that there was no indication of any unusual military movement in the north, thus directly contradicting the charge made by Seoul the previous day.

If the Kwangju uprising is the watershed that marks the switch from attempt at peaceful political change in the south to armed struggle — which at this stage seems distinctly possible — then North Korea faces a clear and dangerous dilemma. Those who commit themselves to armed struggle in the south will be bound, sooner or later, to rethink the question of relations with the north, and the north will not find it easy to stand by as a spectator if armed rebellion spreads in the south. By the same token, as the political base of the southern regime shrinks, the pressures within it to crank up the threat of 'invasion from the north' will be intensified. Who can be sure that the next incident on the DMZ will not be a much bigger one, much more difficult to contain? And with electoral uncertainty deepening in Washington another 'Mayaguez' or 'Poplar Tree' incident, providing an occasion to demonstrate toughness against communist 'aggression' *some-where* in the world, might not seem such a bad idea.

After 27 years, the Armistice remains a brittle and temporary artifice. Pyongyang would certainly like to move beyond it, to establish a permanent peace treaty with the United States and to get down to serious discussion about the reunification issue with the south. It has built too much in past decades to want to risk it in war. But, for the military regime in the south, anti-communism is a vital last card, which clearly it intends to play and play and play again. It is a dangerous conjuncture.

The Song of July

*I wish that I might return
To the native place, to my native place,
When Spring would come in March
and azalea blossoms in red.*


*Night after night
I look up at the blue starry sky
And only gaze at the Bear in the north.*

*But April, when cuckoos sang mournful songs,
And May, when blue irises were blooming,
Both passed by like the waves of weary dreams.*


*When June came round in the field
With fragrance of yellow wheat and barley.
The hope for returning home was once kindled.*

*Now
July has come when wayfarers pay customary visits
Carrying old hens fastened with strings,
Yet are the ways to the native place, to my native place,
Blocked right across,
And completely shut up forever?*

From a poem written at the time of
the Korean War
by Myong-mun Yang



Letter Picture "Chung" or Loyalty,
latter half of 19th C.



Letter Picture "Hyo" or Filial Piety
19th C.



Letter Picture "Yeom" or Honour
19th C.

Korea 1980 — Kwangju: Kim Dae Jung : an analysis

Rev. R.F. Wootton

Rev. R.F. Wootton has lived in south Korea and visited the country many times. His work is with the division of Justice and Human Development of the Uniting Church of Australia.

This paper, 'Korea 1980, Kwangju, Kim Dae Jung: An Analysis' was presented to the *Second National Korean Studies Conference* at La Trobe University in November 1980.

1979 was a year in which the popular movement against Park Chung-hee's dictatorship grew by leaps and bounds. Park was assassinated on October 26, 1979, not by a radical student or a North Korean spy, but by Kim Jae-kyu, director of the KCIA. This fact is highly significant. Kim Jae-kyu killed Park on returning to Seoul from an inspection of what had happened in Pusan and Masan.¹ It would seem that Kim was less than happy with being in a position of responsibility to have to order a massacre to save Park, should such a situation break out in Seoul as many people were expecting. In his trial Kim claimed that he had acted out of a sense of patriotism and because he sympathised with the people's desire for democracy as opposed to a dictatorship.

Most people were still basically optimistic, feeling that 'the historical significance of the October 26 assassination' would make democratisation inevitable.

Chun's Move for Power

Then on December 12, 1979, came the start of what people most feared, with a coup d'état inside the military led by Chun Doo-hwan and other generals fanatically loyal to President Park and his Yushin legacy. These generals were afraid that martial law commander Chung Sung-hwa and other top generals were going to softly allow the growing demand for a return to democracy to lead to the military's being driven out of politics and the Park era to be drastically re-evaluated in a public manner. Thus they simply eliminated those generals from the scene. Chun was only a two-star general at the time of the coup, but he had been commander of the powerful Defence Security Council since March 5, 1979. This intelligence network within the military is comparable to the KCIA in civilian society in terms of

its internal political vigilance over the armed forces.

What happened between December 12 and May 17 was a process of Chun consolidating power behind the scenes in preparation for a total takeover, while the democratic movement tried to re-invigorate public opinion about what was really happening behind the smokescreen of Choi Kyu-hah's 'caretaker government' and its rhetoric about 'political development'. But time, Choi's government, the army, martial law, press censorship, and the US were all on Chun's side, and proved too great a match for the democratic movement with its limited resources and the limitations placed on it. First of all, no mention of the December 12 coup ever appeared anywhere in the Korean press. And Time, Newsweek, and all the other Western publications that reported the incident along with Chun's picture, arrived as always with the pages about Korea deleted. Many people therefore, didn't even know who Chun Doo-hwan was, although most people did know that something had happened on December 12, since there had been open battle in downtown Seoul on that evening. After December 12, the editorial dialogue in the newspapers was cooled down a little, as the word 'Yushin' was forbidden to be used in the mass media by the martial law censors. Under martial law, all publications and statements of any sort were supposed to be submitted to the martial law authorities for censorship, with failure to do so meaning arrest and trial in a military court. Also, all indoor and outdoor gatherings of any kind were forbidden without prior permission from the martial law authorities, effectively thwarting attempts to make open political organisations. But along with the erosion of these basic rights by martial law, Choi's government made a number of highly visible, but superficial (and easily reversible)

moves to make the public optimistic about the intentions of his government: the lifting of emergency decree no. 9, the release of selected prisoners, reinstatement of expelled students, return of civil rights to various well-known ex-prisoners, a liberalisation of campuses, etc. But to 'reinstate' these people without giving them free access to the mass media, the right to publish or to organise themselves politically, was 'like taking a starving person into a banquet room only to be chained to one of the walls out of reach of the food.'

Over these months, the government very effectively managed to create an illusory sense of optimism amongst the majority of people, while using martial law only 'surgically' to make sure that no real changes took place.

During this entire period, the US was completely aware of Chun Doo-hwan and his activities, and it is ridiculous to think that they did not know (and probably even advocated) what he was planning to do.

A Warning to Students

By the time large numbers of people were becoming informed about Chun Doo-hwan and what he was up to, he felt strong enough to come out into the public eye and start taking control openly. On April 14, 1980, President Choi Kyu-hah issued a harsh warning to students that they were 'undermining national solidarity' by following a course of 'rejection and confrontation with no efforts to solve issues through dialogue and co-operation'. This was a bombshell to students, who were all too acutely aware that it was martial law and the restrictions it continued to impose, which made 'dialogue and

1. Major cities in S. Kyongsang Province. Industrial unrest had sparked off worker demonstrations, generally reported as 'spontaneous'.

co-operation' impossible. Presidential Spokesman Suh Ki-won expanded upon Choi's statement by saying, 'The presidential statement is aimed at requesting students' self-reflections and self-restraints before the possible intervention of police or other law-enforcement authorities'. And to make what all of this meant perfectly clear, Chun Doo-hwan was appointed acting director of the KCIA on the same day, leaving him in a position of primary influence over the two most powerful organisations in the country, the KCIA and the army.

Students and the democratic movement realised acutely at this point that Chun was intent on taking over everything, and that he would stand in the way of democratisation to the bitter end. Three days after Chun's appointment, 2000 students rallied at Seoul National University calling for the lifting of martial law and Chun's resignation from all posts. Other universities throughout the country followed. On April 24, 361 professors issued a joint statement in favour of the students' moves for democratisation. Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung both began to speak more strongly and urgently about the manoeuvres of the anti-democratic forces. Then on April 29, Chun held a news conference in which he said, 'It must be understood that the mission of my organisation (the KCIA) is to help promote political development by ensuring social stability and defending the nation and eliminating elements hampering political development'.

It is important to note that by this point in time most intellectuals could see that Chun was manoeuvring decisively towards a total and public takeover and that a confrontation was inevitable. But Chun's strategy from this point was to move quickly and firmly, taking advantage of the limitations placed on the democratic movement by martial law, which made it practically impossible to inform or educate the general public in time to stop his takeover.

A Showdown for the Democratic Movement

On April 30, a special meeting of martial law district commanders was chaired by martial law commander Lee Hui-sung, to prepare for a showdown between Chun and the demo-

At Seoul National University more than 12,000 students (nearly the whole student body) held a peaceful 'Assembly for Democratisation' in which they issued a 'stern warning to the reactionary forces of the present transitional government striving to maintain the Yushin system' and block democratisation 'using national security logic as a means of deceit'.

students' and politicians' groundless slander of the government is worsening social disorder and increasing the danger of North Korean miscalculation'. The meeting resolved to 'take decisive measures from the standpoint of national security if the current lawlessness continues'. By this point it was more than obvious that Chun Doo-hwan himself was the primary cause of social disorder and the greatest threat to national security.

Two days later, at least 16 universities held rallies to protest the manoeuvring of the government and the military. At Seoul National University more than 12,000 students (nearly the whole student body) held a peaceful 'assembly for democratisation' in which they issued a 'stern warning to the reactionary forces of the present transitional government striving to maintain the Yushin system' and block democratisation 'using national security logic as a means of deceit'. At the same time they set an ultimatum date of May 14 for the lifting of martial law, after which they would take 'stronger action'. This was assumed to mean that they would give up peaceful on-campus activities and take to the streets to push for the lifting of martial law and Chun's withdrawal from the scene. Then on May 6, it was announced that Choi Kyu-hah would make a five-day state visit to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait beginning on May 11, leaving him out of the picture for a confrontation between Chun and students.

On May 12, two days after Choi had left for the Middle East, the army made signs that it was moving to attack the universities. The universities emptied almost immediately, and the army never showed up, but that night there was a 'coup-like incident' as more than a thousand tanks occupied the government office building section of downtown Seoul during the curfew hours. On the same day, there was a shooting incident at the DMZ caused by Chun's forces, but reported in the Korean newspapers as an 'infiltration

details or thorough description of the complicated events of this day have yet to be sufficiently reported with a sense of their inter-relationship).

On the next day students returned to their campuses, infuriated at the military's attempt to intimidate them. 26 campuses held large rallies and 2,000 students from Yonsei University broke on to the streets and marched to downtown Seoul where they clashed with riot police.

Peaceful Protest Meets Police Violence

'On the next day, May 14, more than 80,000 students took to the streets nationwide, chanting 'Lift Martial Law' and 'Chun Doo-hwan Resign'. Downtown Seoul was almost totally occupied by more than 50,000 students who marched around peacefully in the rain singing and chanting, while being bombarded with tear gas and pepper fog, as helicopters circled overhead.

On the 15th, more than 100,000 students in Seoul and nearly 200,000 nationwide (amounting to about two-thirds of all college students) demonstrated again for the withdrawal of martial law and the resignation of Chun Doo-hwan. All major cities came to a virtual standstill on this day. In Kwangju, where about 35,000 students demonstrated, there was no attempt at all to harm the demonstrators as police co-operated with the students to keep the peaceful actions peaceful. But Seoul became a cloud of tear gas, as the police were quite brutal in trying to keep the students from marching on the Capital Building. On that night students called off the demonstration, emphasising that their show of strength was meant as pressure on the government and that they did not want to inconvenience people or cause unnecessary disorder. They called upon the government to respond to their demands.

And on May 16, the 19th anniversary of Park Chung-hee's coup d'état, a powerfully symbolic day

quiet. As it turned out, it was a mistake for the students to make a show of restraint and to expect a reasonable response from the government.

On May 17th came Chun's response. The army invaded Ewha University, where the student body presidents from most of the country's 85 colleges and universities were having a meeting. They beat and arrested most of the student leaders, causing a sense of terror, as tanks and armed troops occupied the whole university. Martial law was expanded, every university closed

and was occupied by tanks, armoured cars, and armed soldiers, and thousands of people arrested, including students, professors, journalists, writers, ministers, priests, and prominent politicians like Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil (president of the 'ruling' DRP). Kim Young-sam was placed under house arrest (and later complained that his not being arrested was an attempt to discredit him).

A sense of terror spread across the country as tens of thousands of troops moved into Seoul and other major cities. They occupied radio and television stations, political head-

quarters, newspapers, the National Assembly, etc., giving downtown areas the sense of being military bases. The vigilance that began was incredible, as almost all pedestrians had their ID cards checked and bags searched, for weeks in some places and going on for months in other places. So absolute was the army's sudden presence that any reaction at all seemed impossible. Nevertheless, students in Kwangju managed to gather and continue demonstrating. Local troops used tear gas on them, but were reluctant to use stronger weapons as their numbers continued to grow. From Chun's perspective (in Seoul), the Kwangju demonstration, at this point involving about 5000 protestors, was the last point of resistance, and it had to be crushed. He ordered paratroopers into Kwangju to *crush the resistance completely*. What resulted was a massacre, as paratroopers stabbed, beat, and shot people for two days. But instead of being crushed, the resistance grew and grew, as everybody began to show totally open support for the students and infuriation at the brutality of the paratroopers trying to enforce Chun's powergrab. On suc-

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cessive days the crowds grew larger, 30,000 on the 19th, 100,000 on the 20th, and between 250,000 and 400,000 on the 21st, driving the army completely out of the city. The whole country watched in expectation as the resistance began to spread throughout Cholla Province. The army maintained a hawk-like vigilance in other major cities, especially Seoul, and it was impossible for even three or four people to stand together in the street without drawing a soldier to check what they were doing. But the general feeling was that the resistance would inevitably spread and that Chun's scheme was done for.

US Takes Sides: Supports Chun

Chun was thus faced with a situation he could hardly have anticipated, and the US put in the uncomfortable position of having to take sides openly, something it had successfully avoided doing in an obvious public manner for several decades. At first, the US maintained its traditional distance, articulating its presence only as a 'security commitment', while sending an aircraft carrier and some AWAC planes to the seas near Korea and issuing a warning to North Korea not to try to take advantage of the situation. The majority of South Korean people, at this point, still had high hopes in the US, that it would use its influence on the side of the democratic forces, encouraging Chun to give up in favour of continuing democratisation, and so prevent a bloodbath or a devastating civil war. But the US continued to tread lightly. The State Department issued a statement saying, 'We urge all parties involved to exercise maximum restraint and undertake a dialogue in search of a peaceful settlement'. But the US turned down a request to intervene and mediate a peaceful solution to the problem, saying that it was inappropriate for a foreign power to become involved in the conflict.

Meanwhile, the Western press was hardly describing the resistance by the 700,000 people of Kwangju and

vince with the kinds of glowing adjectives like 'Brave', 'Courageous', or 'Magnificent' that it showered on striking Polish workers several months later. Rather, in Korea, the Western press makes an effort to remain 'objective', taking up the government's terminology like 'riot', 'violent mob', and 'armed radicals'. Nor did the Western press point out, as it did so explicitly with Poland, that the government kept all mention of the Kwangju resistance out of the mass media until well after the government's troops had been driven completely out of the city, and the cut-off of all travel and communication links with the city was driving people to listen to North Korean broadcasts to find out what was happening.

The US State Department said further, on May 22nd, '*Continued unrest and an escalation of the violence would risk dangerous miscalculations by external forces. When calm has been restored we will urge all parties to seek means to resume a program of political development as outlined by President Choi Kyu-hah.*' But considered in the context of what had already happened, and especially in view of what happened in the following months, this amounted to a call for surrender to those resisting Chun's takeover. Then a bombshell announcement on the same day by the Defence Department, indeed made it clear that such was the message exactly. Defence Department spokesman Thomas Ross told reporters in Washington, '*The South Koreans have asked General John Wickham, the US commander in Korea, to release some Korean units from his control (for 'riot control'). We have agreed to do it.*' In other words, Wickham had openly

and officially given Chun the troops necessary to put Kwangju and Cholla Province back under the control of martial law, and in so doing, gave him a decisive show of US support for his takeover.

'Shock' is an insufficient word to describe the reaction when people read these words in black and white in the newspaper. And 'anti-Americanism' is a simplistic label for the emotions that have been generated out of that shock, the intense feeling of having been deceived and betrayed by somebody you trusted and had high hopes in. But anyway, the tide was turned.

Boistered and encouraged by the US's support, Chun continued his march forward. On May 24th, Kim Jae-kyu and four others, who had become popular heroes for having assassinated Park, were executed by hanging. Then as the US continued to issue strong warnings to North Korea not to get any ideas about interfering, Chun's forces moved back to Kwangju in the early morning hours of May 27th and proceeded in the following days to crush all resistance throughout the Cholla Province. Having achieved military control of the whole country, Chun then began to purge the whole society of potential future sources of resistance. The US went back to making its empty, meaningless urgings. The State Department said, '*We regret that the situation reached the point it did. Now that relative calm is returning, we believe it is most important that underlying issues be addressed in a spirit of reconciliation by all elements in Korean society.*'

But such rhetoric, in the absence of any decisive action, served only to make popular mistrust of the US even stronger, after Wickham had thrown his weight behind Chun when it really counted.

On May 31st, Chun set up a 'Special Committee for National Security Measures' to act as a shadow government and to clear away all obstacles to his becoming president. Then came a parade of shows of sup-

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port for Chun from the US. On June 5th, the US House of Representatives approved a \$251 million military aid package to Chun which included \$85 million for emergency ammunition stockpiling and \$1,490,000 for international military education and training. This sparked a flock of economic shows of support. John Moore, head of the official US government Export-Import Bank, which uses US tax money to finance loans for exports by US corporations, led a special 18-member trade mission to Seoul.

Then came the biggest delegation ever, 67 members, to participate in a meeting of the US Korea Economic Council on June 9th, led by John Voss, Chairman of Caltex Oil, one of several US oil companies that control South Korea's petroleum industry. Then in late June, the World Bank's International Economic Consultative Organisation for Korea, with heavy US participation, agreed to lend South Korea \$8 billion a year for the next six years.

Whatever happened to the idea that 'underlying issues' would be 'addressed in a spirit of reconciliation by all elements in Korean society' was anybody's guess. The initial shock at US support for Chun was gradually replaced by a feeling of disbelief, then by anger and a sense of desperation.

'Purification Drive' Purges Pro-Democratic People

General Wickham and Ambassador William Gleysteen quietly left for the US, and remained there while Chun carried out his 'purification campaign' through the 'Special Committee for National Security Measures'. Tens of thousands of government officials, reporters, newspaper editors, broadcasters, professors, students, university presidents, businessmen, politicians, teachers, lawyers, writers, singers, religious leaders, labor leaders, and even TV stars were 'purified' out of their positions in society to clear the way for Chun.

Included in the 'purification drive' were not only pro-democratic people, but also well-known pockets of corruption which had been a major issue of the democratic movement. Chun took up other issues of the democratic movement and even a large selection of its vocabulary for his 'purification campaign' and the founding of a 'new era'. Everybody has been called upon to build a first

There are other things which may backfire yet. The lengthy indictment against Kim Dae-jung and other democratic figures, includes many, many quotes of them talking about democracy, giving the impression that to talk about democracy is in itself considered evidence of anti-state activity.

society' and 'bright, new democratic welfare state' under the 'wise leadership' of the 'great new leader Chun Doo-hwan'. But such propaganda has made little difference in terms of winning support, as dictatorship itself it still widely perceived to be the inevitable breeder of corruption and other social ills. The central political issue is still democracy versus dictatorship, and there is little question about on which side of this issue Chun stands. Kim Dae-jung and 23 others were charged under martial law with having 'plotted and instigated to overthrow the government'. But it is clear even to those who support Chun Doo-hwan that he is the one that 'plotted and instigated' to suppress democracy. The only thing that the democratic movement did was to try and oppose *Chun's conspiracy*. Chun had already declared quite clearly that he would 'eliminate' all such people who 'hampered political development'. This included even the ordering of a massacre in Kwangju which nearly made his whole conspiracy backfire.

Kim Dae-Jung Sentenced

But there are other things which may backfire yet. The lengthy indictment against Kim Dae-jung and other democratic figures includes many, many quotes of them talking about democracy, giving the impression that to talk about democracy is in itself considered evidence of anti-state activity.

A careful reading of the indictment can only leave one with the strong impression that these people

are great heroes. The entire text of the indictment was published in every newspaper. Newsweek magazine characterised Kim Dae-jung by concluding that his only crime for which he has spent most of the last decade in prison, exile, or under house arrest, has been to have consistently advocated that the Korean people should have the right to freely choose who will rule them.

For such a 'radical' position, Kim has been sentenced to death. But Chun has organised a great show of support for his campaign, with huge rallies using civil servants and the employees of large companies. These gatherings of tens of thousands of people throughout the country in gymnasiums and sports stadiums (even in Kwangju), might have been characterised as 'fascist', if it were not for the fact that people chanted Chun's slogans and raised their arms up in Nazi-style, with something less than enthusiasm. But no aspect or institution of society went untouched. 172 magazines and periodicals were closed down, the university enrolment system dramatically changed (with the hidden aim of suppressing future student activities), and huge corporations, businesses, and government bodies completely restructured. 'Purification Committees' were set up throughout the country, in every business, at every school, and even on a neighbourhood level. The membership of most of these committees is kept secret. In elementary schools, for example, one in every five children is secretly designated to keep watch over the other children. If Chun could never hope to win the voluntary support of the people, he has certainly learned

'Purification Committees' were set up throughout the country, in every business, at every school, and even on a neighbourhood level. The membership of most of these committees is kept secret. In elementary schools, for example, one in every five children is secretly designated to keep watch over the other children. If Chun could never hope to win the voluntary support of the people, he has certainly learned enough from his experience with intelligence agencies to know how to create a totally pervasive network to keep vigilance, intimidate and sew mistrust and fear amongst them.



"We oppose military rule" — the citizens of Kwangju demonstrate on a main street.

But in the same interview, Wickham revealed that the US had supported Chun since at least January, when they thwarted an attempted ousting of Chun by pro-democratic generals. This made it clear that the US's support of Chun from early on, made it oblivious to what the Korean people really wanted all along.

On August 16, Choi Kyu-hah resigned as president. Chun retired from the army and on August 27th he was 'elected' to replace Choi in accordance with the Yushin Constitution. The next day Ambassador William Gleysteen returned to Seoul 'from his summer vacation' and attended Chun's inauguration on September 1st. The South Korean 'crisis' had been solved and the transition from Park to the 'new era' of Chun was complete.

Most of the popular potential leaders of Korea are in prison, and the most bitterly hated person in the country is now its president. No amount of propaganda will change people's perception of this situation, and no amount of oppression will wipe-out resistance to it or bring about 'stability' while it continues.

enough from his experience with intelligence agencies to know how to create a totally pervasive network to keep vigilance, intimidate and sew mistrust and fear amongst them.

In early August, General Wickham returned from Washington and proceeded to give an interview that was plastered over the front pages of every newspaper in Korea with Chun's picture (wearing civilian clothes). The AP dispatch began, 'A top US military official claims that the US is willing to support South Korean strongman General Chun Doo-hwan if he consolidates his already near total power by taking over the presidency.' He further said that 'relations have recently improved and there is no strong 'anti-American' feeling among Chun's inner circle'. Wickham qualified the support by saying, 'Provided he demonstrates over time a broad base of support from the Korean people, and does not jeopardise the security of the situation here, we will support him because that, of course, is what we think the Korean people want.'



The trial of Kim Dae Jung has alerted world opinion to events in the ROK. These Australian protesters took part in a 'mock trial' in November at the National Korean Studies Conference. Photo — Robin Osborne/RAPPORT

Korea: ACFOA policy

In May, 1980, following the uprising of Korean students and citizens in Kwangju, the ACFOA executive passed these resolutions.

1. The ACFOA Executive expresses deep concern at recent actions of the Martial Law Command in South Korea, particularly the arrest of politicians, students, writers and churchmen, the prohibition of all forms of political activity, and the closure of colleges and universities.
2. The Executive asks the ACFOA Secretariat to urge the Australian government to:
 - (a) Express concern at the suspension of democratic processes in South Korea.
 - (b) Urge the cessation of military action against civilian demonstrators.
 - (c) Urge that the human rights of political detainees be respected.
3. The ACFOA Executive urges the government of South Korea to treat the people of Kwangju, whose protest was recently put down by the military, justly and moderately, with due consideration of their grievances.
4. The ACFOA Executive urges member agencies to inform their membership of the situation in Korea and to promote a greater awareness of Korean matters among the Australian community.

A press release was issued on May 30

The Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) today expressed concern at recent developments in the Republic of Korea (South Korea), particularly the ruthless repression of political activity in the southern provincial capital of Kwangju and the wholesale arrest of politicians, students, writers and churchmen by the Martial Law Command.

ACFOA is the national coordinating body for some 33 major voluntary agencies operating in the field of overseas aid and development.

Speaking following a meeting of the National Executive in Melbourne, the Council Chairman, Mr Richard

Alston, said today, 'Australia's overseas aid agencies are greatly troubled by the rapid deterioration of events in South Korea of recent days. The prospect of any movement towards democracy in the post-Park era has been shattered and it is clear that any gains made in recent years by the rapid industrialisation process have been practically overwhelmed by the gross denial of human rights and the steadfast refusal to meet the social, cultural and political needs of the majority of the population.'

ACFOA calls on the Australian Government to express concern to the Martial Law authorities at the suppression of the democratic process in South Korea and to urge speedy recognition of basic economic, social and political needs of the total community. In the event of significant movements towards normalisation Australian Aid Agencies would be more than willing to be involved in genuine development programs.

At the annual Council meeting in September 1980 ACFOA members commended the Minister for Foreign Affairs (then Mr Peacock) for his intervention on behalf of Korean opposition politician Kim Dae Jung. Council urged that the Australian government make a strong and continuing expression of concern for the restoration of democratic rights in South Korea.

In response to ACFOA's motion, the present Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote to the Executive Director:

The Government is aware that many people are concerned about developments in the Republic of Korea (ROK). The Government shares that concern. This is not only a part of the Government's fundamental policy in relation to human rights, but also derives from extensive contact with Koreans.

Our concern about the human rights situation in the ROK is reflected in the firm stand which has been taken on the case of Mr Kim Dae Jung. The Government's position concerning Mr Kim remains as set out in Mr Peacock's statement of 17 September. Since then the strength of the Government's concern about the death sentence imposed on Mr Kim has been conveyed to the Government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) on a number of occasions, both in Seoul and through the ROK Embassy in Canberra. Our Ambassador in Seoul has expressed this concern to President Chun (on 16 October) and to Prime Minister Nam (on 12 November) . . .

Poems of Kwangju

'Kwangju really hit us all, everywhere'

letter from a poet in the Philippines

KWANGJU, CROSS OF OUR NATION

*O Kwangju, and Mudung Mountain.
Between death and more death,
City of our eternal youth, flowing
with blood and tears!*

*Our father: Where has he gone?
Mother: Where has she fallen?
Our sons:*

*Where were they killed and buried?
And our lovely daughters:
Where are they lying, mouths agape?
Where were our spirits
torn apart, ripped to shreds?*

*Kwangju, by the flocks of birds
and by God as well
abandoned: City of our bloody wounds,
where the truly human
beings still abide, dawn to dark
thrown down, beaten, and yet rising again.
In death refusing
and through death seeking life,
Province of Lamentation! Phoenix!*

*Though the sea winds tumble down headlong,
and all the other mountains of this age
tower up in a sham,
no one can rip,
no one can steal
this banner, Freedom's,
banner of humanity,
with flesh and bone given life
at the core.*

*City of ours!
Our songs, our dreams, our love
at times mount up like great waves,
at times like an ancient tomb
collapse, and yet.*

*Kwangju! O, Kwangju!
Shouldering the cross of this nation,
he climbs over Mudung Mountain,
over Golgotha, the Son of Heaven,
on His body
the wounds,
the death.*

*Truly we have died.
We who cannot love this land,
who cannot love our children
have died.
Truly we have died.*

*Those who have survived
hang their heads in guilt.
Those who have survived
have all lost their souls.
To face a bowl of rice
is too difficult, too frightening
to do.*

*I died, my love, waiting
for you, waiting outside the
gate for you . . .*

*Why was it my life they robbed?
It was our lot to live
in a rented room, but how much gladness we knew!
How I wanted to provide well for you!
O, my love!*

*And I, with this body bearing life
have now found death. My love,
forgive me. My love,
your child, yours . . .
O, my love, I have ended
by killing you.*

*O Kwangju! Mudung Mountain!
Piercing the very center of death
and emerging, city
of our eternal youth, vibrant
with the fluttering white cotton sleeves!*

*Phoenix
that you are
Phoenix!
PHOENIX!*

*O Kwangju! O Mudung Mountain!
Our eternal banner,
dream,
and cross.
Even as life flows on,
City of Youth
may you be ever younger.
For now we are sure,
gathering together. Hands joined
in sure affirmation,
we have risen.*

KIM CHUNTAE
(Translated by David R. McCann)

Kim Chunt'ae taught until recently at Chunnam High School. This poem was printed on one of the many broad-sheets which appeared in Kwangju during the uprising. The poet's present whereabouts are not known.

KWANGJU

*Quiet lies
Kwangju, silenced*

*The soldiers
have cut off*

*The tongues
of Kwangju*

*No tongue lashes
out any longer*

*On the boulevards
of Kwangju*

*Quiet lies
Kwangju, silenced*

*The severed
Tongues*

Are gathered up

*Put together
like a lump of rock*

*Quiet lies
Kwangju, silenced*

*Dumb has Kwangju
become*

*Protests can
no longer issue*

*From the tongues
severed*

Of Kwangju

*Like a rock
have become*

*The gathered
severed tongues*

Of Kwangju

*A single rock
yes, a rock*

*That one
may pick up*

*And hurl
yes, hurl*

*Upon the crystal
peacefulness*

Of martial law.

ALFREDO NAVARRO SALANGA
(Translated from Filipino by E. B. Maranan)



A PAGE FROM A KWANGJU DIARY

*Kim Chi Ha, a thousand
Lashes back, spoke for us
Describing Cholla's
Yellow soil as rich
and catacomb of martyrs.*

I saw not

*The first Flowers of April
But know about the blight
Of Ariran Hill*

Wept and sung in our legends.

It is May.

*Comrades and I have caused
To spring across this city
Two hundred thousand flowers
Looking fiercely at the wall
Of ignorance and armor
Strung, like a conscious
Plague laying siege,
Around our battlements.*

It is dawn

*Upon the people of Chosen,
We speak no longer to mere shadows,
We swarm much like fish
In the sea.*

*Our words are those spoken
By all youth who broadcast
Seeds*

Across a famined world.

It is dawn

Upon a planet of waiting buds.

*But wreaths, thornlaced,
Are being fashioned
Everywhere, by rueless
Guards and governments.*

EDGAR B. MARANAN
Philippines

KWANGJU STUDENTS – MAY 1980

*Even when you spoke so carefully
looking over your shoulder
there was a soft wildness in you,
children from country ways
from green villages of the south
there was always laughter in your voices.*


*Even when you studied so carefully
under the bare light bulbs
making notes and pleasing your teachers
good students of Kwangju,
you never belonged to the grey present;
there was always judgement in your eyes.*

*Why did you choose today
for the day of no returning?
After so many years of waiting
parents so proud in the villages,
your sisters saving so you'd get ahead,
how did you know this was the day to die?*

WENDY POUSSARD
Australia

The Sound from Underground

KIM CHI HA



After almost six years imprisonment, poet Kim Chi Ha was released from a Seoul gaol on December 11. His release was in the early hours of the winter morning, too early for crowds to gather or reporters to see him.

Kim Chi Ha, an eloquent and satirical critic of the Korean establishment was sentenced to death in 1974 for helping a student organisation which the government claimed was subversive. His sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment.

He was released the following year, but re-arrested after 27 days for writing a newspaper article critical of the government.

In the poetry and life of Kim Chi Ha, political and personal events become fused. Even his pen-name is an

expression of political commitment. 'Chi Ha' is ordinarily written with the two Chinese characters meaning *grass stream* but with two different characters having the same pronunciation it means *underground*.

The unexpected release of Kim Chi Ha together with the referendum on the constitution is expected to temper the brutal international image of Chun Doo Hwan's administration. Kim is suffering from chronic tuberculosis.

A new edition in English of Kim's poems 'The Middle Hour' has been translated by David McCann, and published in 1980 by the Human Rights Publishing Group, Stanfordville, New York. Kim, whose poetry is based on traditional Korean literary forms, is not an easy poet to translate, and this book makes his poetry much more accessible to English-speaking readers.

The Story of a Sound

(This extract from a longer poem tells the fate of Ando, a struggling worker. Eventually exasperated by the impossibility of making a living, he complains . . . and suffers dire consequences.)

*One evening as the sun was going down
he planted his two feet down on the ground,
rolled his eyes back in his head and yelled
'Agh! What a dog's life this is!'*

*No sooner were the words out of his mouth than
Clankety-clank, heavy handcuffs were snapped on his
wrists
and Ando was dragged straight off to court.
Bang, Bang, Bang . . .
'State the charge'.*

*'The crime, your honour, of standing on the ground with
his two feet
and spitting out groundless rumours.'*

'Oho! That's a big one!'

*'The defendant, by standing on the ground and spitting
out groundless
rumours, your honour is guilty of*

*the impertinent neglect of our national policies for
INCREASED PRODUCTION
OF GOODS FOR EXPORT WITHOUT A
MOMENTS REST;
opposition to the THREE NO's, the FIVE UN's, SEVEN
DON'T's and the NINE
ANTI-NEGATIVES;*

*the crime of thinking up GROUNDLESS RUMOURS that
would BEWITCH THE PEOPLE
and CONFUSE THE WORLD;
the intent to pronounce said rumours;
the pronouncing of same;
the intent to propagate said rumours;
the propagation of same;*

*the crime of INSUFFICIENT VENERATION FOR
THE FATHERLAND:
DENIGRATION OF THE MOTHER TONGUE:
comparing the fatherland to an animal;
the crime of making it possible for other countries to
conceive of our fatherland as an animal,
thereby and in conjunction with DISTURBING THE
ENVIRONMENT FOR CAPITAL
INVESTMENT;*

(Ando is found guilty of many other crimes too)

*in addition to which the defendant, for violating the
provisions of the special anti-anti-social manipulation
law, is hereby found guilty of all crimes as charged.*

*Therefore, in accordance with the law, it is the solemn
judgement of this court, that immediately upon
adjournment*

*one head be removed from the defendant
to prevent further thinking or pronouncing of such
groundless rumours;*

*two feet be cut off to forestall the
recurrence of inflammatory standing on the ground;
and to prevent the breeding of future
seditious types such as the defendant, that one
reproductive organ and two testicles be removed;*

*And finally and furthermore, whereas there is the clear
and present danger that defendant may resist, his two
hands are to be bound behind his back; he is to be
wrapped in one water-soaked leather straight-jacket;*

*and the opening of his throat is to be jammed shut with
a hard, thick, and long-lasting voice-blocking tool; after
which he is to be put in solitary confinement for five
hundred years'.*

Despite this treatment, Ando was not entirely silenced.
Although he had no voice, no tears, he succeeds in
slamming his body repeatedly at the wall of his cell.

K'ung.

K.ung, K'ung.

*There were those who couldn't sleep at all when they
heard that sound rising up,
people with money, the ones who could really
blow the wind right by. They sent out their strict orders
to have that fellow executed, and yet
K'ung.*

*It's a strange business, how that sound seems to drive
some people mad.*

K'ung, K'ung.

*You can hear it now, night and day, never
ceasing.*

*There are some who call it the work of a ghost;
others will tell you it is Ando, somewhere
still living,
and ceaselessly hurling himself against the walls.*

*They say this stealthily, whispering from ear to ear,
while a strange light flashes from their eyes.*



A Long Prepared Inheritance in the North

Philippe Pons
Le Monde

Contrary to his appearance in the few photographs of him that the West has, Kim Jong Il does not look particularly corpulent. He is short and, with his wavy hair and glasses, he gave, in addressing the Congress, more the appearance of an intellectual who is versed in theoretical matters. The Koreans say he is modest, but certain people who have met him have found him haughty. His seriousness and tight lips do not give his face that smiling bonhomie that characterizes his father Kim Il Sung. Nevertheless, the young Kim resembles his father in certain ways.

Studied in E. Germany

Born on February 16, 1941, somewhere in Siberia, Kim Jong Il is one of the sons from his father's first marriage. During his infancy, he was called by the Russian name, 'Yora'. During the Korean War (1950-1953), he was sent to China. Thence he moved to East Germany, where he studied at the Air Force Academy for two years. He graduated from Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang in 1963 and joined the Labor Party in the following year. Step by step, he began to be appointed to posts of importance. In the meantime, he had been his father's personal secretary.

After the seventh plenary session of the fifth central committee in September 1973, Kim Jong Il was appointed to the secretariat of the central committee. The central committee, which is headed by his father Kim Il Sung, is composed of 13 secretaries who are charged with coordinating the activities of various departments. Most observers of North Korean affairs believe that Kim Jong Il has become in recent years the de facto chief of the secretariat of the central committee. This has assured him of control over the party machine, and put him in a position to succeed his father one day.

The campaign to make Kim Jong Il known in the party began a little before 1973. In the 1972 edition of the dictionary of political termino-

Academy of Social Sciences, the definition of 'hereditary succession', which in the 1970 edition was described as a 'reactionary practice of the old exploitative system', was deleted.

Throughout the previous decade, that name and functions of Kim Jong Il had been little publicized in the party's official publications. The few times he was mentioned, he was given the epithet 'center of the party' — occasionally 'glorious center of the party' — an epithet that has appeared regularly since 1974. In 1973, Kim Jong Il was personally charged with, among other things, setting in motion the three principal revolutions (ideological, cultural and technological). One supposes that these three revolutions, whose objectives have not yet been clearly defined, are the tasks that Kim Jong Il can one day boast of accomplishing. The accomplishment of these three tasks will, like the struggle for independence that Kim Il Sung took charge of, give an ideological justification for the younger Kim's accession to power.

This has not been realised easily; without doubt, it met with resistance from some of Kim Il Sung's old comrades, who are for the most part around 70 years old, and who fought the Japanese in Manchuria.

Fierce power struggle

It seems that the campaign for Kim Jong Il met with a setback around 1976. Different explanations for this have been advanced. According to one, he instigated the incident at Panmunjom on August 21, 1976, in the course of which two Americans were killed by North Korean soldiers. According to another version, which does not necessarily exclude the above, a fierce power struggle took place within the party between the supporters of Kim Jong Il and his opponents; this was followed by purges. And, lastly, there were rumours that the heir apparent had been involved in a car accident. Nothing has come to light that would support these speculations. It seems likely nevertheless,

Kim Il Sung wanted his son to step back a little, if he was, as it was said, the instigator of the incident. This did not, however, mean that the 'great leader' had changed his intentions: at the end of 1976, a small booklet was distributed to the cadres of the party; it dealt with 'the immortal accomplishments of comrade leader Kim Il Sung' and referred to Kim Jong Il as 'the sole successor'.

In the early spring of 1979, the epithet 'center of the party' began to be used once again in official publications to refer to Kim Jong Il, which suggested that the campaign in his favour had begun again. At the same time, the North Koreans went out of their way to deny rumours that Kim Jong Il was in poor health to foreign visitors.

Does the promotion of Kim the younger signify that North Korea will change, or is it just a procedural matter that will not change what is convenient to call — as the Koreans themselves do — 'Kim Il Sung-ism'? The new generation of leaders in Pyongyang have three possibilities: to repudiate the past as Stalin's successors did; to continue to glorify the theses of 'the great leader' as the 'Marxism-Leninism of modern times', or to pay him lip service, while consigning him to the museum of history and emphasizing the necessity for change.



Views of The North



1 "When reduced to the simplest of terms, politics in North Korea has been observed as having degenerated into a thoroughly personalised family affair built up around a personality cult whose intensity is simply unprecedented in the history of mankind. Although built up in the name of 'socialism', and of 'communism', the North Korean regime of Kim Il Sung has now turned into a classic example of a religious dynasty, which is, in fact, fashioned more after the Yi Dynasty that ruled Korea for 500 years before the Japanese annexation of the peninsula in 1910 than it is after other Communist states."

*from a paper by Lee, Dong-bok
Director,
Office of South-North Dialogue/Spokesman
(Seoul Side),
South-North Coordinating Committee*

2 "Stock Western images of this country, concentrating almost exclusively (and very unsympathetically) on President Kim Il Sung, miss a great deal. For that, of course, the North Koreans are themselves very much to blame, for that is what they choose to present to the world, and they do it in a way most calculated to mystify and to arouse suspicions of mini-Stalinism.

True, the institutions of socialist democracy, if they exist, are well hidden; but not even the worst enemies of the system claim that the regime holds power by terror. Its performance in many areas is better than generally perceived outside the country."

Gavan McCormack
*extract from Letter from Pyongyang
Far Eastern Economic Review, August 15, 1980.*

3 "During our stay in north Korea we saw the cities of Pyongyang and Nampo and travelled through rural areas. We visited factories, a co-operative farm, educational institutions, health facilities, homes, stores, a children's camp, and attended cultural events. Our hosts were co-operative in arranging the great majority of the visits we requested. A few appointments they suggested and we declined. They declined to show us a re-education centre or take us to the CMZ, saying in regard to the latter they did not want to stress hostilities with the US.

We have conversations with officials, including Kim Young Nam, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers Party and a member of the Politburo, and Hyun Jun Gook, a Vice Chairman of the Korean Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and chief negotiator at the Panmunjon Working Level Talks preparing for the North/South Premiers' meeting. These conversations took 19 hours.

In addition, we held conversations with the Democratic Women's Union and the Socialist Working Youth League.

We extended an invitation to the Korean Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries for a return visit in the near future to the United States and our invitation was accepted. Our organisation had received assurances from the United States Department of State that suitable exchanges with north Koreans would be approved, indeed encouraged. To our knowledge there has been only one visit of a north Korean to the United States. He was a member of the International Olympic Committee and went to Lake Placid last winter. Approximately 100 Americans have visited North Korea.

In our visits to various institutions and enterprises in north Korea, we were impressed with north Korea's emphasis on free education and free health care for everyone, on self-reliance at all levels of the society, and on their use of appropriate technology.

There is much evidence that north Korean agriculture has become one of the most efficient and productive in the world. Japan and north Korea share the honor of the highest rice production per hectare world-wide. North Korea's average yield of corn per hectare rivals that of the United States. The country is food self-sufficient.


In the context of the world energy crisis, north Korea's industrial development, relying as it does on its own coal and hydroelectric resources, leaves it in a very favourable position.

The north Korean society invests substantial resources in services for its children. We saw very well equipped nurseries, kindergartens, and schools in both city and countryside. We were intrigued by seeing one of the recreational camps which each child has an opportunity to attend at least one week each year.

North Korea, however, does share some common problems with other societies. These include bureaucratic frustrations, some discrepancies between urban and rural life, and occasional individual anti-social behavior. While sympathetic to the country's need for strong leadership in order to mobilise for reconstruction after the devastation of the Korean war, the intensity of life and the emphasis on a single leader remain difficult for us as Americans to comprehend fully or to accept. In terms of human rights, north Korea is strong on economic and social rights, but the government appear to have little interest in freedom of press, religion or speech."

Report from American Friends Service Committee visit to North Korea, September 2-13, 1980.

Chun Doo Hwan's View



The Asian Wall Street Journal recently published excerpts from a most interesting interview with President Chun Doo Hwan. Mr Chun spoke with Norman Thorpe, Seoul correspondent of AWSJ and Tokyo correspondent Urban Lehner.

AWSJ: President Chun, what is the most difficult problem you face and how do you plan to deal with it?

CHUN: First of all, the most important thing is to defend this country. National security is at the top of the agenda. It is made difficult by the fact that the North Korean Communists continue to infiltrate armed agents.

Secondly, we have this economic problem of fighting inflation.

Thirdly, there is the political problem of honoring a political schedule. Legislation is necessary. You don't run a country just on a constitution. We have to have political parties, a presidential election and general election to choose representatives to form a National Assembly.

By the end of June next year we must have a new government. This is a promise I made to the people, and no matter how tight the schedule might be I am going to honor that commitment.

Those are the difficulties we face, but I am optimistic we will overcome them.

AWSJ: Why is your administration re-designing industrial and corporate structure and how far will the realignment go? What risks are being taken? What are your views about the role of businessmen and business?

CHUN: I can understand possible misgivings about this. When corporations are asked to get rid of their real estate which is serving no useful purpose, then you get this misgiving that what is happening here is a strongly state-controlled economy. That is not the case at all. I want to make it very clear that the fundamental and principal tenet under which this country operates is a free enterprise economy. It is to strengthen this free market economy that these measures are being taken. We have a number of (foreign) joint-invested firms in our country. I want to emphasise that foreign investors' interests will be completely and fully protected. There is no call for having any misgiving about this.

AWSJ: Recently, some foreign companies have been postponing investments in Korea or investing elsewhere. Are you planning any steps to make the foreign investment climate more attractive, or is this unnecessary?

CHUN: In the past when foreign companies wanted to invest in Korea there was too much red tape involved because the government wanted to regulate and control

them. My policy is to eliminate this red tape as much as possible and drastically simplify administrative procedures. I have made instructions to this effect and studies are being made to improve the investment climate.

In the past, foreigners weren't allowed a share over 50 per cent, but I am going to allow foreign investors' equity to go up to 100 per cent.

AWSJ: South Korea's economy is in its worst recession in more than two decades. When can recovery be expected, and why will things get better?

CHUN: According to analyses made by my economic and financial experts, we are hopeful that by the latter half of next year there will be a business recovery.

This belief is based on two factors. One is external. These experts believe that by the latter half of next year business will recover in the US and Japan, which are our major business partners.

Secondly, the social disorder after the assassination of our president was one of the major causes of slackening of business activity. The restoration of order and stability has a very salutary effect on stimulating business.

AWSJ: How do you view relations with the United States and with Japan and other Asian countries?

CHUN: First, let me comment on relations between Korea and the United States. There happily exists a traditional relationship of goodwill and friendship. This relationship must not be changed. It must grow stronger in the future. My view is that this relationship will continue and grow even stronger than before. President-elect Reagan and the Republican platform indicate there is great promise for what I have just said.

AWSJ: Under President Carter, Korean-American relations, while generally friendly, have been marked by a certain coolness that didn't exist in times past. President Carter at one point considered withdrawing large numbers of American troops from Korea. And in recent months there have been remarks by US officials that some South Koreans have interpreted as interference in internal Korean affairs. Do you expect this to change under President Reagan. What in the Republican platform that you alluded to makes this so optimistic?

CHUN: As I understand it, President Carter made an election campaign promise to withdraw troops from Korea. But after assuming office he made a judgment based on review of the situation. It is my understanding that he concluded that US troops are not here just for the sake of Korea, but for the US objective of global peace, and that US troops being here is consistent with the strategic interest of the US. Based on that decision he froze the withdrawal of US troops. I welcomed this.

As for Governor Reagan, it is my understanding that he has shown willingness to understand the position, environment and conditions under which American allies are striving to achieve common objectives. The objectives are the same but the environments are different depending on the threats of force which face us, the culture and the milieu. I respect, admire and support Mr Reagan's position. And of course I fully support his view that world peace is essential and that strength is necessary for peace.

The position taken by President-elect Reagan will tend to raise the morale of American allies. Confidence and trust in the US will improve around the world.

AWSJ: Diverse groups are pressuring you about Mr Kim Dae-Jung. The military want him executed. Liberals in Korea and abroad are asking you to spare him. Are you concerned about the overseas reaction?

CHUN: I realise the image of this case overseas is not the same as here. In the US, perhaps there is no clear-cut distinction between an ordinary offender of the law and a political offender.

I understand that Mr Kim is being tried for having violated a criminal code very seriously. He is charged with having attempted to overthrow the government and snatch political power by violence and, having failed, having caused the deaths of innocent people (in the Kwangju insurrection). It can be compared to a military attempt at a coup d'etat although he did not have armed soldiers with him.

As for the campaign to save Kim's life, you ought to know that there is a violent campaign going on in Japan. And predominant among the protestors are leftist leaning Communist sympathisers in Japan directly linked with the North Korean Residents' Association in Japan (Chosoren) which takes orders from none other than Kim Il Sung himself. Its front organisation is Hanmintong, which has the claimed objective of democratic reunification of Korea but which takes orders from North Korea.

Throughout the world wherever there is a North Korean mission or representative there is activity going on in connection with the Kim Dae-Jung affair. Pro-North Korean organisations are being used to full capacity. The North Koreans want to exploit this affair.

Among those people who write letters to senators and the White House are Korean residents in the US who are sympathetic with North Korea for one reason or another. Some of them write thousands apiece. There is an organised campaign.

I want to make one thing absolutely clear. There is absolutely no personal relationship between Mr Kim and myself. I have never been in politics. I never was his personal rival. There is not a personal vendetta. I bear him absolutely no personal ill will. I have no personal grudge. I have no emotion on this one way or other. People write stories suggesting that I am his political enemy. That relationship never existed.

AWSJ: During the Kwangju insurrection, plain, average people said repeatedly that they witnessed incidents of brutality by government paratroopers sent into the city. They said the students took up guns and the insurrection erupted as a reaction to these acts not because of something organised by any one person such as Kim Dae-Jung. Would you comment on the interpretation of these average Kwangju citizens?

CHUN: I know there are many stories about Kwangju. But if there is a riot in the US and you have to put down that riot, how could you do that without getting tough.

It was not a spontaneous happening coming from innocent motives. It is a fact that a 39-year-old university student receiving funds from Kim Dae-Jung was there and active at the time. Kim Dae-Jung supporters were there and active.

Demonstrations were forbidden under martial law which was in effect at the time. Stones and rocks can be lethal weapons, you know. The turmoil was a result of propaganda and psychological warfare aimed at provoking the regional animosities and ill feelings of people in that area.

Experienced investigators looked behind the scenes. There was clearly evidence of somebody directing and masterminding the operation. If, as you suppose, these were groups of innocent students throwing rocks, why should they hide their faces (with bandannas), why should they steal weapons, not just from one police box but from several?

It was a systematic insurrection that was directed. Why should they attack the prison? Obviously it was an attempt to free the prisoners. It was no secret that there were Communist prisoners in Kwangju prison. This was an obvious attempt to free these Communist agents. So these were not ordinary students.

The important thing to note is that the initial stage of the insurrection was directed by Kim Dae-Jung and his followers.

AWSJ: You are currently an interim president. Do you plan to run for president in this Spring's election? If so, will you promise to step down at the end of one term as the new constitution specifies?

CHUN: You ask whether I am going to run. I can't tell you for the simple reason that we do not have the laws governing the election, the National Assembly election, political parties and so on. There are no political parties at the moment. There is no political party to draft or sponsor me. It would be most inappropriate for me to make a comment on whether I am going to run.

As for the question of the term in office, yes, the seven years in office is a clear and unmistakable provision in the new constitution. Regardless of who is elected, he is bound to honor, defend and protect that constitution. The president may not serve more than seven years. I insist that is the most important provision in the constitution. It is the consensus of the people. It is the order coming from the people. If we respect that constitution, democracy will take root.

South Korea's New Constitution : the emperor's new clothes

Edward J. Baker

The news media's perception of South Korea's new constitution has been remarkably sanguine. A New York Times editorial, for instance, hoped that it may 'finally provide a measure of democracy and protect some fundamental human rights'. In the constitutional referendum of October 22, 1980 a reported 91.6 affirmative vote was cast by the voting 95.5 per cent of eligible voters.

This result has been naively interpreted in some media reports as an indication of widespread support for Chun and the new constitution.

However, the constitution must be considered in the context of present political events and structures. Moreover, the supplementary provisions of the constitution authorise the present government to effectively remove significant political opposition, and to control the formation of political parties.

This extract from an article by Edward J. Baker, argues that the 'democracy and human rights' of Chun's constitution, like the emperor's clothes in the fairy tale, exist only in the eyes of the beholders.

The constitutional provisions for a strong presidency, a weak National Assembly chosen from a pool from which all candidates displeasing to Chun's group are removed, and a powerless judiciary, along with the Supplementary Provision bode ill for the immediate future of democracy in South Korea. Even more ominous omens are the circumstances of Chun's rise to power through the use of force, and the secretive, undemo-

cratic process by which the constitution was drawn up and suddenly thrust upon the people for their approval before they were given any chance to study or debate its contents.

Chun's Seizure of Power

In the wake of President Park's death, the people of South Korea made it known that they wanted democracy and protection of basic human rights. A poll taken by the respected Seoul National University Social Science Research Institute and published in the Dong-A Daily News found that 72.8 per cent of the people felt that achieving democracy was the most urgent task facing the nation, even at some cost to the economy. From October 26, 1979, to May 17, 1980, public debate about the future course of the nation flourished. Many groups and institutions drew up draft constitutions.

All these manifestations of the popular aspiration for democracy were ignored by President Chun. How can anyone be confident that

he will move toward a 'welfare democracy' or even follow the imperfect provisions of his own new constitution?

Chun violated the chain of command and the Combined Forces agreement between the US and the ROK when he used the forces under his command to eliminate 30 to 40 of his senior generals and establish his own supremacy in the army in December, 1979. He made himself director of the KCIA in violation of the legal provision that that post cannot be held by anyone on active military duty. He declared a fuller form of martial law on May 17 to prevent the National Assembly from voting to end martial law which even the government party had come to see as undesirable.

He unleashed paratroopers on the peacefully demonstrating citizens of Kwangju, who were protesting his high-handedness, resulting in as many as 2000 deaths by some estimates and close to 200 by the government's own admission. He has prosecuted and sentenced to death his and Park's most feared political rival, Kim Dae-jung, in a proceeding viewed as groundless by most observers and protested by many governments including those of the US and Japan.

This course of behavior makes it far more likely that Chun will do everything possible to hold on to power as long as he can, rather than that he will serve a term as president and retire to the position of an honored elder statesman giving occasional advice to his successor.

The Constitutional Referendum

To what extent do the South Korean people support President Chun and his new constitution? This is a difficult question to answer because, under present circumstances, it is extremely dangerous to voice any opinion contrary to the government and impossible to project such an opinion further than the physical range of one's own voice. It is certainly safe to say that nothing like 91.6 per cent of 95.5 per cent of the eligible voters are supportive of the new arrangements.

As mentioned above, in polls in the freer atmosphere of last spring as many as 98 per cent of those surveyed indicated they wanted a directly elected president. Could they all have changed their minds so drastically? Is it really possible to take as a sign of sincere support of the government the reported affirmative vote of 72.8 per cent of the 92 per cent of the eligible voters among the people of Kwangju?

In the May uprising in Kwangju as many as 300,000 citizens turned out at a time to protest martial law and the brutality directed at them under it, and as late as mid-October posters of Chun and the new constitution were so regularly defaced in Kwangju that they had to be placed under armed guard. If the percentage of affirmative votes was in fact so high, there must be some other explanation than popular enthusiasm.

As the reaction after Park's death showed so clearly, in a repressive political atmosphere it is possible not only to prevent people from expressing opposing views, but also to induce people to express support for

positions they disagree with. Park's 1972 referendum, according to the official reports, produced a voter turn-out of 91.9 per cent of which 91.5 per cent favored the Yushin Constitution, yet as soon as Park was dead it was virtually impossible to find anyone supporting its retention.

South Korea is a tightly regulated, highly centralised state. Every citizen who has attained the age of majority has to carry at all times a state-issued ID card bearing his or her picture. Everyone is locally registered, usually in the place of his/her birth or childhood residence, and must return there to vote regardless of where he/she lives. This system of registration is very efficient for carrying out many government purposes, including seeing to it that people vote. Under circumstances like those currently existing, many are afraid not to vote. When they do vote, they are not certain that they are not being watched.

Moreover, the choice in the referendum was limited. Contrary to pre-May 17 expectations, the people were not being offered a chance to vote on a National Assembly draft produced through a public process of debate, hearings, consultation with a broad range of experts, negotiation, and compromise. Instead, the people were presented a draft drawn in secret by an unspecified group and custom-tailored for Chun, just as Yushin had been custom-tailored for Park.

No criticism or independent discussion of the draft or comparison with the abortive Assembly draft were allowed. The only analysis of the new constitution available was that presented in the government's program of 'enlightenment'. A 'yes' vote meant choosing the new constitution as being in some respects better than the Yushin constitution. A 'no' vote meant retaining the Yushin constitution and, perhaps, getting into trouble if it were learned how you voted.

It should also be noted that there was no independent scrutiny of the voting process or of the results, making it impossible to be confident in the reported figures. There have been serious allegations of fraudulent practices and vote counting.


Unfortunately, one can only conclude that the circumstances under which, and manner in which, the new constitution was drafted and put to a referendum, and its substantive provisions, especially the Supplementary Provisions for the transition period, will work toward the elimination of democratic politics from South Korea, at least for the immediate future.

November, 1980

Edward Baker is a Research Associate in the East Asia Legal Studies Program at Harvard University specialising in Korean law and history. He was a Korean language specialist for the House Subcommittee on International Organisation's investigation of Korean-American Relations, has a JD from Yale University, and has lived in South Korea for six years.

The North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea is composed of approximately 40 organisations committed to support of human rights in Korea, including the National Council of Churches in the USA, the United Church of Canada, the United States Catholic Conference, Church Women United, the United Presbyterian Church, the Christian Church, the Presbyterian Church US, the United Methodist Church, and various local and regional organisations.

Copies of the complete article, analysing the provisions of the constitution can be obtained from the North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea, 110 Maryland Ave, NE, Washington DC 20002



Turtle
Latter half of 19th C.

Saemaul Undong. South Korea's Rural Movement

John Sayer
Michael Kelly S.J.

*My village is a good place for living
Let us build with our hands
With thatched roofs replaced, with village roads widened
Let us create a green garden, tending it carefully.
By helping each other, by working with our sweat,
Striving for an income boost, let us create a rich village.*

from the *Song of Saemaul*
attributed to President Park Chung Hee.



The lives of Korean farmers have been profoundly affected by *Saemaul Undong*, popularly translated as the *New Community Movement*. The government claims that the movement is an economic and spiritual success, combining 'income boost' with increased community pride and mutual co-operation. Many south Korean farmers differ with their government about whether Saemaul has brought them benefits or further problems.

A Concrete Program?

President Park first suggested a new rural development scheme in 1970 and in 1971 a pilot project was launched. Conditions in the country at the time clearly indicated the need for rural planning. In the early 70s, urban-rural migration had turned from a steady flow into a flood, and this coincided with a slump in industry. Political and social unrest threatened.

The Presidential election of 1971 demonstrated that support for the Park regime was eroding, particularly in the predominantly rural areas of the south-west.

Standards of consumption in the city were rising and the south Korean population was growing fast. The rice deficit was becoming an increasing drain on foreign exchange and stepped-up rural development could provide a market for some manu-

factured goods then in oversupply. Rural villages were offered 335 bags of cement (there was a serious glut in the Korean cement industry at this time) to build water supply systems, laundry areas and compost bins, etc. In 1972 the directors of the program divided Saemaul into three elements: 1) Spiritual enlightenment or attitudinal change; 2) Improvement of the living environment or social and cultural change; 3) Income increase.

In general, the movement began with the promotion of the environmental projects and later moved towards income increasing efforts. In 1972 the Saemaul chiefs selected 16,600 villages that had achieved good results in the pilot project, and provided them with a further 500 bags of cement and a ton of steel reinforcement rods. At this time, the emphasis was still very much on village beautification projects, road widening, building communal meeting halls, playgrounds, repair of irrigation facilities, channels and ponds, etc. In 1973 the Saemaul authorities reincorporated all the nation's 34,665 villages into the program and classified them into undeveloped villages, developing villages and developed villages.

At the same time, the bureaucratic and administrative structure of the program was being consolidated

in government ministries and agencies. By 1974 there was a shift from promotion of environmental projects to income increasing projects, especially in the villages classified as developed. Income increasing projects included activities to increase food production, activities to promote regional specialisation and activities to promote co-operative production and marketing. Training of Saemaul leaders for each village was also stepped up during this period.

Realising the political and economic gains for the government from such a mobilisation, the Saemaul idea was introduced to city and factory contexts. Since 1977 the leadership has sought to further institutionalise the movement as a more integrated rural development program.

The original slogan, 'self-help, self-reliance and co-operation' has been changed to 'self-help, diligence and co-operation' and 'diligence' is described as that virtue which 'fosters the spirit of saving and frugality' so that people's savings may 'lay the foundation for the national economy'.

Working with Sweat

South Korean government operations have a strongly hierarchical structure and the pressure to satisfy

superiors weighs heavily on individuals and agencies. Consequently, village officials are more preoccupied with pleasing their immediate superiors, and producing spectacles for visiting dignitaries than with the needs and aspirations of villagers.

Local officials are under constant threat of dismissal for underachievement in implementing centrally directed programs.

New Roofs for Old: A Question of Overheads

One of the most widespread campaigns of the early Saemaul movement was the program to change the old-style straw roofs for tiles or metal. The brightly painted new roofs became the symbol of rural modernisation. Cases of forcible removal of old roofs can be heard in almost every village in the country. The movement was particularly virulent near the national highways, where high government officials and visiting foreigners could glance at the brightly painted roofs from passing cars.

There is nothing sadder than the sight of old houses with crumbling earth walls, barely able to support the weight of an expensive, brightly painted new roof. For the farmer there are few things more heart-breaking than being forced to go into debt at a usurious rate, in order to invest in an entirely nonproductive venture of replacing a roof.

A thatched roof of course is more troublesome and needs periodic replacement. Over the years, many wealthier farmers have changed voluntarily to tiles. But some of those who were forced to change could not bear the burden and joined the columns of city-bound migrants.

Towards the end of the 70s, the government began the even more drastic program of 'housing improvement' and 'village reorganisation'. These schemes involved the replacement, and frequently the relocation, of the farmers' entire villages. This was an even more dramatic campaign than the roof improvement campaign, and the economic burden for those in designated villages even more crushing.

Endeavouring for Income Boost

Most statements of Saemaul aims put the ultimate effect of the move-

ment as an increase in the incomes and living standards of Korea's rural population.

It is very hard to say whether Saemaul has been as successful at promoting income increase projects as it has with its village improvement projects. The movement sometimes takes credit for mechanisation and crop improvement programs that were ongoing projects of the Office of Rural Development but there is not much sign that new income increase projects were zealously promoted. It is worth examining the form some of these schemes have taken before we try to assess the results of Saemaul as a whole.


Infrastructure improvement projects, if imposed on the village, will benefit wealthy farmers and often cause only problems to the poorer farmers who are not in a position to afford either the labor or capital required. The straightening, widening and paving of roads is of obvious benefit to rich farmers with a large marketable surplus or who own farm machinery or mechanical transport. However, for the small farmers, the projects have required their obligatory participation and many of them were forced to donate precious agricultural land without compensation to make way for the new roads.

Similarly, electrification, village warehouses and workshops may be the logical investment for the wealthier farmers, but are only an untimely and inappropriate drain for the rest.

Under 'production improvement', the government encouraged many farmers to diversify into special crops such as mushrooms, livestock and seri-culture (silkworms). Due to lack of government guarantees, or support for prices in the light of this expanded production campaign, the market for these goods frequently fell at crucial times and many farmers reverted to rice production.

Administration and Training

To coordinate the massive onslaught of Saemaul Undong, the President demanded active participation drawn from many government departments. A centralised National Council made up of representatives of more than a dozen government departments and agencies, formulated the overall plan and made all ultimate decisions. The plans were



then passed down through Provincial Councils, County Councils, to Township Councils which are then responsible for implementing the plans in surrounding villages.

One of the bridgeheads enabling the massive Saemaul effort to penetrate the villages and mobilise the villagers to implement an outside plan, is the creation of Saemaul Leaders in each village. Most Saemaul propaganda states that these leaders are to be elected by the villagers, or 'selected' by the villagers and approved by the township officials. But in conversations with numerous farmers in Korea, I did not once hear of an actual election taking place. What seems most common is that the existing influential village elite recommend a candidate to the authorities who then make the final decision.

The propaganda value of the Saemaul Undong structure is widely recognised by the government which spent a considerable proportion of its contribution on Saemaul education. By 1977, 197,259 village leaders had received Saemaul training, 35,057 non-farmers, such as students, business leaders etc. and 218,977 civil servants had taken a shorter seven-day course, and over 19 million villagers had received some kind of local instruction.

Summing Up

It is hard to make a simple assessment of a movement so widespread and diverse as Saemaul Undong. From its overall direction and philosophy to the design of an individual village improvement, the movement was a product of centralised planning imposed on the villages. Because the President paid close attention to its progress, the various government departments concerned with rural development attained a level of coordination and efficiency far superior to anything achieved before.

Despite the expected exaggerations, it is clear that many rural projects have been completed because of the Saemaul movement: roads were paved, bridges built, roofs replaced and sanitation improved. The majority of Saemaul projects, however, involved consumptive expenditure rather than productive investment. Such improvements may satisfy the aspirations of the wealthier farmers whose lands are develop-

ed enough for general village improvement to be a logical step but for ordinary farmers, the investment of labor, cash and materials into cosmetic or general infrastructural changes makes no sense and can only cause hardship.

The south Korean government was responsible for less than half the investment in the program, the rest of the burden being borne by farmers. Between 1971 and 1974, the government contributed only 22 per cent of the total cost of the program. More significant than the development funds was the coordinated administrative effort, education and technical assistance provided by the government. These had political aspects that directly benefitted the country's leadership.

Certain 'income increase' projects promoted the production of more cash crops but due to such campaigns being launched nationwide, the supply of special foods and industrial raw materials to the urban areas increased, prices fell, and thus few farmers gained in the long-run. Many of the village 'productive base' improvements, such as better road access, are geared towards an increase in commercial agriculture.

Rural debt has risen. According to Korean Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, average debt per farm household rose from 10,282 won in 1971 to 81,564 won in 1977. The exodus to the cities continues. The main emphasis of Saemaul Undong in its later years has been to increase rural income, and this is emphasised in current government evaluations of the movement. However, changes in income are not the sole criterion for the success or failure of the Saemaul Undong.

Political Results

- a) The movement succeeded in creating a loyal group in rural areas supportive of the Yushin rule. This consisted chiefly of the wealthier farmers and village officials (often the same group). An intense propaganda effort encouraged villagers to associate progress directly with the ruling regime. Criticism of the program was seen as criticism of the state.
- b) The building of village halls, bulletin boards, village loudspeaker systems, the organising of frequent meetings and social events around Saemaul, and most im-

portantly the trading and installing of a Saemaul Leader in each village created many new channels for the dissemination of government propaganda in the rural areas. The same channels improved the government's capability for gathering political intelligence and establishing control in the villages.

- c) Many of the urban middle class and some foreigners were convinced that the government was concerned with the welfare of the farmers and had pumped funds into the countryside to pull the farmers out of a pit of backwardness that was entirely of their own creation. High priority was given to projects clearly visible to outsiders.

Saemaul Undong Since Park

The assassination of President Park Chung Hee has not meant an end to his brainchild — the Saemaul Movement. For a short while after his death, the program lost impetus as officials watched to see if it would be dropped, along with that other instrument of Park's rule — the Yushin Constitution.

In his inaugural speech at the beginning of September 1980, south Korea's new strongman, President Chun Doo Hwan said, 'The government will promote the nationwide social reform campaign already underway in tandem with the Saemaul Undong . . .'. The social reform campaign included a massive purge of critics in south Korea's political, academic and press circles and played an important part in Chun's consolidation of power, referred to by some as a 'coup in stages'.

In mid-December, 1980, President Chun Doo Hwan said that the Saemaul Movement in the eighties should be designed to imbue all the people with a sense of being the nation's masters and with a spirit of self-reliance. 'Only by doing so,' he said, 'can we find a way to survive in the 1980s in which economic and military tensions are expected to heighten.'

It is clear that the Saemaul Movement has lost none of its political overtones as some hoped it might during the brief period of political liberalisation between Presidents Park and Chun. The government views the Saemaul Movement as an important mechanism which can be used to efficiently impose government programs in all corners of the country.

A Farmer's Story

Wendy Poussard

It began, in a way, with potatoes — seed potatoes distributed to farmers for a second crop after the rice harvest. In the Republic of Korea the government decides, in accordance with its current agricultural policy, which crops will be grown and which varieties will be chosen.

The implementation of these decisions is a matter for local authorities in the towns and villages.

Potatoes are not highly regarded in Korea. But the farmers in the village of Chonggi, near Yongyang planted them, as they were advised. Yongyang is a remote place in the poorer, less developed area of Kyongsag puk to, home province of the famous Park Chung-hee and also of a farmer, Oh Won-Chun who, until very recently, was not famous at all.

Oh Won-chun is a handsome man, thirty-one years old. By repute he is quiet and sensible, not the kind of person who gets drunk and talkative. Five years ago he became a Christian and, at the end of 1976, he joined the Catholic Farmers Association of which he became a local leader. He was a man who spoke his mind, but not too much: like many rural people he maintained, through the harsh circumstances of life, a sense of his own rights and identity. He lived peacefully with his wife and three children.

It is not easy for farmers to make ends meet and provide for the future of three children. The people's staple food is rice, but for the grower costs rise steadily while the selling price remains relatively low.

The potatoes, unfortunately, did not grow. They were no good at all. And for his loss of income Mr Oh and the Farmers Association pressed for some compensation, which they received. The story might have ended there — a happy, or at least satisfactory conclusion.

But on May 5, 1979, Oh Won-chun disappeared. He just wasn't there any more and even his wife and children did not know where he had gone. Soon a rumour began to circulate that he had slipped away with a girlfriend, but many people could not believe it. When he returned to his village two weeks later he was

strangely silent and at night he cried in his sleep.

In the Korean mass media Oh Won-chun has become an issue rather than a person now. Many stories are told about him and some of them are lies, but this is the story which I believe to be true.

On May 5 two intelligence agents picked up Mr Oh at the bus stop and took him to the coastal town of Pohang. There they kicked and beat him for two hours. After his ordeal he did not look good. Maybe the treatment he received had been a little rougher than originally intended. He was taken by two men to Ullung Island, a rocky holiday resort a few hours' journey from shore. The two men who accompanied him gave him some money. 'Have a good time,' they said. One of them went back to the mainland, but the other stayed behind. Every time Mr Oh

approached the wharf he was still there.

One incident during the lonely stay on Ullung Island deserves mention. An especially tasty plant grows on the island and Mr Oh was encouraged by the inn-keeper to send a sample as a gift to a friend. 'Everyone who comes to the island sends some!' Mr Oh gave the address of a woman friend in Yongyang. A parcel of herbs addressed to her found its way into the possession of the police.

On May 19 Won-chun again met his captor by the wharf. His bruises had subsided and he said he no longer wanted to cause trouble or to know anything about the Catholic Farmers Association. 'You have done a lot of thinking. Let's go back,' the man said.

Mr Oh was taken back to his village. 'You will be very busy working on the farm,' he was told. So he did not go to Andong or meet with the Farmers Association but stayed at home and worked in the rice fields. It was the growing season when from the empty, flooded fields the shoots grow tall and strong and ripen in time if no disaster destroys them. Mr Oh told people in his village that he had been to Ullung Island, but he did not mention the time at Pohang and rumours about him persisted. He seemed upset and withdrawn.

At last, in mid-June, he broke his long silence. As he spoke with others he recognised that the intimidation used against him could be used against others too. If silence can be ensured by beatings and threats no one is safe. With the support of the Farmers Association members, the Bishop and priests of the Andong diocese, he decided to try to obtain justice.

On July 7 he signed a 'declaration of conscience' briefly telling his story. He addressed the statement to the Diocesan Justice and Peace Commission, the Farmers Association and the Parish Priest.

His feelings about the future, expressed in this statement, are full of foreboding:

This fact, no matter what happens, is fact, it says. If I change my

story it will be as a result of force and threats . . . I have been working with the poor and oppressed farmers as brothers . . . I do not know if my blood will be spilt again . . . Christ take care of little us. In the name of the Church beneath Christ hanging on the Cross . . .

'This fact, whatever happens is fact' — Koreans are aware of the authorities' reputation for effective physical and mental torture and so it is necessary to add this ominous provision to statements which are critical, or may be interpreted as critical of government policy.

On July 17 the French Bishop of Andong, Rene Dupont contacted police officials in Andong and complained that Oh Won-chun had been mistreated. He asked for an investigation, and demanded that those who beat him should be punished.

The police said they would make an investigation. They questioned the farmer in the presence of the Bishop and some priests. Then the investigators said it would be necessary to go back to Pohang, but they promised the Bishop that they would return later in the afternoon. Mr Oh was accompanied on the journey by Father Yu, representative of the Peace and Justice Commission. Mr Oh was asked to identify the road he had previously taken and the place where he had been beaten, but he could not remember. Already they had begun to treat him not as a victim but as a criminal. They said they would have to go to Ullung Island but Father Yu protested that this was contrary to their agreement. Besides he had to get back to his parish and say Mass.

Near a police box by the wharf, with policemen looking on, there was a short violent struggle. Then Father Yu was taken back alone.

Since this time Oh Won-chun has become a famous name. He has been featured in newspapers and on television. But no one knows what he is thinking. He looks as if he does not know either and he does not hear very well.

On August 11 the story of Oh-Won-Chun's confession appeared in the *Korea Times*.

Two Catholic laymen and a priest have been arrested for having disturbed public order with a false claim that one of them had been kidnapped and tortured by investigation agents. Oh Won-Chun . . .

will face charges of violating Presidential Emergency Measure No 9 along with Fr Chong Ho-kyong 38, Andong diocese, and Chong Chae-don 25, secretary of CFA's Andong chapter . . . In Seoul, investigation authorities stressed that the police action against the three Catholics was a simple response to their malicious fabrication of facts intended to discredit the government's policies on farmers and religious people.

On August 6 Cardinal Kim celebrated Mass at Andong with Bishop Dupont, and the Bishop of Chonju and many other priests. Until August 23 the priests and farming people of Andong continued to wait and pray in their church. A number of them were arrested and held for periods of up to 25 days.

Father Chong was arrested for distributing the story of the incident to church organisations. Everywhere people were talking about Andong. The event began to assume national significance. Prayer meetings were held all over the country and at Myong dong Cathedral in Seoul eight bishops and three hundred priests celebrated Mass with a crowd of over 5000 people who packed the church and the surrounding area. Dioceses not previously noted for courageous social involvement have been moved to action and to protest, to tell the Andong story.

Meanwhile a number of Catholic priests and laymen were arrested or investigated. There seems a strong drive to remove or silence articulate Christians who align themselves with farmers or workers. Some Catholics ironically profess to welcome this strategy. 'We need a few more priests in gaol yet,' they say.

And what about Oh Won-chun, the unimportant farmer from the little village? He has signed a confession that says his story, his 'declaration of conscience' is a lie. On a national television and later in the court-room he has hazily admitted guilt.

His trial began on September 5 in the provincial city of Taegu. In the packed court, friends called to him, telling him to be brave. A press photographer shows him sitting alone, separated a little from the others. He is wearing the loose white garment of a prisoner and he looks young and very vulnerable. 'Catholic farmer Oh Won-chun 31, casts a blank glance' the caption reads. In Korea today it is not easy to tell the truth.

Nuclear Korea

The following comment on Korea's Nuclear Program comes from the American Friends Service Committee's *Korea Report* of July 1980.

South Korea is currently the world's largest market for nuclear power plants. It has announced plans to build 44 nuclear power plants in the next 20 years.

Opponents of nuclear power in south Korea see four major problems. Uppermost is the tremendous expense. Each plant, costing over \$1 billion, is more expensive than any other single purchase in the country's history. The government is piling debt upon debt, mortgaging Korea's future for generations.

Second, it's unclear how much ordinary Koreans will benefit from the nuclear energy generated. The plants now under construction are located at the southern tip of the country — near Masan, the export zone for foreign investors; near Ulsan, where Gulf Oil and Dow Chemical have plants; near Changwon, south Korea's new military production complex; and near Chinhae, a port being eyed by the US Navy as a possible new US Asian base.

Third is the environmental danger of nuclear power. To date, just one nuclear power plant, Kori I, has begun operation. Just at the time of the Three Mile Island accident, this Westinghouse plant was closed because of a malfunctioning cooling system which resulted in contamination of the containment structure. Since then the plant's operation has been suspended several times, closing again in October 1979 for a complete overhaul and safety check.

Nuclear Weapons

Fourth is the danger that nuclear power will lead to nuclear weapons. A 1977 Ford Foundation Study estimates that by the mid-1980s south Korea can build up to 36 plutonium bombs a year, just using the waste from the nuclear reactors operating in the country.

In a current drive for increased military aid for the south, the question of nuclear weaponry is once again being mooted.

Koreans in Australia

All of the Koreans who have migrated to Australia are from the South.

During the 1960s and 1970s, large numbers of Koreans have emigrated, most to the United States of America and other large numbers to Canada, Germany and South America. Australia first started to receive Korean migrants in the late 1950s, but only in a very small trickle (and up until 1966 only six Koreans had taken out Australian citizenship). However, from 1970 onwards, particularly after 1975, there has been a rapid and rising influx. Between 1973 and 1977 almost 230 Koreans took out Australian citizenship, and in one year (1978-79) alone the number of Koreans taking out Australian citizenship rose to 356.

It is impossible to obtain precise figures on the number of Koreans who have now settled in Australia, but an estimate would be somewhere in excess of 4,000. The vast majority — over 3000 — live in either Sydney or Wollongong, while some 300, including children, live in Melbourne and the remainder live in mainly WA, Queensland or the ACT.

Though Koreans are still a very new ethnic community in Australia, they have already developed several community structures, many of them centred around their Christian churches, to which a large number adhere. While Christians, in Korea, probably number no more than 10 per cent of the total population, in Australia the number would make them about 40 per cent to 50 per cent of all the Koreans here.

Because most Koreans have been able to enter Australia on the basis of their skills or qualifications, those who are here do not fully represent a cross-section of Koreans in their own country.

Among Koreans, Australian Immigration Policy is seen as discriminatory in some aspects. This is largely due to the difficulties associated with obtaining entry permits for settlement or visit and the lack of publicity for Australian Immigration policy in Korea. While more than 80 per cent of new settlers from northern and western Europe benefitted under the assisted passage scheme (1959-1971) almost all Korean migrants have had to pay their own passage.

South Korean Regime turns on its press

A news report from Peter Hazelhurst, in Seoul (correspondent to *Irish Times*) August 22, 1980.

A campaign of terror has certainly transformed South Korea's docile newspapers into a blatant propaganda machine. Not only are the statements of the defendants in political trials censored out of reports of daily newspapers, but South Korea's press is now forced to put false inflammatory remarks into the mouths of the accused.

Among the many eminent journalists purged from their jobs this month were 134 who signed a petition against military censorship. The 'purification program' of South Korea's press began late in July when the regime, led by the country's new strong-arm leader, General Chu Doo Hwan, apparently instructed the Korean Newspaper Association to dismiss the aforementioned 'unreliable journalists' by August 10.

Sources close to the association claim that the country's major publishers were handed a black-list and were warned that the regime would take direct action against the press unless 'unsuitable' journalists were dismissed by the deadlines.

They included Mr Park Kwon Sang, the former editor-in-chief of the respected daily newspaper, *Dong-a Ilbo*.

Apparently Mr Park, a former London correspondent for *Dong-a Ilbo*, irritated the regime recently when he submitted to the military censors an as yet unpublished editorial column calling for a fair trial for Mr Kim Dae Jung, the incarcerated Opposition leader.

Campaign of Terror

The campaign of terror against the press is all pervading. When I telephoned Mr Park at his home in Seoul recently he replied: 'I am not well. I had better not see you at this time. Maybe some other time. I hope you understand.'

According to the guidelines of the regime, journalists are to be purged if they are not ardent anti-Communists, if they protest against military censorship, and if they have maintained close contact with discredited politicians or businessmen.

'Anyone who even hints that he is trying to work for democratic rights is being ruthlessly eliminated,' one eminent journalist told the *Times*.

More than 172 periodicals were closed last month. Many of them were banned because they were deemed as obscene and classified as 'publications contributing towards juvenile delinquency.' But they also include intellectual and literary works.

The regime appears to be impervious to the reaction of its Western allies, the US and Japan.

Elections: Over bar the shouting

No sooner had South Korea's voters accepted the constitutional changes at the national referendum of October 22, than Press reports began to filter through indicating that officials in Seoul were preparing lavish ceremonies for Chun Doo Hwan's inauguration as President of the ROK for a seven-year term in accordance with the new constitution.

Elections scheduled for February 25 meant little as Chun was already assured a large majority of votes in the electoral college.

Dissolution of political parties had also been part of the constitutional changes. New parties had to be formed and Chun's "Democratic Justice Party" secured more than two-thirds of the electoral college's 5,278 seats making his election as President by the electoral college a mere formality.

Opposition parties had problems forming after the new constitutional reforms. The three opposition parties which fielded presidential candidates were said to have trouble finding candidates for the electoral college — hardly surprising when most of the Korean opposition had been systematically intimidated or banned from political activity. Kim Dae Jung was in the second round of his trial by a martial law court for sedition, Kim Jong Pil was disqualified on corruption charges and Kim Young Sam was under house arrest!

The outcome was never in doubt. Officials in Seoul said that 78.2 per cent of the 21 million eligible voters had cast ballots.

had cast ballots in the electoral college elections on February 11. Government officials were reported to have made house to house calls to bring out the voters.

Parliamentary elections will be held late in March following the inauguration of the President.

Amnesty Report

On March 2, 1981, Amnesty International released a 43-page report entitled 'Republic of Korea: Violations of Human Rights'. Amnesty's London office announced an urgent world-wide campaign to end torture and imprisonment of prisoners of conscience and the organisation urges professional and trade groups to join its drive to alert world opinion.

An Amnesty spokesman said 'Amnesty International's concerns over the violation of human rights in the Republic of Korea have remained constant in recent years in spite of various legal changes and changes of government.'

On the same day, President Chun Doo Hwan announced his intention to release or reduce the sentences of more than 5000 offenders, including some political opponents.

Contributors: Acknowledgements

GAVAN McCORMACK visited south Korea in February as guest of the International Cultural Society of Korea (Seoul) and north Korea in May as guest of the Korean Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (Pyongyang). He has been lecturing in history at La Trobe University and is now doing research in Japan.

This article was first published in *Arena* no 56.

REV. R.F. WOOTTEN has lived in south Korea and visited the country many times. His work is with the division of Justice and Human Development of the Uniting Church of Australia.

This paper, 'Korea 1980, Kwangju, Kim Dae Jung: An Analysis' was presented to the *Second National Korean Studies Conference* at La Trobe University in November 1980.

EDGAR B. MARANAN and **ALFREDO NAVARRO SALANGA** are well-known poets in the Philippines.

This is the first time these 'Kwangju poems' have been published. They are translated from Tagalog.

KIM CHUNT'AE's poem was printed on one of the many broadsheets which appeared in Kwangju during the May uprising. His present whereabouts are not known.

KIM CHI HA, Korea's most famous poet, was released from prison in December 1980. The extracts from his poem 'The Story of a Sound' are from a new collection *The Middle Hour: Selected Poems of Kim Chi Ha* translated by David R. McCann and published by Human Rights Publishing Group, a division of Earl M. Coleman Enterprises Inc, Stanfordville, New York.

PHILIPPE PONS writes for *Le Monde*.

AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE is a private humanitarian organisation supported by American Quakers.

JOHN SAYER is a member of the Asia-North America Communications Center. The material for the article on Saemaul is from part of a major study on agriculture in Korea commissioned by the Institute for Food and Development Policy.

MICHAEL KELLY, SJ, friend of Asian Bureau Australia, is based in Hong Kong, where he is an editor with UCA News Agency.

WENDY POUSSARD works with Asian Bureau Australia and is an executive member of ACFOA.

MARGARET ANDERSON and **ANNE-MARIE FITZGERALD** did all the typing and made some of the coffee. They work with Asian Bureau Australia.

We most sincerely thank the organisations and publications which have permitted use of their material.

Some resources

Politics: Human Rights (mostly ROK)

Korea Communique (periodical)

News summary and comment on human rights in Korea published by Japan Emergency Christian Conference on Korean Problems.

John M. Nakajima, Chairman

c/- NCC Japan

24 2-3-28 Nishi Waseda

Shinjuku-ku Tokyo 160

Japan

One year subscription US\$15.00 airmail

American Friends Service Committee

Korea Report (periodical)

Includes short articles on political and economic questions.

AFSC, 1501 Cherry Street,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102, USA

Subscription by voluntary contribution

Poetry Reading for Imprisoned South Korean Poets

A collection of recent Korean poems and a guide for setting up poetry readings on behalf of imprisoned poets.

AFSC, 1501 Cherry Street,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102, USA

US\$1.00 each; 10 for US\$6.00

North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea/Update (periodical)

110 Maryland Avenue

NE Washington DC 20002

Background Information 1979/1

Human Rights in the Republic of Korea (occasional publication)

Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches.

A detailed report on human rights, itemising incidents and listing victims from January 1978 to January 1979. Also introductory chapters placing human rights issues in a political and economic context.

WCC

150 route de Ferney,

1211 Geneva 20

Switzerland

Subscription by voluntary contribution.

Bulk orders billed at approximately Swiss Francs 3.00 per copy.

The Middle Hour

Selected Poems of Kim Chi Ha

Human Rights Publishing Group 1980

a division of Earl M. Coleman Enterprises Inc.

Conklin Hill Rd

Stanfordville, New York 12581

Bloodshed in Kwangju

Japan Emergency Christian Conference on Korean Problems

A photographic account of the Kwangju uprising from *Korea Communique*

US\$2 (address: see *Korea Communique* above)

AMPO (periodical)

Pacific Asia Resources Centre

sometimes gives detailed coverage of Korean topics

Australian distribution:

ADF

130 Little Collins St

Melbourne Australia 3000

In September 1980 AMPO printed a special issue entitled: *Korea May 1980*

Peoples' Uprising in Kwangju

General Korean Sources

The Korea Times

South Korean English Language newspaper

14 Chunghak-dong Chongno-gu

Seoul 110

The Korea Herald

South Korean English Language newspaper (government owned)

1-12, 3-ga Haehyon-dong Chung-gu

Seoul 100

Korea Journal

Published monthly by the Korean National Commission for UNESCO

subs US\$21 from:

KUMI Trading Co Ltd,

Subscription department

CPO Box 3553,

Seoul

publishes articles on a selection of cultural and semi-academic subjects.

Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society

Overseas membership of the RAS is US\$8 per annum.

The RAS publishes an annual volume of 'transactions' on scholarly topics and circulates a book list of publications available from its bookshop. A good source of general information on Korean history, art, etc.

Royal Asiatic Society

Korea Branch

CPO Box 255

Seoul

The Far Eastern Economic Review

weekly news magazine dealing with Asia.

People interested in writing to the families of Korean political prisoners can receive information and advice from:

Australian Development Foundation

130 Little Collins Street

MELBOURNE Vic. 3000

Korea Courier

is a magazine published by the Australia-Korea Society for Friendship and Cultural Exchange.

\$1.00 for four issues

Korea Courier

Box 1867R GPO

MELBOURNE 3001

Korea Society of Asian Studies Association of Australia

A newly formed scholarly organisation for communication and scholarly activities among members of the ASAA concerned with the study of Korea.

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I do not anticipate or support any revolution attempted or achieved by a small number of armed groups committing terrorist acts of violence . . .

My vision of a revolution is one that will bring into being a unified Korea based on freedom, democracy, self-reliance and peace. More fundamentally, however, it must enable the Korean people to decide their own fate. I can confidently support and welcome such a revolution.

And our revolution will not follow foreign modes but will issue forth from our unique revolutionary tradition. The Tonghak rebellion, the March First Independence Movement, and the 1960 April Student Revolution foreshadow our next revolution.

Kim Chi Ha
from A Declaration of Conscience
May 1975