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

# Expulsion from Paradise: The Bypassed Generation

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

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# The Idea of Values, The Value of Ideas

James Finn

The concept of values has had considerable play in recent years, and it is now often used to describe what is being taught in the nation's classrooms. It has also come under attack by those who say that it has become a slippery term that allows one to avoid talking about truths, beliefs, ideas and facts. I recalled this argument as I noted several recent news items that concern our nation's...well, uh, values.

**Item 1.** A full-page ad in the *New York Times* informs its readers that the top price paid for an apartment in New York was in Trump Tower, that "of the ten most expensive apartments, four were in Trump Tower," and that TT was also the first to set a price of $1,273 per square foot. Lest we fail to understand the significance of these facts, Donald Trump, who signed the statement, tells us: Trump buildings "have proven, once again, to be the standard by which all others are judged." And there you have it. Know the price tag and you will know the value. A more naked standard of value would be hard to find. It even confounds Oscar Wilde, who defined a cynic as a person who knew the price of everything and the value of nothing, for what sense can that definition have when price and value are interchangeable terms?

**Item 2.** A judge of the Princeton Borough Court sentenced two student officers of one of Princeton University's eating clubs to 30 days in jail and fined them $500 each. They had been found guilty of serving alcohol to minors at parties in which students were urged to drink large quantities of liquor. As a result 45 students suffered alcohol-induced medical problems, 39 were treated at an infirmary, six at a local hospital, and one remained in a coma for 24 hours. In handing down his sentence, the judge said only luck prevented an alcohol-induced death such as had occurred recently at another university. Sounded serious to us. But Harold T. Shapiro, president of Princeton, allowed as how he was shocked at what he termed the "disproportionate and excessive" sentence. Thirty days in jail after the lives of students are threatened is excessive? What values is President Shapiro trying to teach us?

**Item 3.** Other signs of confusion at a university on the other coast. At its meeting of 31 March 1988, the Faculty Senate of Stanford University approved a curriculum change that would replace the required course in Western culture with a new course on "Cultures, Ideas and Values." Students gathered outside said they were ready to interrupt the Senate if the vote went the wrong way. Two years earlier, a small group of students had charged that the course in Western culture had focused on works by white, European, upper-class males and needed to be changed. To the charges of racism were added those of sexism and imperialism. The new program will give special attention to race, gender and class; it will recruit minority faculty and those with knowledge of non-European cultures; and each quarter students will study works from at least one non-European culture. Some faculty members have minimized the extent of the change, saying it's only a modification of the previous program, but President Donald Kennedy has asserted that the change is a substantial improvement.

Why should anyone not on the Stanford campus be concerned about the changes in the curriculum? Shouldn't we leave to the faculties of the many universities of this land the responsibilities for resolving educational questions? In any case, how important is the issue? Professor Stephen Graubard of Boston University has assured us that altering a university course shouldn't be treated as "a matter of cosmic importance." Possibly not, but what has happened at Stanford is a matter of great earthly significance, here and now. For what the Faculty Senate voted on was not merely a change in the curriculum—and who would wish to say any course had reached the perfection of stasis—but a change in the standards by which the curriculum is determined. Bluntly stated, a system in which the criterion of selection is the intrinsic merit of the works is to be replaced by one based on the color or gender of the author. This signals a disastrous shift in educational standards.

A great red herring should be disposed of immediately. Race, gender and class—like a number of important concepts—are worth serious examination. But the Stanford curriculum already provides for such study. And students at the university are already required to take a course in non-Western culture. The students at Stanford were not deprived of the nourishment of the books they would now study in place of books central to Western culture.

Sidney Hook, justly honored for his developed views on education, has written that "the course in Western Culture has not been merely repackaged or revised. It has been radically converted into a politically diluted course in sociology." And of the demand that faculty be recruited from "women and people of color" to study aspects of culture that reflect their special interests he wrote: "Race, color, religion, national origin, and sexual orientation are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the fruitful study of the humanities or any subject matter."

The changes at Stanford were initiated by a small, militant group of students and junior faculty who have presented, however inchoately, a political agenda. The course in Western Culture is being revised under pressure from those who have not sufficiently absorbed the highest values of that culture. ■

# Letters from Readers

## Reason and unreason

TO THE EDITOR:
Richard Gambino's lengthy anti-Allan-Bloom article "Education & the American Mind" (March-April 1988) was too critical of the natural law philosophy.

He is correct to criticize the Aristotelian version of natural law. Reason may (or may not) be unique to mankind, but "unique" is not necessarily "true." Mr. Gambino's other criticisms are also on the mark.

But reason is the one true basis for morality because it is the only way we can know anything. The basis of reason is consistency (without which no thought is possible) and accuracy (a form of consistency, between our thoughts, actions and the objective reality they refer to). Consistency and accuracy both require that *we should treat objective reality as it is.* Would Mr. Gambino argue otherwise? Would he consciously advocate irrationality (or unreason)?

If we should treat reality as it is, then we have the right to be free to treat people as having the same right to be free which we have (this logically follows from treating reality as it is), so we have equal rights: our right to be free is limited by the equal rights of others, and this follows from human nature (reason).

Here we have a provable moral standard derivable from human nature. I should hope my organization, Freedom House, would defend equal natural rights, not because *we* think it's nice, but because everyone has such rights and there should be an organization whose main purpose it is to defend them.

Steven Cord, *Professor Emeritus, I.U.P.*
*Research Director*
*Henry George Foundation*
*of America*

RICHARD GAMBINO RESPONDS:
Human intelligence is richer than its one component of Aristotelian reasoning. If we rely strictly on Aristotelian reasoning from objectively seen "facts," we would deduce that the sun moves around the earth because this is what we see. My point is not to deny deductive reasoning its place, or advocate irrationality. On the contrary, it is that all students should be taught to understand and use as many forms of disciplined intelligence as is possible. Many of these have been brought to bear on moral matters.

## The dawn of true history?

TO THE EDITOR:
The excellent article by Jiri Pehe, "The Prague Spring—In 1988" (May/June) raises the cardinal question of the Soviet type system: where does the root of its crises lie?

Most observers point to its inflexible and bureaucratic economic system as the cause of its downfall. This indeed plays into the hands of the Communist dictatorships which attempt to save their political power by trying to reform their economic system, while at the same time conserving their political system. More astute observers realize that there cannot be substantial progress in the economic field as long as the political system does not emancipate itself from its dictatorial structure. The Soviet Union and Hungary may be on the verge of such a development. However, looking at the most recent developments in these two countries, one is struck by the fact that the fundamental causes of the crisis lie far deeper than merely the shortcomings of the economic and political systems. The truth is, there can be no major advance in the economic or political sphere if the people as a whole will not take up the challenge of profound and revolutionary change. So far they have not done so. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that Marx's great vision of a better world—without exploitation of man by man, of true justice and freedom, which moved hundreds of millions all over the world—has collapsed in the quagmire of Stalinist dictatorship. The unquenchable faith in the Communist society has died. But without such faith there cannot be a rejuvenation of this society. The crisis of this society is that it is in a stage of moral and ideological last resort.

This moral and ideological crisis reflects itself in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, for instance, in the upsurge of the Church. The Church, which never played a significant role in either East Germany or Czechoslovakia (since 1945), has in recent years acquired remarkable influence. And this, not because the Church has solutions for the problems of this society, but because Marxism-Leninism has not.

Does all this mean that a society based on the common ownership of the means of production is doomed to failure? The answer will depend on whether such a society can actually be built. So far in the Soviet type system the means of production have not been owned by the people, but by the Party dictatorship. Yet how can the common ownership of the means of production be attained?

In principle the answer is quite simple. Common ownership can only be achieved through an all-embracing democracy by which the people become the master of the economic, political, ideological and moral processes of society. Marx, Engels, Luxemburg and Lenin developed some important ideas on socialist democracy but never worked out a systematic theory of

*(Continued on page 38)*

# Expulsion from Paradise: The Bypassed Generation

Eva Kanturkova

*Eva Kanturkova is one of the most prominent Czechoslovak human rights activists and writers. A signatory of Charter 77, Kanturkova has served as Charter's spokesman and has been imprisoned for her beliefs, an experience she described in* My Companions from the Bleak House *(Woodstock, N.Y.: Overlook Press, 1987).*

*"Expulsion from Paradise: The Bypassed Generation" is a personal account of the fate of an entire generation of Czechoslovak intellectuals, a pampered generation that graduated from universities shortly after the Communist putsch in 1948 and for twenty years had few quarrels with the system. When their opportunity finally arrived in 1968, most of them wanted and fought for "socialism with a human face"—a democratic version of communism —not the destruction of the Communist system. Looking back at the last twenty years, Kanturkova traces the disillusionment and destruction of her generation.*

*This essay is one of many in* The Prague Spring: A Mixed Legacy, *edited by Jiri Pehe and to be published by Freedom House this summer on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The essays, written by chief players in the Czechoslovak drama of 1968, range from personal reflections on the Prague Spring to analyses of the Prague Spring's political and economic ideas—ideas which are now invading the very country that sought to destroy them in a military intervention twenty years ago.*

Twenty years is a long time in human terms—one fifth of a century, a third of an adult life. The last twenty years in Czechoslovakia have been a period of decline, but it can't be said that this decline has resulted in a worsening situation. In a famous passage of *To The Lighthouse*, Virginia Woolf describes how time takes its toll imperceptibly in the short term, but in the long term with far-reaching effects. Dust settles in an abandoned house; mirrors become blind; things rot, wood dries up; spiders take over; trash and leaves are blown about by the wind; and all is covered by weeds.

People abandoned the house of Virginia Woolf; our land was abandoned by freedom. But under the hard cover of the anesthetized public life, under the many folds of the tough crust of simulated ideological life, time too creeps in. Movement takes place imperceptibly in small, minute shifts which we don't even notice, shifts which are recognized only after they have become part of us. Time and motion are half-conscious; the changes are impossible to verbalize. On the outside, silence. Nonetheless, under the self-confident surface of crass power, change smolders.

I do not want to write about how, during the past two decades, the republic has deteriorated contrary to the plans and hopes we once had. What is evident, what everyone knows, is of no particular importance. Rather, I would like to capture that creeping of time inside us. Inside we have certainly not changed. We haven't lost our creativity, hope, willpower, talent, imagination or skills. It is only that all these valuable properties clashed with the impossibility of their realization. Like the person in the fairy tale, we all had to penetrate beyond the door of the thirteenth room. With the creeping of time grew our understanding, optimistic certainty inside us, thanks to which nothing is ever completely lost. There is always something that's new, something to be understood, and one's life is to be arranged accordingly. Maybe it's in powerlessness that one's understanding transforms into something substantial.

**We were strongly critical even as we enjoyed all the advantages of our succession: the revolution, whether we realized it or not, had created a place for us. This fact will one day be the cause of traumatic thoughts within many of us.**

On the outside this shift, manifesting itself as a shift into separation, "dissidence," could be expressed in what is almost a slogan: from a loyal citizen to a prisoner of the regime. At first glance this is a dramatic depiction, but it does not express what sort of loyalty was entailed and what sort of slave the one-time loyal citizen had become.

## My generation

It could be said about a substantial, numerically strong part of my generation that the start of their careers chimed in with the spirit of the times. At least that's what I am able to deduce from the fate of my high school and university classmates and friends. When we left the university in the midfifties our hands were still clean, for the revolutionary terror had taken place at a time when we were still too young to take part. We were, therefore, entering ready-made conditions but with (fortunately for us) awakened reason, for at the start of our adulthood great

upheavals were taking place in the Soviet Union, in Hungary and in Poland. In 1956 I saw Poznan with my own eyes; my husband was studying in Moscow at the time of the 20th Congress.

We were strongly critical even as we enjoyed all the advantages of our succession: the revolution, whether we realized it or not, had created a place for us. This fact will one day be the cause of traumatic thoughts within many of us. To the credit of a majority of my friends I must say, however, that the two main circumstances of our entering into society—the possibility of a career and a critical eye—remained in balance. Our fathers' generation tried to win us over, and it really was quite impossible not to accept the advantages presented to us. But it went against our grain to abuse the advantages. We used them according to our talent, knowledge and skills.

Our conscience functioned inside us. The focus of our critical sense was not ourselves—after all we were secure—but rather the people who had suffered under the revolutionary terror. Our critical sense protected our moral sense and we entered into social ties with a high degree of idealism, refusing to identify with Communist excesses—as they were called at the time. But, influenced by the times, we remained loyal to the regime. We wouldn't have dreamed of wishing for its downfall. The only thing we asked from the regime was to be ideally just. And so we became the loyal opposition. There was no distinction between those who were and were not Party members. In any case, opposition from outside the Party was impossible at the time; members of the opposition had been either scattered or placed inside camps and prisons. And people were arrested not only for outright animosity to the regime but for nondestructive rebukes as well. In 1966, at the time of the partial awakening, the trial of writer Jan Benes took place. His "crime" consisted of corresponding with an émigré magazine.

I began to write relatively late, when I was almost thirty. My husband and I had been poor for a long time—we never thought of trying for an easy career. This wasn't naïveté, it was the trend of the times. To this day I see the 1960s as years made to measure for me, as a time when I fought to be able to do that which I wanted and for which I was suited. However, I lived through failures and painful falls as well. There had been a political prisoner in the family and my father's means of livelihood was destroyed by the regime. Nonetheless, I never felt that I had been bypassed. There were plenty of opportunities and he who knew something, he who had a goal along with the willpower and talent was sure to find a place for himself. And this began to be true—albeit more difficult—even for those who had been prisoners and people who had once been persecuted. Time had started to favor that which was natural. Our generation was also mutually supportive; almost everywhere there were people who thought and felt the same way, although this support was quite harsh to itself, critical and not willing to compromise its values.

During the next five years I published four books and wrote several movie scripts. I didn't need to worry that I was being successful with something that was artistically without quality, that the support we were giving each other was really unprincipled protection. We were quite different from today's young generation; we did not enter official structures the same way.

**When my friend was being dismissed from her writing job she said that according to the constitution she has a right to work. They laughed and told her that indeed she has but that nowhere in the constitution does it say she should not be making her living as a cleaning woman.**

The impact of critical thought and views came to an end when they encountered a brick wall—21 August. I can still hear the droning of the Antonov planes over Prague. That night I was awakened by the jarred window panes. The radio, which was still broadcasting, told what had happened. My husband was shooting a television program in northern Bohemia; he found his way back to Prague inside a recording van that made it through the columns of Russians. He arrived in Prague in one piece, perhaps thanks to the fact that he spoke Russian with an acceptable accent. I and my son sat on a bed until the morning, holding each other, trembling inwardly with tension. In the morning we left our apartment. My husband went off to broadcast against the occupation from secret television studios and as we were saying goodbye we couldn't be sure that this was not the last time we would see each other alive. The whole street saw us and understood.

Undecorated by illusions and ideology, naked reality emerged immediately in all its power: the internal opposition was too weak to be able to reform Soviet-style socialism. Quite simply, Soviet imperialist interests were much more powerful than anything else, even socialism. After 21 August I certainly found it more difficult to come to terms with my loyalty. I would have felt guilty, had I not possessed a critical sense from the beginning. But because I had been critical there came an open conflict. Having once been the generation of succession we became, almost without exception, the persecuted generation.

We were excluded from succession and from its link with influence and action; we became a generation which was to be bypassed. As the revolutionaries had once courted and cultivated us, the conservatives started to court and cultivate the youngest generation. People who had been persecuted during the fifties had lived through it all before. For those who experienced it for the first time only after

21 August, it felt something like an expulsion from paradise. Not only did they experience disillusionment with the very ideas to which they, in good faith, originally devoted their lives, but they also experienced a great loss in the means of their existence. Yet, despite all this, I do not see this loss as a historical punishment for our previous good fortune, our succession, because the entire country suffered through the destruction of this opposition.

I don't like to make too much of a woman's intuition because it sounds too much like a Cassandra, but I had been skeptical as to the possibilities of 1968 from the very start. Not that I wished for the downfall of the regime while realizing that it wouldn't come true. Quite the opposite: I became a loyal citizen all the more because our criticism was reaching its height and because for the first time in twenty years other people could speak out—people who were not Communists. But I didn't believe in the ability of Czechoslovakia to wean itself away from the influence of the Soviet Union. We are too small a country, strategically placed in too important a spot. Also, and this is less often written about, we are a nationalistically fragmented country. The end of the Prague Spring fit not only Brezhnev's plans but also the plans of ambitious Slovak representatives. For them Alexander Dubcek was a welcomed Trojan horse.

Despite all that happened, 1968 was a happy year for me. I can't remember when I worked with such intensity, though even that was an expression of our skepticism. We tried to fit everything that we could into the upsurge and finish it before all the threats around us came true. At the same time it was an intensity born of relief because we were able to do all that we had wanted to.

## The movie coffin

At the start of that year my novel *Smutecni slavnost (Funeral Celebration,* or *The Wake*) was published and Barrandov Studios bid on it. We worked on the script with director Zdenek Sirovy all that spring, always under pressure from two sides. First, we knew that we mustn't miss out on this opportunity when the state-owned studio was willing to provide the means of making a film such as ours. Then there was also the pressure of the material itself: it was to be a black and white film, a tragic story in which black and white played a graphic role. It had to be shot in winter and this was why the script had to be finished and accepted in the fall.

As is known, the clever Czechs with their August Party congress in Vysocany made sure that the Soviet assault did not succeed 100 percent. Brezhnev had to release his prisoners, and the prepared group of leaders-collaborators did not dare to take over immediately. And during those strange months when everything had already been decided but had still to be gradually realized—by those who had been in power before August—we started to shoot. Because of the beauty of the countryside the director had chosen Vysocina, where people were poor and life was hard. The studio rented a farmhouse near Pelhrimov and when word got around what it was we were shooting, people came from far and wide to watch. But not to earn the hundred korunas fee.

The film tells of the death of a farmer who has been evicted from his native village because he fought collectivization. In offices still controlled by people who have evicted him, his wife obtains permission for the body to be buried in the family crypt. She brings the body to the ruined farm and there in the courtyard places it on a raised platform inside a casket. It is accompanied by a funeral procession through the black and winter countryside. One former farmer, who in real life had been evicted, came from far away and asked to be in the procession without pay; he saw in it personal satisfaction. We even hired a local amateur brass band which sounded a bit squeaky and slightly off key. We had a chance to think about what was illusion and what was reality. The country was occupied and we all knew that it would be for a long time. Nonetheless, we saw nothing illusory about the fact that people manifested their resistance only behind a movie coffin.

**The interrogator would arrive well dressed, shaved and perfumed...Proud of his cultivated life and the amount of reading he had done, he told me "A book is the only thing I could ever steal."**

Local authorities complained to Prague, but we managed to finish the film; unfortunately not soon enough for it to be released. Along with many others it is locked in a safe. Reportedly, the bosses of Barrandov Studios used to show it to Soviet delegations in order to document the presence of counterrevolutionaries in Czechoslovakia. Lately they can't even do that. But the film, *Funeral Celebration,* is reported still timely; the director Zdenek Sirovy considers it to be his best.

## Separation

At first through the main shock of the occupation and then through minute shifts, we were being further and further separated from society. The great numbers of those affected are well known. Because of their dismissal from institutions, offices, science, industry and schools the country is wasting away. Most members of the internal opposition were Party members; some were dismissed, some left on their own. During the purges only one symptomatic question was asked: Do you approve or disapprove of the entry of the armies? All the newly founded structures were gradually destroyed. The country was covered with an impenetrable and self-promoting police-protected bureaucratic

stratum all the way to the management level of industry and agriculture. You must understand: I am not trying to describe affliction and deterioration but separation.

**Undecorated by illusions and ideology, naked reality emerged immediately in all its power: the internal opposition was too weak to be able to reform Soviet-style socialism. Quite simply, Soviet imperialist interests were much more powerful than anything else, even socialism.**

Those who felt their separation only on the institutional level see their dismissal, to this day, as an injustice that has ruined their lives. They maintain the illusion that it is possible to develop democratic socialism, even under the rule of a Communist monopoly, from the top—through the "progressive" will of the leadership. Today they expect a revival through the policies of Gorbachev. Historically, and during the past twenty years quite convincingly, the destruction of internal opposition has proved the inability of Communist socialism to liberalize itself solely through the power of enlightenment created and active inside the Party. With socialism which is unaccompanied by pluralism, the country can only continue on its road to slavery and backwardness.

As I see it, what was positive about the "expulsion from paradise" lay mainly in the fact that the one-time critical loyalists finally found themselves in the same position as the rest of the nation. Actually, they were now in an even lower position: university professors, directors of companies, secretaries, journalists and scientists became, in the best of cases, lowly clerks, in worse cases, workers, and in the very worst cases, unskilled help such as window cleaners, watchmen and fire stokers. Perhaps I am ready to accept that as punishment for our one-time superiority. But I would like to see that those discarded in 1948 were able to mix with those discarded in 1968 as an opportunity for a deeper conversion than that based on the loyal criticism of the previous decades.

I am not an author who can write bestsellers. I am more interested in what I am writing than how favorable are the conditions under which I am writing, or what sort of response the book will receive. Even so, had the conditions which had developed during the 1960s continued, I would probably have achieved a certain amount of success and popularity. As things were, I was still able to publish the novel *Po potope, (After the Flood)*, but there was no longer any place for it to be reviewed. In the end it was taken out of the libraries. The theme of *After the Flood* is concerned with the hero's spiritual breakdown and his finding new courage to live. The censor connected the image of the flood with the takeover of 1948, the time during which the book takes place. As the Czech saying goes: every gypsy tells fortunes according to his horoscope.

To document the base vengeance that governed the decision making of the rulers: Secretary Jan Fojtik made into pulp the entire press run of my novella *Pozustalost pana Abela (The Inheritance of Mr. Abel)* because my husband signed a protest petition on behalf of the first of the new wave of political prisoners—his friend and colleague, the journalist Vladimir Skutina.

Suddenly there wasn't a magazine or a publishing house that would print a single line by me. I mention this not as a complaint but to emphasize the situation. Our problem was not how to come to terms with unfavorable conditions. It wasn't that simple even for those who had not been affected by the political conditions. Everyone had to find a way out in his own life. Those who were not directly affected have learned during the last twenty years how to turn inward into their private lives. The regime accepted this—it prefers people who are socially indifferent to those who are restless. Many also went into exile.

For me emigration was not a choice. He who remained began to wrestle with a paradoxical mechanism absolutely unimaginable for someone living under normal conditions. The totalitarian arrangement of society controls everyone to the smallest detail: which dentist to visit; what sort of shoes to buy; whether there will be beef or pork on Sunday; tasty bread or bread without taste; whether one has a place to live; whether one's children can study; whether one can travel abroad; whether, whether, whether. For each

## Ideas and Defeat

The legacy of the Prague Spring is mixed: we could, in fact, speak quite accurately of the legacy of ideas and the legacy of defeat. While the legacy of ideas is now felt in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia remains under the spell of that other legacy. The last twenty years in Czechoslovakia have been marked by harsh oppression and a return to ideological and economic methods of Stalinism...

While the generation of 1968 has lived with the legacy of defeat and humiliation, it has not forgotten the glory of the Prague Spring, and through it the glory of the days when Czechoslovakia was a free democratic country. As the ideas of the Prague Spring are coming back to life in the USSR, the silenced generation of Czechs appears to show more courage and is accompanied by a younger generation of people with few or no memories of 1968. Destructive as the period of neo-Stalinism in Czechoslovakia has been, it has not succeeded in completely eradicating democratic traditions of the nation. A number of independent activities that have sprung up in the past few years, as well as the revival of interest in public matters, show that the Czechs are beginning to believe once again that their own political and civic activities have meaning, that they may be able to become masters of their own fate.

**Jiri Pehe**, from the Introduction
***The Prague Spring: A Mixed Legacy***

of these "achievements," as they are called, one pays with servitude. The basis of this type of government is an absolutely monstrous type of reasoning. When my friend was being dismissed from her writing job she defended herself by saying that according to the constitution she has a right to work. They laughed and told her that indeed she has but that nowhere in the constitution does it say she should not be making her living as a cleaning woman.

I read a review of a young author's book, penned by one of today's university professors of literature, a man who during the 1960s had no chance of making it higher than an official of the apparat. He said that the author had not properly used his talent to benefit society. An author's talent, wrote this cultivator of literature, belongs to the society. According to the precepts of this new age of slavery the "society"—as this parasitical class likes to call itself—is free *not* to make use of talent and to send an able literary critic to wash steps.

The situation is made more difficult by the fact that a certain psychological deformation takes place in people who are disposed of by the regime in such ways. Those who can't find a place for themselves through their independent spirit of entrepreneurship apart from the state begin to place their demands on the state and no longer upon themselves. In effect they are coming to an agreement with it.

**What was positive about the "expulsion from paradise" lay mainly in the fact that the one-time critical loyalists finally found themselves in the same position as the rest of the nation.**

I too first tried to find a place for myself inside this enclosed social structure. Three things were important to me—that the regime wouldn't succeed in proletarianizing my husband, that we wouldn't endanger the children who were still in school, and that I would manage to successfully defend my ability to write. The old publishing house personnel and dramaturgists were largely gone, but not so completely as to make it impossible for forbidden authors to publish under a different name. Not under a pseudonym, because through the central control of all payments that would be easily discovered, but under names of other people. Some of my friends use this method to publish to this day. I know of a case where the bogus author was even accepted into the writers' union on the basis of a good book. The real author's name, of course, had been kept strictly confidential.

Some day it will be hard for literary historians to find their way through such a jungle. And jungle rules predominate not only in the way such works are published but also in the division of royalties. This is done in various ways, according to how the bogus author values his name, how he regards the risk of such undertakings. It has been known for the bogus author to retain the entire payment for himself when the real author was unable to prevent such a theft. Several bogus authors have published my works under their names. They were friends and accepted no payment. Except for one—he took ten percent and was quite lovely in addition. Having acquired such a pleasant feeling about becoming a playwright, during rehearsals and especially on the evening of the premiere (I even bought some flowers for him), he started to advise me how to improve my dialogues. And this despite the fact that he found it difficult to write even a simple letter.

My first bogus author was a good friend, a talented director, now dead, who used to introduce himself on the phone as "your agent 007." I regret that even now I am not able to name him and express my gratitude. He looked around for acceptable material with which to counterbalance the various ideological garbage he was forced to direct. He chose my text and also signed it. We were a happily matched pair, seeing things similarly and with a related poetical sense. The production, which was the result of our cooperative effort, was quite successful; it was even made into a film. The entire company, except those who were not to know, had been told. The secret and dangerous nature of the production provoked the actors, costume designers and even the scenery movers into an exceptional effort. We were living through something which a few years later, in connection with the birth of Charter 77, was described by philosopher Jan Patocka as the solidarity of those suffering from shock. Faced with the same risk people sometimes became lifelong friends.

## Emigrating books

But in the end the mechanism of those in power proved to be too strong. With subsequent materials it was no longer possible for my friend to be both author and director, and other directors ruined the productions. Since I no longer wanted to write things for the purposes of contraband livelihood, I had to opt for a higher level of separation. My books emigrated in place of me.

To Czech authors, there is a difference in importance between a book published abroad in a foreign language translation and a book published there in Czech. A foreign language edition means success; it reaches many people. A Czech version published abroad, even though it is salvation for the written work, reaches few people abroad and readers at home sporadically or not at all. For a forbidden author to publish abroad is full of risks. Long ago, when Jan Benes was on trial, I felt a revulsion over the guilty verdict. But I also felt admiration for him: at that time it never occurred to me to publish in Czech with an exile publisher. In 1981 I was in jail precisely for that reason—my book was published abroad. When I let it out of my hand I knew what could happen to me as a result. Yet I did not want to tempt fate—that's not my

nature. In the book itself I was trying to get a friend fresh from prison to tell me about her experiences.

When the time came I did what I felt I had to do. Within the stench of an unaired cell, while climbing steps and walking through corridors that, during the 1950s, had seen the passage of so-called enemies of state sentenced to hang or to serve long prison terms, I felt many things. Dressed in a worn flyer's shirt and running pants loosened by time, I also felt relief. My institutional separation had reached its summit. A prisoner is not dragged behind bars with his loyalty intact.

The shock of one's drop in social standing does not always lead to far-reaching changes in viewpoint. Inside many of my friends the ideals of 1968 remained fixed as permanent values to which a society must return. It remains their hope existentially and as a means of their livelihood. Because of these ideas they believe in their future only in terms of their own importance and a return to their former position. The truth, however, remains, that he who has allowed social demise to transform the defeated ideal into a fixed idea is in danger of succumbing to soured discontent, bitterness and also opportunism.

The salvation of conversion probably rests in the fact that under the pressure of a situation one examines as deeply as possible one's spiritual equipment and its potential. And when one discovers its limits, he looks for other options, other spiritual solutions. I, however, have no faith in conversion to the opposite side and I respect those who were able to free their spiritual horizon of ballast, yet did not fall prey to pressures of current fashion and opinion. I am someone who needs to form and renew a harmonious state within herself. I understand reserve in others but in myself I view it with revulsion. Harmony probably lies in making one's actions and thoughts into a unity. Even in my books I notice how my view and depiction of the world is balanced by my understanding of the new situation.

The film version of *Funeral Celebration* differs from the book in that another central hero is accented in it. I wouldn't be able to say how much this is caused by the differing requirements of film and literature and how much by my own inward shift. In the novel the hero is a worker, a carpenter and master of his craft. He is a small town man, considerate, wise and honest. After the war he becomes a functionary of the Communist party. The novel tells how power which had been won and put into practice is no longer a mere vision of movement but is its reality. It destroys not only ambitious people with base motives, but also those who are noble. The film script, on the other hand, was based on the opposite thought, that there are values before which even power (which is not choosy) must bow down. In the film, power has to retreat before the dignity of death despite the fact that the man who was being buried did not possess much dignity during his life.

The problem of power has always fascinated Czech writers. Revolutionary violence, its aftermath and guilt feelings cried out to be analyzed—becoming part of the spiritual climate. My third novel, *Cerna Hvezda (The Black Star)*, was written under the immediate influence of the 1968 tragedy. The theme had been chosen earlier. I began writing it in 1970 and the writing was accompanied all day long by the radio as a monstrous stimulus. The country was under the rule of the victors of 1968, and their outrageous lying and agitation only strengthened my determination. We were being hosed down by ideological sewage. Its stench settled like poisonous gas over the entire land. Those whom the book meant to warn against had become victors. There were days when I wrote as if in a wild dream. The protagonist of the novel is similar to my father in some of the circumstances of his life. The time span of the book is from the 1930s to the start of the '60s. It is a book about how one fights for power and how, after the victory, one deals with it on the highest level.

**Under the impenetrable cover of fake reality the fruits of change are ripening. And they seem to me to be more important and consequential than attempts to tear off the cover which is already rotting anyway.**

In the then-current anti-Communist atmosphere some of my critics felt it was wrong that the hero of the novel should be a Communist, but I regarded such criticism as facetious. I was proud that I had captured this general social danger called communism from the inside, through its internal functioning. And I do not consider it a mere facile argument to say that communism is one of the basic phenomena of our time, that it's impossible to avoid and that it is useful to describe it from the inside. In any case, many readers whose experience did not reach beyond the 1970s wept over the fate of my father who died in the 1960s as if that fate were their own. Also, one could use another facile argument: other movements besides communism ruled through their monopoly on opinions as well, for example religious movements. In the case of Czechoslovakia's own dramatic history, until the dissolution of the Austrian monarchy the Catholic church had monopolized ideas.

But all this outside evidence is not important. I saw the problem of a limited view in something quite different. The hero of the novel is a man not particularly strong; in his youth he joined the Communists for sentimental reasons and also because of his own weakness: he did not want to remain an outsider. It was the way many an intellectual joined the Communist movement. He is talented, moves up and becomes a famous journalist, but never stops being split by the chasm between his own decency and the indecency of power. His decency pre-

vents him from using his power several times and, in the end, the unscrupulous rulers of the Movement wipe the floor with him. And the limited viewpoint? The hero of the novel is without an alternative viewpoint, remaining inside himself. He defends himself, hesitates and when he harms someone it is only himself. But he is still a prisoner of the power monopoly; failing to find a way out he dies by his own hand.

Of course, while writing the novel I would not have been able to formulate an explanation of it so clearly; the convenient view from the inside also constituted my limitations. In this case the circumstances were useful and fruitful, but in the future they could deteriorate into a hollow, claustrophobic shell. I don't know what it was and how it resulted in my realization that a criticism of power can become a fascination with power, that when you begin to criticize it too much, you find yourself within the sphere of its influence. In the full freedom of his exile, Czech writer Josef Skvorecky wrote his novel *Mirakl (The Miracle)*. He had been unable to achieve such a clean incision in any of his previous works written at home. In *The Miracle* he described the conditions through the eyes of another type of existence. He wrote about our times through the eyes of "the others," those whose connection with power was such that they were being choked by it. That was an alternative, a liberating stance which, when applied to myself, I accepted as justly critical.

As part of my own, complex research I wrote the novel *Pan veze (Master of the Tower)*. Its form is that of an intrusion of planes—what is current mixes with distant history, reality with imagination, fact with parable. Because the hero of the book, a writer, sold himself, he is unable to finish the most important work of his life, a novel about Christ. Upon dying he is resurrected for eternity by love; he lives through all that he had been writing about during Easter Week in Jerusalem. It is a novel about a novel and also about guilt and desire for expiation. The writing does not strictly adhere to the gospels; Jesus is not God to the writer, but a man with actions so principled that he could be pronounced God. Mainly due to this, the book got the reception which usually befalls books asking questions with such a vehemence: at times enthusiasm, at other times violent antagonism.

That ideas permeate the world has been proven for me through an outstanding philosophical study *Kristus pro ateisty (Christ For Atheists)* by Professor Milan Machovec, and also through the excellent essay *O povaze nasi kultury (On the Character of Our Culture)* by Professor Vaclav Cerny. Machovec examines the possible factual basis of the gospels and the roots of that which shapes us, while Cerny looks into that special mix of ancient paganism and eastern Christianity, two sources of European spirituality, which again and again knot themselves so painfully through European history. Of course a writer draws from his own feeling of the times, not from previously thought-out theories. A writer searches for an explanation of his time; in choosing the theme aside from the atmosphere of the times I was also influenced by the roots of childhood and early adolescence. In those two books I became aware of the complex background of even my own thought.

It seems to me that the spiritual aspirations of a particular time tend always to deal with central themes, stressed independently by various people. Correct or not, I believe in the vitality of my novel; for me, it has already provided a sharp ray of light. The realization that the truth of the world is comprised of all that which is complex and paradoxical, calls for one to differentiate and to be as precise as possible in one's explanation. In order for a person to understand the world, he must keep creating a spark within himself, remain open. Only with such openness is it possible without mutilation, without one-sidedness, to study everything without destroying it: the genuineness and falseness of this world, the past and future of humans, the existence or not of God—whatever it is that shapes and deeply affects us. Only in openness is there such a great spiritual strength and freedom.

## "Trust nobody!"

In the transformations of our two decades we saw the other face of liberty, and we were to engage it in practice as well. I will attempt to express it via a small detour. My last book was about prison, the novel *Pritelkyne z domu smutku (My Companions from the Bleak House)*. Some of my friends say that my prison experience helped me to write my best work. The prison experience is a good experience, so good that to have been in prison constitutes (in Czechoslovakia) almost an honor instead of shame, but I still do not consider it indispensable to a writer's creativity. Something much more important than the mere acquisition of material developed through my own prison experience. Whenever a human being becomes powerless, the poles between those who rule and those who are ruled are drawn astonishingly far apart. The imprisoned pariah becomes a real pariah only when the warden reveals how much of a master he actually is. This is probably true everywhere, but in relation to regimes with a monopoly of power this drawing apart of the poles so faithfully expresses the condition of the entire society that to describe a prison, the fate of imprisoned people, means to describe our society. One recognizes himself in the fate of the prisoners even when one has never been in prison, even when one is afraid of it. Unfreedom, exposed in its nakedness, is an indictment of unfreedom disguised.

For me the distance between the poles had been personified by two people—my interrogator and one of my prisoner friends, a young gypsy woman. The interrogator would arrive well dressed, shaved, perfumed, carrying a cup of fresh hot coffee which he refused to provide for me when my lawyer asked him. He was about thirty-five with a recent law degree which he acquired not at a university but at a school for state security. He was starting his career with my case, proud of his cultivated

life, the amount of reading he had done. "A book is the only thing I could ever steal," he said as he lovingly went through a laundry basket full of books and manuscripts which had been confiscated in my apartment. He considered them a transgression and conducted his interrogations on the basis of the material. To this date they have not been returned to me, despite the fact that our group has never been brought to trial.

On the other hand the gypsy woman, who carried the delightful nickname of Rum Praline, could neither read nor write. I wrote her letters for her and she would then shyly print her name at the end—she didn't know how to do more. She arrived in the cell with a monstrous black eye and a severed nerve in her lip. According to what she said, she had been arrested either for kidnaping a child, for not paying the upkeep for her child in a state institution, or for stabbing her lover in the stomach. But everything she told us could also have been the product of her imagination—telling stories was an activity very much favored by prisoners. Once Andy—Rum Praline—returned from an unexpected medical examination. During a walk in a remote corner of the prison courtyard where we couldn't be heard she said to me: "Eva, trust nobody, nobody!" And then she added, in an even lower voice, "Not even me."

This is exactly how, under collective danger, under mutual inhuman pressures, something develops which for a person's freedom is as important as his separation from the institutions and that of his opinion. His own community is thereby created. Andy, because she refused to be an informer, had joined me against the interrogator; a community of the powerless had been created. And with Andy's help I am now coming to the pinnacle of our separation, our solitude, our freedoms: the development of independent communities and activities. Our experience with totalitarian power resulted in a practical and at the same time basic decision to simply circumvent power wherever this becomes essential. To create one's own, parallel structures is a far-reaching thing. Inside a totalitarian system, cells are being born to provide other solutions in the future. That is how editions of typewritten manuscripts are born, how periodicals are circulated in typewritten form in twelve copies, how Charter 77 was born. That's how people's spirits are being revived, not only in churches and at religious services, but also at jazz and rock concerts and in movie houses.

When the English film *Ghandi* was released in Czechoslovakia, people remained seated as if glued to their seats even after the movie had ended. And in those seconds a community of people with the same feelings and thoughts was born. An ozone of unity flowed through their consciences. And it remains a mystery why the factual, sober and circumspect Czechs felt Gandhi's way to be their way, especially when far and wide in this land no leader resembling Gandhi can be detected.

Under the impenetrable cover of fake reality the fruits of change are ripening. And they seem to me to be more important and consequential than attempts to tear off the cover which is already rotting anyway. ■

*Translated by Jan Drabek*

# A Close Shave—Sandinista Style

Bernard Nietschmann

Minister of Interior Tomás Borge ordered my deportation from Nicaragua on the manufactured charge that I had created an incident on 5 March 1988 in the East Coast Indian communities of Little Sandy Bay and Karawala in a conflict with a "Sandinista official" that led to his being shot and seriously wounded. Actually, I did verbally challenge a DGSE (Sandinista State Security) psychopath named Melward who had ambushed and wounded a Little Sandy Bay boy named Junior Rubin Mitchell and then tortured him by cutting off his ears and digging out his tongue and eyes before killing him.

Junior and another boy, Betti Cornelius, had been picking coconuts several kilometers north of the village on Sunday morning, 7 February 1988. Betti was taken prisoner and sent to jail in Bluefields. The boys were members of a YATAMA unit based near Lausiksa, fifteen kilometers north of Little Sandy Bay.

**In Managua, Brooklyn Rivera told Tomás Borge, "Please give our thanks to your security and government people on the coast. Their threats and repression against the people further strengthened the Indian position and advanced YATAMA's work." Borge replied, "Yes, they goofed."**

On 2 February 1988 YATAMA and the Sandinista government had signed an agreement that included a provision that no offensive military actions be initiated by either side. The YATAMA units had been directed to cease ambushes and to wait for further orders. But the heavily armed DGSE unit based at Karawala, five kilometers west of Little Sandy Bay, either ignored the orders and initiated their own attack, or were operating with orders from others in the FSLN who wanted to keep the war going. The members of the DGSE unit include "Kelly," first in command; "Melward," who was second in command; "Quinto," "Gein," and another twelve to fifteen personnel.

I was accompanying the YATAMA delegation on a visit to twenty-one east coast communities as part of the second round of peace negotiations between the FSLN and YATAMA, the Indian armed resistance organization that was leading a seven-year-long defensive war against the Sandinista military invasion and occupation of the Miskito, Sumo and Rama nations. The eight-member YATAMA delegation headed by Brooklyn Rivera demanded access to the off limits east coast war zone—where most of the emergency laws are still in effect—in order to present the details of the YATAMA peace initiative to the Indian and Creole communities. The village communities of the four east coast nations had shouldered the burden of this hidden war by supplying sons and daughters, information, shelter, and hard to get food to Misurasata, Misura and Kisan resistance groups, now united as YATAMA. One community had lost twenty-seven sons and daughters killed while fighting the Sandinista army or after being detained by the DGSE.

In Bluefields on 4 March we met with Betti Cornelius's parents—the boy arrested by the Karawala DGSE unit—who were in town to seek the release of their son who was being held in the security prison. Barefoot, poor and worried about their son's prospects of surviving, they told us the events their son had witnessed when he and Junior had been ambushed about a month before. Brooklyn Rivera then went to the prison *comandante* and demanded the release of Betti Cornelius who, as a member of YATAMA, was part of the no hostilities agreement with the FSLN, and thus, had been illegally arrested and jailed. The comandante agreed to release Betti the next day, Saturday.

Saturday morning we left for Little Sandy Bay, a Miskito seaside community, just north of the mouth of the river the Miskito call Awaltara (Río Grande), along the Caribbean coast of Yapti Tasba, the four-nation territory that YATAMA is fighting to free and the FSLN is fighting to occupy. We were accompanied by the Conciliation Commission which is composed of CEPAD (Comité Evangélico Para Desarrollo) and Moravian Church leaders and which acts as the intermediary in the YATAMA-Sandinista negotiations.

## "I am the only law"

In Little Sandy Bay the YATAMA delegation and the Conciliation Commission met with the village people in the Moravian Church. Melward, the DGSE officer, came into the church in an effort to intimidate the people but YATAMA requested the Conciliation Committee to ask him to leave. After the YATAMA presentation, Little Sandy Bay people began to discuss their problems. Their biggest problem was Melward. Junior's brother described the body when he found it and the reign of terror Melward had imposed on the people. Melward had told the community that it was useless for them to complain to authorities in Bluefields, because, as he said: "Here in Little Sandy

Bay and Karawala I am the only law and what I say and do is the law."

We next visited nearby Karawala, a Sumo community that is being used as the DGSE base. One of the delegation, Britanico Cutberth, was from Karawala and had not seen his family since 1981, when he "went into the bush" to fight the Sandinista occupation. Britanico had fought in the central coast region for years. In January 1985 he was part of the Misurasata unit that met and then accompanied Brooklyn Rivera when he came by outboard-powered canoe from Costa Rica to talk to the communities about the just completed first round of negotiations with the FSLN held in December 1984 in Bogotá, Columbia. The Sandinistas learned of Brooklyn's presence in the central coast area and sent in planes, boats and troops to try to kill the only leader of a resistance army who would negotiate with them.

During the bombing and rocket attack Britanico's foot was seriously wounded. He was evacuated to Costa Rica and operated on. Three years later he was in his home village, with a cane and prosthetic lower leg and foot, standing in front of the church and DGSE headquarters in the late afternoon sun as his people ran to welcome and embrace him. And he smiled and his eyes glistened and everyone tried to touch him and hold him. He was Karawala's hero and had come home if but for a brief visit on a Saturday afternoon. We all stopped and watched the homecoming and silently rejoiced at witnessing one of the truly happy moments in this long and brutal war. I took a picture of Britanico but the focus was very blurry. But we don't need a photograph to remember such moments.

## "You have to respect the people"

As we were leaving to return to our boat, Melward and several heavily armed DGSE people positioned themselves on both sides of the wharf so that all the village people who were walking with us had to pass in front of them. There they stood with AK-47s, RPG-7s, and a large-caliber machine gun. We had to climb across the DGSE boat (an aluminum river boat with two 75-horsepower outboards) to get into the Moravian Church boat. I was the last to climb aboard. Melward stood in the DGSE boat, AK-47 in hand and glared at our group and at the Karawala villagers lined up on the edge of the wharf.

I was worried that when we left, Melward would retaliate against the people in Little Sandy Bay and Karawala for telling us about the murder and mutilation of Junior, as well as other crimes. To neutralize Melward's likely vengeance, I decided to put him on notice publicly.

I said to him in Spanish, "I am going to investigate the death of the boy. You have to respect the people."

He got angry and started to point his AK-47. "Kelly," the DGSE first-in-command, told him to stop but Melward continued to menace me with the AK-47. "Do you have a problem with me?" he growled.

He was no more than a body length away and I could clearly see the hate in his eyes as his body trembled with repressed rage. "The people have a problem with you," I said. "Don't hurt them. Respect them."

We then left. The DGSE boat rushed by, and out on the river it turned around and ran toward our boat at full speed, missing us by a couple of feet. The DGSE people sneered as they raised and pointed their RPG-7 rocket launchers in the air—a gang of delinquents with rocket launchers, government uniforms and unquestioned authority, even the right to kill.

The following day, Sunday, Melward was shot and seriously wounded. I didn't find out about this until some days later when Tomás Borge accused me of "provoking" the shooting. I didn't provoke Melward's shooting. By his own hand he aimed that weapon. The resistance fighters made it very clear from the beginning: those Sandinista military and security who oppress, torture and kill innocent people will themselves be killed. DGSE Comandante Juan Bimbo had been killed in Tasbapauni in 1983 by Bruno's Misurasata group after Bimbo had killed and beaten several people. A list of thirty-five people to be shot or arrested was found on Bimbo's body. In 1985 in Haulover, another killer and torturer, Jimmy Boppel, was shot by a Misurasata unit after he led an EPS (Sandinista army) attack on the community.

**The transfer was high drama... Modesto was at my side in the back of the bouncing truck: "Be cool, Nietschmann, be cool," he counseled. I took a flash photograph. John Paul Lederach, Mennonite representative to the Conciliation Commission, begged me not to take *any* photographs at the airport. "Please don't cause us any more trouble."**

At any rate, the DGSE and Borge wanted me out of the country because they have the paternalistic notion that I and other advisors are behind Brooklyn Rivera's Indian politics. In the first round, Borge ordered that I "abandon the country" but YATAMA fought this demand on a self-determination basis and I stayed. At the start of the second round, Borge blocked Clem Chartier, a YATAMA advisor and past president of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, from entering Nicaragua; Borge finally relented and Clem was able to join us in Managua.

The objective of our second YATAMA trip to the coast was to inform communities about YATAMA'S autonomy plan and position in the negotiations. We had already visited many communities in the Sandinista-occupied areas and we now wanted to go to those in the liberated area (no Sandinistas for some sixty miles between Wawa and Little Sandy Bay). In the past Clem Chartier and I had made different fact-finding trips with Miskito fighters to these central coast communities and were anxious to re-

turn to see old friends and thank them for saving our lives.

When we went to the nearby Wawa River landing at Lamlaya to leave for the central coast villages, two DGSE officials ordered Brooklyn not to take me on the trip and said that I could not leave Puerto Cabezas. Brooklyn told them to stuff it and asked what orders they had if we went anyway. They would send helicopters after us. If that happened, Brooklyn responded, the entire delegation would pull out. Brooklyn told me to get into a canoe; we left the DGSE open-mouthed on the landing and headed to the liberated zone in two outboard-powered dugout canoes.

Three days later, 12 March, we left the village of Haulover, the site of some of the fiercest fighting in the Sandinista-Yapti Tasba war, and headed by sea to Puerto Cabezas. Knifing through the swells in a mahogany canoe and being lashed and soaked by bow spray was as good that morning as during any sea trip I'd made in the twenty years I've travelled this coast.

We avoided the anticipated DGSE stakeout at the Lamlaya river landing by staying at sea and going straight to Puerto Cabezas. We took the canoe through the surf and landed in front of the "Beach People" barrio south of the wharf. The "Beach People" are from Big Sandy Bay, Dakura, Wawa and other coastal communities and represent strong support for Brooklyn and YATAMA. Our Wawa motorman organized a huge dump truck to carry us to the hotel (We put five across the front seat).

## On the way to "Immigration"...

Ten minutes after arriving at the hotel a DGSE woman named Carmen came for my passport and took it from me. Clem Chartier photographed the seizure of my passport despite being ordered by DGSE Carmen not to do so. It was clear by her angry reaction that Sandinista State Security is not used to people ignoring their orders. Carmen ordered me to go with her to "Immigration." I said I would change my clothes first (three days of travel by sea going from village to village left me soaking wet). She left with my passport.

## ... bad guys

While I was in the wash house in the hotel's backyard rinsing off with well water, the DGSE bad guys came for me. The bad guys always wear sunglasses and carry leather satchels. They also brought two full combat gear Ministry of Interior soldiers. I watched through the cracks in the washhouse while the DGSE argued with Brooklyn, Marcos Hoppington and Samuel Mercado. Sam then left to go to the toilet so he could pass by where I was very quietly washing and shaving to say, "Barney, don't come out." I shaved three times, washed my hair, bathed and dried while the DGSE went room to room throughout the hotel looking for me. At the time there were sixty or seventy Miskito people in and around the hotel, all of whom knew where I was, but nobody said anything.

I spent the rest of the day in a hotel room. While the DGSE searched Puerto Cabezas for me, I carefully went through my bags and took out all letters, notes and exposed rolls of film. I emptied my cameras. If the DGSE managed to catch me, I was determined not to have any information that they could phony up to use against village leaders.

## ... heat

The room was on the top floor and the sun beat down on the corrugated metal roof turning my little sanctuary into an oven. I blocked the open window with a towel, sacrificing the faint breeze for concealment. I think I could have baked bread in that room. Even so, I was very happy to be there.

## ... *turba* chants

At about 1:00 P.M. some forty Ladino *turbas*—a vigilante mob—were brought in government trucks to the front of the hotel. A group of the *turbas* who said they were *Trabajadores Sandinistas* read in Spanish a denunciation of YATAMA's peace plan, accused Brooklyn Rivera of having blood on his hands, and presented a list of workers they claimed had been killed by YATAMA fighters, including the names of widows and fatherless children. The obligatory chants of *"no pasarán"* ended their presentation. Next, the *Juventud Sandinista*, who were mostly young Ladinos from western Nicaragua, read their declaration in Spanish condemning YATAMA for supposedly representing Reagan politics, for being mercenaries and *cuartomundistas*, and having *gringo* advisors, especially one they were looking for at that very moment. (Apparently, the *Juventud Sandinista* doesn't know that in the other negotiations with the Contras, two of the three government negotiators are foreigners, including one *gringo* and one German). More airhead drivel followed, accompanied by fifteen minutes of shouted slogans led by a local Sandinista party official, made up mostly of "*no pasarán*," "Yankee go home," "*gringo* go home," "*fuera Nietschmann*," "*fuera Rivera*," and demands that YATAMA go to South Africa, not Nicaragua, to talk about injustice. This completed the civil portion of the performance.

## ... *turba* violence

Next came the violent part. The *turbas* began throwing rocks at the hotel, beating on the walls with their clubs, 2x4s and metal pipes, and then they stormed the hotel and tried to smash in the doors to the rooms to find Brooklyn. During all of this time, a dozen Sandinista police and security people stood by and did nothing as the turbas continued to damage the hotel and threaten the YATAMA delegation. I had put my boots back on—they were still wet from the morning canoe trip from Haulover—and prepared to do the best I could as the bulging door threatened to break from *turba* body slams.

## ... and, finally, Miskito salvation

Miraculously just then the Indians came to save the besieged from the cavalry—to be exact Miskito women from the Puerto Cabezas open market, quickly followed by Miskito

people from all over the city—and they were all very angry. They drove the *turbas* out of the hotel and down the street until the Sandinista organizers had to rescue the *turbas* by rushing in with government trucks. The *turbas* fled shouting *"no pasarán."* Several hundred Miskito then surrounded the hotel to protect the YATAMA delegation. This was probably the first time anywhere the turbas had lost. Elsewhere in Nicaragua these paramilitary goon squads consistently got away with breaking up any anti-government demonstration or meeting by beating people with clubs and lead pipes. But the Miskito were not intimidated. Attacks by the Sandinista army, security and air force had failed to intimidate the Miskito people. With the *turbas* the odds were more even and the Miskito civilians were determined to fight to protect their YATAMA leaders.

Brooklyn, Samuel and Marcos left the hotel to walk to the park and market. As I later heard, about 2,000 Miskito people joined them on this walk of defiance past the Sandinista soldiers who were being trucked in from the nearby Kamla base and positioned throughout the city. Check points were set up at all roads leading into Puerto Cabezas to keep the people from coming to hear Brooklyn's talk the next afternoon at the baseball stadium.

I could hear the Sandinista loudspeaker jeeps as they passed blaring threats that anyone who went to the baseball stadium would not receive his government food rations (the only source of food), and that right here in Puerto Cabezas "Yankee Imperialists" and *"cuartomundistas"* were endangering the Revolution, and that people should look for the *"gringo acesor Nietschmann."* Britanico came in to tell me that the DGSE was blocking all access into and out of Puerto Cabezas.

## Leaving Puerto Cabezas

As I listened to loudspeaker jeeps and the Sandinistas' hastily made propaganda tapes, I worked on a plan to get out of Puerto Cabezas to the central coast villages from where I would try to make my way either to San Andrés, the Colombian island 120 miles to the east, or to Costa Rica more than 200 miles to the south.

But the DGSE told YATAMA that if I didn't leave Puerto Cabezas that day, the entire YATAMA delegation would have to leave Nicaragua immediately. It was evident from the number of Miskito people already on the streets (with more coming in from nearby villages) that State Security and the local Sandinista government people had failed in keeping the people away from YATAMA and so now the Sandinistas were trying to use me as the leverage. The local Sandinistas were desperate because YATAMA is a government in exile, and that government was there, staring them right in the face, and the Miskito people were openly supporting YATAMA.

I met with Modesto, Marcos, Samuel and Britanico in the room and told them that I was willing to be exchanged for YATAMA's opportunity to talk to the people tomorrow. Bilwi (Puerto Cabezas) is the capital of the Miskito Nation. Thousands of people were waiting in anticipation of Brooklyn's talk the next day, Sunday, and we'd come too far to let the Sandinistas block us now. Instead of going by sea to San Andrés or to Costa Rica, I decided to go with the Sandinistas. But how and where I would go were still to be agreed upon.

YATAMA, the Conciliation Commission and DGSE met three times to negotiate the terms of my departure. Modesto and Britanico came in and out of the room with news of the positions and progress. The DGSE wanted to expel me from Puerto Cabezas and deport me from Nicaragua. The YATAMA delegation wanted me to be able to stay for Sunday's baseball stadium assembly. East Coast State Security head Salvador Pérez and regional Sandinista representative Mirna Cunningham said absolutely not, I would have to leave today, and they had an airplane waiting. Modesto told me that the Sandinistas didn't want me to witness tomorrow's assembly and photograph and write about YATAMA's political impact or the *turba* attack that was being planned by Mirna Cunningham, José "Chepe" González, Hazel Lau, Rachel Dixon, Cesar Paiz and Salvador Pérez (the Sandinistas may have a military occupation of the Miskito capital city but they have no secrets). YATAMA stalled, the afternoon dragged on, and it became too late for the DGSE to fly YATAMA to Managua to catch the last flight to Costa Rica. The DGSE said that instead of being deported, they would hold me in one of their "safe houses" in Managua. Finally it was worked out that I would go to Managua accompanied by a CEPAD official to guarantee my safety and that I would stay in our regular accommodations, the Hotel Las Mercedes, to await the arrival of the YATAMA delegation on Monday.

Modesto came to bring me the final settlement at 6:15 P.M. I figured I was already in so much trouble that any more wouldn't matter, so I put some new film into one of my cameras to document being turned over to Sandinista State Security.

The transfer was high drama. I came out of the hotel just after sunset, surrounded by scores of Miskito well-wishers, Brooklyn gave me a big hug and said everyone would miss me the next day at the rally, and then I climbed into the back of the white Toyota CEPAD pickup truck with many of the YATAMA people. Clem Chartier and Modesto Watson were there, enthusiastic, hanging tough. In front were Dr. Gustavo Parajón and Octavio Cortés, president and vice-president of CEPAD. Modesto was at my side in the back of the bouncing truck: "Be cool, Nietschmann, be cool," he counseled. I took a flash photograph. John Paul Lederach, Mennonite representative to the Conciliation Commission, begged me not to take *any* photographs at the airport. "Please don't cause us any more trouble." And I thought *I* was the one in trouble!

At the airport security gate, we were checked by Cesar Paiz, second-in-command for the DGSE in the occupied territory and known torturer. To be instantly recognized by one of the main torturers used by the Sandinistas is not the best feeling. "He is here. Open up." We then drove out onto the field where a Soviet military AN-26 aircraft was waiting for me with turboprops running. Around the lowered back ramp were six military jeeps, ten AK-47-

carrying DGSE, and the top Puerto Cabezas Sandinistas: Mirna Cunningham, Hazel Lau, Jose "Chepe" González, Salvador Pérez and Cesar Paiz, among others.

## "Be cool Nietschmann"

The DGSE's main man on the coast, Salvador Pérez, who works directly under hard-liner Tomás Borge, came for me with two other security officers.

"Sr. Pérez, where is my passport?" I asked.

"In Managua."

"That was very fast. When will my passport be given to me?"

"Tomorrow," Pérez replied, obviously upset that this issue was being raised.

"But tomorrow is Sunday. Surely State Security does not work on Sunday."

"It will be given to you on Monday."

"You have a radio, why don't you call to Managua and have my passport ready at the airport when we land tonight."

"We will give you your passport," Pérez emphasized by taking a step toward me.

I didn't have a lot of confidence in Sr. Pérez. To me it sounded like he had never considered returning my passport and was just saying anything to get me on their airplane. During this exchange over my passport, Dr. Gustavo Parajón was trying to introduce Octavio Cortés who was to travel with me as the Conciliation Commission's guarantor for my safety.

Throughout, Modesto was quietly saying to me, "Nietschmann, be cool," interspersed with loud, direct and forceful remarks to Salvador Pérez: "The agreement is that Nietschmann is to be taken to the hotel," "Nowhere else," "You are responsible for his safety," "Return his passport." Thank God for Modesto.

The increasing whine of the turboprops made further remarks impossible. Salvador went up the ramp and stood at the top waiting. I shook hands with Modesto and the rest of the YATAMA people and walked up the ramp. "Chepe" followed and pointed for me to sit next to him. The ramp clanged shut and the plane turned and immediately pulled out onto the runway and took off for the seventy-minute flight to Managua.

*A Miskito resistance fighter deep inside Sandinista-occupied Indian territory.*

The plane was filled with Sandinista MINT (Ministry of Interior) special forces and many "BLI" (anti-guerilla units) wounded were in the aisle and on seat benches along the sides. In all there were fourteen wounded, eight of whom were on stretchers and two of these looked serious. Blood-soaked field dressings were on the chests and midbodies of the ones on stretchers. The others had dressings on their arms and lower legs, and two had bandages over their ears. A doctor gave blood and morphine to the worst while an assistant took down the names and addresses of all the wounded.

Across the aisle Salvador Pérez quietly talked to a "BLI" officer and then scowled at me as if I were responsible for the wounded. In response to my query about the wounded, Chepe said they had been in a truck accident in Truslaya (one of the government's former Tasba Pri relocation camps now used as an EPS base). But the wounds, mud, sweat and fatigue didn't suggest a "truck accident."

We landed at the darkened Aeropuerto Augusto Sandino; the lack of lights was probably due more to the critical electrical shortages than to security. Instead of taking me across the street from the Sandino Airport to the Hotel Las Mercedes as agreed, Salvador and Chepe drove me to a DGSE building. I protested loudly and tried to get Sr. Cortés, whose task it was to guarantee my safety, to yell bloody hell about the agreement not being kept. He was frightened and clutched his overnight bag in silence—a decent man thrust into a bad situation.

As we drove through the almost deserted streets of Managua, I went through my bags in the dark of the back of the yellow Toyota Land Cruiser and blindly felt for and retrieved a pocket knife and a "Leatherman" pocket multitool, my money, a cap, sunglasses and one shirt. The rest I would leave. I could tell where south was from the stars. In front of DGSE, I got ready to bail out the back door. But Salvador came out of the building alone and we then drove to his house, changed cars, and an hour and a half after landing I was taken to the hotel. The DGSE still had my passport and I was instructed to stay in the hotel.

So in one day I'd come by dugout canoe at sea from

Haulover, the heart of liberated Miskito territory, to Sandinista occupied Puerto Cabezas, to avoiding DGSE arrest, a negotiated expulsion on an FAS military airplane loaded with EPS wounded, and was finally to be confined without passport in one of Managua's nicest hotels with at least two plainclothes security people in front.

As soon as I got into the hotel room I made calls to Costa Rica to my wife, Angelina, and to Modesto's wife, Fran Watson, to get things moving on the diplomatic front. Angelina telephoned Armstrong Wiggins, YATAMA's foreign minister in Washington, and he called Indian rights lawyer Jim Anaya and they both made wakeup calls to others. By Sunday morning the U.S. Embassy in Managua was on the move and they sent over the duty officer to get the information on why I'd been expelled from Puerto Cabezas. I asked him to make a formal request to the Nicaraguan government for the reasons for my expulsion, seizure of passport, and hotel confinement.

**The Foreign Ministry told the U.S. Consul that I could not return to the East Coast. If I did "it was likely that I would end up on a statistic sheet."**

On Monday the 14th, the Nicaraguan government had it that I had been removed from Puerto Cabezas for my own safety, that I had been free to leave the hotel, and that my passport would be returned right away. The Foreign Ministry told Wayne Griffith, U.S. Consul in Managua, that I could not return to the East Coast and that if I did the Nicaraguan government could not be responsible for my safety and "it was likely that I would end up on a statistic sheet." At noon, Lumberto Campbell, Sandinista head of the Southern Coast region, came to the hotel and gave me my passport.

Lumberto is just about the only Sandinista who will talk to me and we had lunch together. He said there had been a lot of diplomatic activity over this incident (Washington and the U.S. Embassy in Managua). I told him that the real incident occurred on 7 February when the DGSE man Melward shot and mutilated "Junior" several kilometers north of Little Sandy Bay, and that the killing took place during the period in which FSLN and YATAMA forces had agreed upon no hostilities, an agreement signed on 2 February. It was Lumberto's responsibility as head of Zelaya Sur to inform the military units in his region and to investigate not only infractions, but abuses of power at any time perpetrated by people such as Melward who could very well be psychopathic. I also told him that I didn't want this manufactured incident to spill over into the negotiations. I asked Lumberto to investigate Melward's treatment of the Karawala and Little Sandy Bay people. Another complaint that we'd received from these and other village people was that Sandinista military units were on the small offshore islands and wouldn't allow the fishermen and turtlemen to go to sea which meant the communities were without fish and meat. In Kum on the Wangki we learned of two unprovoked attacks by Sandinista military units after the accord had been signed. In one incident, EPS soldiers had surrounded and machine gunned a house in Kum killing a YATAMA boy, Archilius Abraham Mesco ("Tilba Lupia"), who was sick with malaria and who had gone home to be cared for by his mother.

I said that from all that we found out on the trip about abuses by the EPS and DGSE and the *turba* attacks in Puerto Cabezas, that it seemed to me that YATAMA was showing considerable tolerance to continue any negotiations. Lumberto replied, "Yes, we too are demonstrating tolerance," with the implication that the tolerance was toward me.

Monday at 6:00 P.M. the YATAMA delegation and Conciliation Commission arrived from Puerto Cabezas. I had received no news of what had happened at the previous day's meeting at the baseball stadium but judging from the bandages on three of the Conciliation Commission's people it must have been rough. Several thousand people were in the stadium to hear Brooklyn whose attempt to speak was hampered by thunderous noise from Sandinista artillery, anti-aircraft cannons and machine guns on the other side of the outfield fence, low-flying Sandinista airplanes, and by shouting from *turbas* who had doubled their numbers to approximately eighty people. After Brooklyn's extremely well-received presentation, the *turbas* tried to attack the YATAMA delegation with metal pipes, chains, clubs and rocks. Some looked for me. One *turba* was seen beating Yassir, our Ministry of Foreign Relations protocol man, with a 2x4 and shouting "Nietschmann! Nietschmann!" The *turbas* attacked the Conciliation Commission in the CEPAD truck, breaking all the windows with chains and trying to pull the people out across the broken glass. But the Miskito people and KISAN Por La Paz fighters drove the *turbas* back and finally routed them using the *turbas'* own rocks and clubs. Twenty *turbas* and three Conciliation Commission members were wounded.

Sunday, 13 March, is now known as *La Guerra de Piedras* (The War of the Rocks). The Miskito people decisively defeated the Sandinistas' paramilitary *turbas*, the Sandinistas had failed to keep the people from attending the YATAMA meeting, and the Sandinista occupation government suffered a major setback due to the people's brave defiance.

In Managua when YATAMA and the FSLN resumed discussions, Brooklyn Rivera told Tomás Borge, "Please give our thanks to your security and government people on the coast. Their threats and repression against the people further strengthened the Indian position and advanced YATAMA's work." Borge replied, "Yes, they goofed." ■

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# East of Germany, West of Russia

Zbigniew Brzezinski

I wish to focus on the issue of the proper *political* place and on the *political* future of the region between Germany and Russia. By focusing on the political dimension I do not wish to reopen, nor am I qualified to do so, the old debate among historians regarding the correct cultural-historical identification of the region that lately most have been calling Eastern Europe.

I am familiar with the broad dividing lines in the debate, and also with the fact that it has been waged with genuine intellectual vigor by many historians since at least the 1920s. The distinguished Yale University historian, Piotr Wandycz, a very great admirer of the works of Hugh Seton-Watson, recently recounted the debates waged at the Fifth International Congress of Historians, held back in 1923 in Brussels, and at the Seventh Congress, held in 1933 in Warsaw, over the proper historical definition of the region east of Germany and west of Russia. Between these two major states a new political reality had emerged as a consequence of World War I. Inevitably, scholars had to probe more deeply into the question that also agitated the politicians: Was that reality of several independent states something artificial, or was it firmly grounded in authentic history? To most historians of the region, the answer has been clear. The region represents a distinctive part of Europe. It is European. Yet it fits neatly into neither Europe's west nor its east.

**In a significant way the competition for the future of Europe, which has been underway for some forty years now, is shifting from the possible Soviet domination of Western Europe to the possible loss of Soviet domination in the East.**

That historical perspective has been echoed by those who partake of and express the region's cultural contribution to the larger European entity. In recent years, both Milan Kundera and Czeslaw Milosz have eloquently stressed the unique cultural identity of a region whose boundaries cannot be precisely fixed but over which, more often than not, forces from the West and the East have brutally collided. The tragic consequences of that collision have given the region a personality with a peculiar metaphysical character based on a community of suffering, a suffering which in turn has preoccupied its writers, poets and thinkers with the absurdity of life as well as with the mystery of humanness. Suffice it to evoke here the names of Kafka, Bruno Schultz (who is just being discovered), and Mrozek in order to grasp the central dimension of the tragic and the absurd in the daily life of the region.

In the era of mass executions, purges and the holocaust, that tragic absurdity has become suffused with transcendental pain. Its social impact was poignantly expressed by yet another of the region's tribunes, Mircea Eliade, who noted that it was the special fate, literally, of millions of central Europeans to discover through the mortifying but also cleansing experience of imprisonment, torture and suffering in themselves and in others a redeeming spiritual quality.

## East Europe, "Central" Europe

Let me state my political thesis immediately: The contemporary political notion of *East Europe* is the product of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. That is, it is the consequence of the political arrangement that reflected the power realities of the mid-1940s. It produced a condition in which there were, indeed, only two Europes, Western Europe and Eastern Europe. That condition has endured for some four decades. It has been perpetuated by the East-West struggle for the future of Europe, which in turn has made the division of Europe into the eastern and western halves all the sharper and all the more dramatic. Each half has been tied and subordinated to a non-European power. The dominant reality defining that division has been the confrontation between the U.S., itself a cultural and democratic extension of Western Europe, and the Soviet Union, which is geographically, in part, an Eastern European state, though it is culturally much influenced by its prolonged exposure to oriental despotic traditions. But this condition, it is my firm belief, is now gradually coming to an end. We are witnesses to an important historical development: the revival of the authentic and distinctive personality of a major segment of Europe, a process that consequently warrants the use again—politically and even much more so culturally and historically—of the term "Central Europe."

How is this happening, and what might be the policy implications of this truly important process? Our point of departure for answering these questions has to be the recognition that two centrally important facts have defined the last forty years of that region's history. The *first* is that communism was imposed on it from outside by a

politically and culturally alien formation, by the Soviet Union, where Marxism had been adapted to its own special, rather distinctive, oriental despotic conditions, and thence was grafted by force on societies with altogether different political notions, different religious and cultural traditions, and a different sense of subjective self-identification.

The *second* is that the dominant nation was viewed by the subordinated nations as culturally inferior, thus precipitating a retrogressive subjugation. This is an important point, drawing a very sharp and pregnant contrast between the experience of the Soviet empire and the experience of, say, the French or British empires. In these latter cases, notwithstanding the objective element of subordination and subjugation, even within the subordinated peoples, there was some sense that a dominant nation was a possessor of values and culture with which the subordinated wished to identify itself. This varies from empire to empire, but the *mission civilatrice* was not phony. Senegal's appreciation for French literature is but one example of the impact of French culture, projected by French power, upon the subordinated country. None of that is true of the relationship of Eastern Europe to Soviet domination. I leave aside the question of whether the lack of a sense of cultural inferiority—nay, even the sense of cultural superiority—by the subordinated peoples towards the Russians is objectively justified. The fact is they feel that way. The average inhabitant of the region felt that domination by Moscow represented domination by a source of cultural inferiority and was a historically retrogressive step.

## Catching up with the West

Thus, these two conditions shaped the reality of Eastern Europe over forty years. Why were both of these very important handicaps to Soviet imperial sway obscured by the understandable desire of the population of the region for rapid social and economic recovery? They were obscured by the mirage of catching up with the West, which was one of the major claims of the new Communist regimes. It was claimed that within a brief historical period of time Poland or Czechoslovakia would outstrip, for example, Great Britain in industrial development and in general modernization. They were also obscured by reverence for Soviet power, which was very real in the wake of the defeat of Nazi Germany, and even by a kind of perverse admiration for Stalin's personal power.

All of that is now gone. Recovery has not closed the gap with the West, and everybody in the region knows that. The Soviet Union, moreover, is now seen as a stagnant uncreative system, unable to cast off its own Stalinist veneer and its own deeply rooted Stalinist system, although still striving to preserve what is now in effect a "co-stagnation sphere" in Eastern Europe. The technological gap between the Soviet Union and, especially, the United States and Japan has had a devastating impact throughout the region, as well as the world, on the notion that the Soviet system has discovered the key to social innovation and that it represents the wave of the future.

## Poland—pluralist possibilities

The greatest impact of all of these changes has been felt and has manifested itself in Poland. Solidarity, while having lost the tactical battle for organizational freedom, won the struggle for societal self-emancipation. Solidarity was tactically defeated in the political context, but it has prevailed at the historical-cultural level. In Poland, the Communist government still governs, but it is unable either to indoctrinate or to reconstruct society in its own image. On the contrary, on the social level there is now widespread evidence, almost routine manifestations, of the revival of genuine political life in Poland, of authentic political life.

**In Poland, Solidarity, while having lost the tactical battle for organizational freedom, won the struggle for societal self-emancipation...tactically defeated in the political context...it has prevailed at the historical-cultural level.**

Here, we come to a new condition. Part of the essence of Communist rule—of its totalitarian self-expression—is not only the suppression but the elimination of any independent political thought, especially of any independent political dialogue that needs social interaction, for that in effect is the beginning of the political process. Today in Poland you have a genuine political life on the societal level. It is not a genuine political life in the sense of an open, institutionalized, constitutionally governed political competition. But it is, nonetheless, a political life on the societal level involving a dialogue, the exchange of views, the articulation of alternative programs—not just opposition to communism but the articulation of alternative liberal programs, social democratic programs, conservative programs, and even very right-wing nationalist programs as an alternative to the ruling regime.

All of this is expressed in wide-ranging publications—newspapers, books, magazines—published underground but operating on the semi-surface, in effect testifying to the emergence of a de facto political opposition as a normal condition of life, although that political opposition is still not in a position to claim that. It exists, and by existing it postulates something about the future. It is clear, and the public opinion polls show it, that by and large communism in Poland is discredited. The Communist elite is either isolated or is gradually being co-opted to the more enduring national values. In that sense, culture and history have already been recaptured by the authentic national personality.

All of this is taking place in a setting of massive economic stagnation and growing economic crisis. Barring

a return to terror, which I think is unlikely, or a massive social explosion, which is quite possible, followed by Soviet intervention, which is not to be ruled out, continued decay and a gradual transformation into a kind of pluralist system is possible. Certainly, all of that is dominated by a growing desire to be part of an authentic Europe. This problem for Moscow is accentuated by growing regional unrest of which Poland may be the spearhead and the most advanced case but by no means the only case.

Throughout the region, we are witnesses to the phenomenon of the organic rejection by the social system of an alien transplant. That is what has historically happened in Eastern Europe. The alien system, grafted on by force from outside, is being repudiated by the social organism. This process manifests itself on the economic and political planes, and the combination of the two is particularly destabilizing. The region as a whole is experiencing today both political liberalization and economic retrogression—a classic formula, as we know, for revolution.

## Hungary—political dialogue begins

There is a revival of political life not just in Poland but also, for example, in Hungary. It is not as extensive as in Poland, but it manifests itself increasingly. Even the head of the People's Patriotic Front in Hungary, a Communist mass organization, has recently spoken in terms of the eventual need for formal opposition parties, and has acknowledged that the current monopolistic rule by the Communist party may have to be viewed as a transitional phase. This revival is extremely widespread, activated by dissidents and probing magazines. It is the beginning of a political dialogue in Hungary of the kind that was crushed by force barely twenty years ago.

## Czechoslovakia—reviving the dialogue

More timid manifestations of the same process are beginning to surface in Czechoslovakia, a country that has been a political cemetery since 1968, but that is again undergoing a political revival. Manifestations on the streets of Prague have again taken place. There is a revival of the dialogue. When Gorbachev visited Prague in April of 1987, his principal spokesman, Gennadi I. Gerasimov, was asked at an open press conference attended by Communist and non-Communist journalists what in his view was the difference between Dubcek and Gorbachev. His amazing answer, confined to two words, was "Nineteen years." I take it to mean that Mr. Gerasimov was simply saying that Dubcek was premature. He was not saying he was wrong, that he was a revisionist or a traitor, which is what the Czech leaders were saying.

## Romania—dictatorial degeneration

In Romania, the political scene is deprived of an authentic political dialogue, but it is beginning to be dominated by mounting bitter social resentment against unbelievable deprivation reminiscent of World War II and against a personality cult of unique vulgarity. This is hardly a stable condition. It is a Communist regime that has degenerated into a familial dictatorship with considerable kinship, for example, to President Marcos and his distinguished spouse.

All of this is compounded by ever bolder regional dissident activities. We are seeing this for the first time in forty years. We see joint statements and regional meetings of dissidents. The unrest in East Germany in 1953 was confined to East Germany. The events in 1956 happened in Poland and Hungary at the same time but without any communion. The Prague Spring of 1968 was an isolated phenomenon. When Polish workers were shot down in Gdansk in 1970, Poland was the sole focus of unrest. Now, for the first time, dissident activity is assuming a regional scale. *Sub rosa* regional meetings, joint declarations, and even open meetings are being held.

All of this is taking place in a context of increasingly grave economic conditions. These conditions are deteriorating to such an extent that a *New York Times* economic analysis of Eastern Europe stated: "While the newly industrialized countries of the Third World are building factories with the most advanced technology, Eastern Europe is increasingly a museum of the early industrial age. Eastern Europe is rapidly becoming part of the Third World, and many Third World countries are surpassing it economically." In addition, Eastern Europe is now heavily indebted. Polish indebtedness is well-known, but the other Eastern European countries are increasingly indebted as well. In Hungary, the indebtedness has reached a level of $2,000 per capita, the highest in the world.

**We are in the beginning phase of a protracted period of internal uncertainty so far as the Soviet Union is concerned. For the foreseeable future, the Soviet Union is going to be essentially a one-dimensional rival, a rival in the military domain.**

All of this raises the question as to how soon and in what form the zone of economic stagnation and political unrest will become the zone of revolution. It is not inappropriate to pose the historically pregnant question of whether the year 1988 might not be initiating the new Spring of Nations in Europe, a parallel to 1848. It is not an exaggeration to affirm that there are five countries now in Eastern Europe each of which is potentially ripe for a revolutionary explosion. It is not an exaggeration to say that this could happen in more than one at the same time. One could not predict it with any degree of certainty—it may not happen at all—but the preconditions, objective and subjective, are certainly there.

## In the Kremlin—defensive readjustment

This poses a massive dilemma for the Kremlin. A major military intervention to crush any such outbreak would certainly also mean the end of perestroika in the Soviet Union. It would terminate the chances that may exist for any sort of renewal or modernization in the Soviet Union. It could even affect adversely some of the key political players in the Kremlin. It is quite striking to me that today the Kremlin, in response to these developments, is placing less and less emphasis, publicly and privately, on ideological homogeneity and ideological orthodoxy in the bloc and more and more on the reciprocal benefits of economic cooperation and of continued security links. In effect, we are seeing in the reaction of the Kremlin a defensive readjustment of the basis for unity and loyalty in the bloc. It is an attempt to structure the relationship on a foundation of enhanced common interest rather than on the hierarchy of subordination and a system of ideological orthodoxy. I doubt that this will suffice to cope with the mounting desire of the region to be again genuinely a part of Europe and not to be submerged as an East Europe with its political and even its cultural center located in Moscow.

This has far-reaching implications. In a significant way the competition for the future of Europe, which has been underway for some forty years now, is shifting from the possible Soviet domination of Western Europe to the possible loss of Soviet domination in the East. It is a geopolitical and historical shift of some dimensions. During the 1950s and even the 1960s, the Soviet Union and its Communist parties in Western Europe represented a genuine threat to freedom west of the Elba. The Communist parties in a number of West European countries were potent political forces, with the potential for an increasing appeal, and the Soviet Union itself enjoyed a kind of historical prestige, as well as some sense that it was riding the wave of the future. We should not forget how optimistic Khrushchev was in 1960, when he not only categorically predicted, but had his prediction explicitly inscribed in the official Communist party program, that by 1970 the Soviet Union would the number one industrial power in the world. That prediction has been excised from the newly revised Communist party program.

The Soviet empire is clearly on the defensive. Eastern Europe is stirring and redefining itself as Central Europe. Today the average Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, or Pole openly professes that he feels closer to the typical Austrian, even German, and certainly Frenchman than to his eastern neighbors. The very notion of Moscow as the region's cultural capital, once an idea openly propagated by Soviet spokesmen, now generates simply derisive scorn from the region's intellectual community.

Not only is Eastern Europe entering a phase of systematic crisis, but so is the Soviet Union itself. The fate of perestroika is certainly most uncertain. My own judgment is that its prospects are less favorable than the prospects for successful economic change in China. The Chinese program of reform is more ambitious, better designed, and grounded in more favorable social, economic, and cultural settings than the Soviet program. There is in China a societal capacity to use the reforms for economic advantage. These conditions, in my opinion, are lacking in the Soviet Union. This is why, in a recent major report to the president of the United States a group of strategists, of which I was a part, concluded that by the year 2010 it is very likely that there would be a profound transformation in the global economic hierarchy. Instead of seeing Khrushchev's prediction come true, the United States will still be in first place—but followed by China, which in turn will be only slightly ahead of Japan. The Soviet Union will be in fourth place—distinctly behind. If these prognoses have any merit, they obviously foretell a dramatic change in the position of the Soviet Union, not only in its relationship to Eastern Europe but in relation to the world at large.

I believe that the solution to that dilemma will not easily be found, and that perestroika might well not be the solution. The ultimate weakness of the Soviet Union and, therefore, of the perestroika program is rooted in the fact that the Soviet Union itself is a multinational empire. The decentralization of a multinational empire often leads to the dissolution of the empire itself, a condition which does not exist in the Chinese case.

We are in the beginning phase of a protracted period

### Whither Central Europe?

**N**othing could be more foreign to Central Europe and its passion for variety than Russia: uniform, standardizing, centralizing, determined to transform every nation of its empire (the Ukrainians, the Belorussians, the Armenians, the Latvians, the Lithuanians, and others) into a single, Russian people (or, as is more commonly expressed in this age of generalized verbal mystification, into a "single Soviet people")...

Central Europe as a family of small nations has its own vision of the world, a vision based on a deep distrust of history. History, that goddess of Hegel and Marx, that incarnation of reason that judges us and arbitrates our fate—that is the history of conquerors. The people of Central Europe are not conquerors.

**Milan Kundera,** *"The Tragedy of Central Europe,"* ***New York Review of Books***

**W**e should not disguise the fact that it was not Russia which ushered in the beginning of the end of the Central European tradition. It was Hitler who tore up by the roots that certain decency of political and cultural standards which the Central European nations managed to preserve more or less intact up to 1937.

**Milan Simecka,** *"Czechoslovakia: Another Civilisation? An Other Civilisation?"* ***East European Reporter***

**T**he division of Europe into two parts had a great deal to do with the end of Paris as the capital of the world...the paradox of today's situation is that Central Europe has been forced into the Russian orbit. But Central Europe is not drawn there culturally; it does not gravitate toward Moscow. Moscow has none of what Central Europe is looking for...It wants to look to the West, where it discovers a curious lack of any center, any single capital.

**Czeslaw Milosz,** ***Conversations with Czeslaw Milosz***

of internal uncertainty so far as the Soviet Union is concerned. For the foreseeable future, the Soviet Union is going to be essentially a one-dimensional rival, a rival in the military domain. It will be a rival that should not be underestimated, for its capacity for the projection and development of military power remains enormous, especially with its capacity for effective societal mobilization. Beyond that dimension, it will not be a major power. It has already lost the ideological and economic competition which provides the underpinning for the cultural and political competition around the world.

This may increase the Soviet temptation to play the German card, but also, I suspect, it reduces the scope of that card. If the Soviet Union were to play the German card in order to exploit and stimulate increased German neutralism, and thereby obtain large-scale economic assistance as well as political benefits in the West, it would be doing so in a context in which its hold on Eastern Europe, as the Soviets see it, will be automatically diminished. Given the weakness of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the economic and political weakness of the Soviet Union itself, and the emergence of a quasi-neutral Germany on the basis of a grand maneuver, it could at the same time create conditions for the more rapid dismantling of the Soviet empire, stimulating in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary the desire for an equally neutral status. Without direct control of East Germany, control over this fermenting region will be all the more difficult. That imposes a major limitation on the Soviet capacity to play the grand hand on the German issue.

For the West, this does create an historical setting for enlightened policies on the East-West issue. I do not believe for a minute that a massive revolutionary outbreak in the region is in our interest. Were that to occur in the foreseeable future, I believe, despite what Mr. Dubcek has said in his recent interview, that the USSR would have no choice but to intervene. It is almost equally certain that the West would impotently stand by, and that reform in the region and perestroika in the Soviet Union would be the victims. Thus, I do not believe that an explosion is something which we should be fermenting or simply waiting for or welcoming. Gradual change, I think, is desirable. It should be encouraged. It should be facilitated, and it is feasible.

## A "de facto" neutral Central Europe

Our strategic and historical goal should not be the absorption of what was once called Eastern Europe into what is still called Western Europe. But the progressive emergence of a truly independent, culturally authentic, perhaps de facto neutral Central Europe, is a goal which I think is both obtainable and worthy. When I say "de facto" neutral, I mean mainly neutral in substance but not neutral in form. This would emerge in the context of the continued existence of the alliance systems that define the geopolitical reality of contemporary Europe. If this is to take place, it has to be deliberately promoted. It has to be promoted by the encouragement of political change, by the sustaining of political resistance, and by the promotion of an ever-larger political dialogue within the East.

Human rights is our most appealing platform. We live in an age in which the quest for human rights has become the genuine historical inevitability of our times. The promotion of human rights should not, however, be a largely solitary American undertaking.

It is also desirable to promote more expansive and extensive East-West economic contacts. Given the likelihood of an economic crisis in the East, I think it is not impossible to take advantage of these circumstances through the expansion of economic contacts to increase the range of societal political independence, to institutionalize diversity of social and political behavior. This is more likely to happen if there is a deliberate will in the West to take advantage of these circumstances through the constructive process of economic engagement to promote systematic change.

**I do not believe that an explosion is something which we should be fermenting or simply waiting for or welcoming. Gradual change, I think, is desirable. It should be encouraged. It should be facilitated, and it is feasible.**

Beyond that, it is not impossible to use conventional arms control for intelligence, military, and political purposes. I think it is quite likely that in the foreseeable future the Soviet Union will try to exploit the INF Agreement to promote extensive East-West negotiations for the liquidation of all battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe. This would have the effect of denuclearizing Western Europe and of promoting a nuclear-free zone in the West, a long-standing Soviet objective. Why not anticipate this and meet it on equally appealing political grounds by focusing public attention through proposals in the area of conventional arms, aiming at the thin-out and eventual removal from Central Europe of main battlefield tanks? Most Europeans have some sense of what the tank represents. Some have experienced it themselves, and others remember it vividly. It is a military fact that a thin-out of tanks, not to speak of their ultimate removal from certain regions of Europe, would greatly reduce the capacity of the Soviet Union for offensive military operations, but it would also create a sense within central Europe that the retraction of Soviet military power is beginning to take place. The notion of a "tank-free zone" in Europe would be an appealing response to the deceptive and

destabilizing Soviet promotion of nuclear-free zones in Europe. That, it seems to me, would also contribute to the emergence of a larger and more authentic Europe—one composed as was ancient Gaul of three parts: Western Europe, Central Europe, and Eastern Europe.

Such an initiative would be more constructive both in its military and political dimensions than even the forthcoming START Agreement, regarding which some questions need to be raised. I think that there is a real danger, in the haste to conclude that agreement, that we will have an agreement which is deficient in the areas of verifiability, of strategic stability, and of deterrent credibility. In the area of conventional arms in Europe, I believe we have the advantage of undertaking initiatives that help to stabilize the situation militarily while improving it politically for ourselves, both in Central Europe and even within our home electorates.

It is time for our governments to consult quietly in order to develop contingency plans for the possible crisis or crises in Eastern Europe, to use that old geographical term. If there are indeed major eruptions in the foreseeable future or, if there is indeed a new Spring of Nations in Central Europe, let us not be caught by surprise. Let us be ready with proposals designed to diminish the Soviet temptation to repeat the Russian performance of 1848, 1956, or 1968, thereby shaping the new situation more in keeping with the realities and the dynamics that I have outlined. ■

*Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor under President Carter, is a member of the Board of Freedom House. This article is adapted from a recent talk given by Professor Brzezinski as the Seton-Watson Memorial Lecture in London.*

# Free Comment

## Religious liberty & human rights

*The Giorgio Cini Foundation recently sponsored a conference in Venice on "Human Rights and Religious Freedom in Europe, for Peace and in the Spirit of Helsinki," in which all the delegations of the Helsinki process and many private citizens (including Soviet dissidents) took part. Michael Novak presented the following remarks at that time. Mr. Novak holds the George Frederick Chair at the American Enterprise Institute. In 1986 he was appointed ambassador and head of the U.S. delegation to the Experts' Meeting on Human Contacts, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Bern, Switzerland.*

The first moral obligation, said Blaise Pascal, is to think clearly. This is especially true regarding human rights.

In 1986, at Bern, *before* the announcement of glasnost and perestroika, the United States foresaw and encouraged a "more open Soviet Union"—a more open world.

The age of communication will be especially favorable for human rights. Electronic processes are replacing industrial processes. Electronic signals are replacing paper. Distances are measured less in kilometers of space than in milliseconds of time. At the center of economic life, mind is replacing matter. The material of a floppy disk costs eighty cents to make in volume; the software imprinted on it by mind makes it many times more valuable.

Computers keep track of prisoners of conscience. Information on their condition is instantaneous. Soon personal computers will link citizens in Kiev with citizens in Houston, citizens in Osaka with citizens in Leningrad.

A nation that will deny its citizens personal computers will thereby punish itself. But citizens with computers in their homes will have access to information and communication that the state cannot control. Advanced states will be free states. The closed society will seem backward and obsolete. Any nation that will wish to live on equal terms with others will have to open itself—and restructure itself.

"Openness," "restructuring"—these are imperatives of survival, necessities of progress. The words are good. Only one thing disturbs us. To hear that glasnost and perestroika mean going back to Lenin is to remember Lenin's deeds.

Does going back to Lenin mean reliving the last seventy-one years all over again? Reliving mistakes about human rights and religious liberty? Why not go back before Lenin—to Dostoevsky, to Tolstoy, to Berdyaev? To the anticzarist liberal jurists of the nineteenth century? Concerning human rights, the people of the Soviet Union have many resources before Lenin.

In addition, the word "human"—as in "human rights"—does not belong to one people or to one ideology only. Citizens must know *many* traditions. To say "human" is to speak of others, *all* others, not only of yourself. When you say "human" you speak of me; and I, in turn, of you. Thus, there cannot be *two* worlds of *human* rights—one East, one West. There is only *one* world of human rights, the *human* world, whole and entire. Anything less is not wholly *human*.

I was glad to hear our Soviet colleagues yesterday renouncing mistakes of the past. Just seven years ago, *before* glasnost, a representative of the Soviet Union said in Geneva that "individuals have no rights, only states have rights." I am glad that world is gone.

For religious liberty is *born* in the individual, deep in the conscience that no police force and no power of the state can take away. In our day, prisoners of conscience have learned this, even under torture. *Inalienable* rights come from no human power. They are not given by humans. They

cannot be alienated by humans. They arise from the light that is the light of conscience. Wherever there is conscience, there are human rights.

We may all hope that under glasnost and perestroika, conscience will be awakened; that conscience will be nourished; that conscience will be supported. When that day comes, there will no longer be *two* worlds of human rights, but one world.

Respect for conscience means two things—the competition of ideas, and checks and balances within limited government. It means restructuring: *away* from monopoly. Away from a monopoly of political power, away from a monopoly over economic decisions, away from a monopoly of conscience.

Yesterday it was remarked that the people of the U.S. use the official motto "In God We Trust." That means, operationally, "In nobody else." Every person sometimes sins. Therefore, trust no one with too much power. Competition of ideas, checks and balances—both are necessary to make individual rights secure.

In this practical way, religious liberty (which includes rights of conscience among atheists) is the first of all human rights. No one in this room—or anywhere in the world—can run away from the light of conscience. Conscience is our dignity. Conscience is the light within us that demands openness. It is conscience that is now demanding a "restructuring" of today's political order in the East.

Conscience makes humans more important than cattle in a herd, or bees in a hive. Conscience makes us human. Conscience gives us human rights. The sponsors of this conference were wise to link "human rights" to "religious liberty." That is to link consequences to first principles, effects to their cause.

Religious liberty is nothing else but the primacy of what is distinctively human over every worldly power. Nothing else but the inalienability of conscience. In the thousandth year after the coming of Christianity to Kiev, "openness" and "restructuring" may yet lead to deeds that will inspire East and West alike. The technologies of mind are creating new possibilities for human community. Thus, "openness" and "restructuring" are useful slogans for our time. But the reality they point to, ultimately, is religious liberty, the awakening of scores of millions of consciences.

May that reality soon arrive, for persons and for communities, everywhere on earth. ■

## Abba Eban on the Middle East

***Q.*** *How do you view the Reagan administration's efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East?*

A. I have a complaint against our friends. Although they have done everything possible in the last eight years to strengthen us militarily and economically and diplomatically, what they haven't done for us is to help us get agreements with the Arabs. That's the most important thing the Americans can do for us.

*Q. But many people here—Jews and non-Jews—get the impression that the Arabs don't want to negotiate.*

A. That's all damn nonsense, because the amount of change in their minds and consciousness—not enough in my opinion, I hope it will go on—but it's quite staggering. Even on the Palestinian side, at the present moment, the PLO wants to negotiate. We haven't noticed the change. We tried for a long time to generate a change in the Arab mind. Now we have succeeded and we just can't take yes for an answer. It may be our fault that we haven't told American Jews of these developments. ■

ABBA EBAN
INTERVIEW IN *NEW YORK NEWSDAY*
16 MARCH 1988

## The essence of democracy

Under the aegis of perestroika and glasnost, the Soviet press has been increasingly and understandably preoccupied—in articles, editorials and letter columns—with the problem of democratizing Soviet society as well as with the essence of democracy itself. The leading ideologists of perestroika make a good case of singling out democratization as the key to the success of social and economic reforms. They are right. It is another matter entirely that genuine democracy cannot exist under the monopoly of a single party. Monopoly, whether political or economic, is incompatible with equality, and in the absence of equal rights democracy is a pipedream.

Democracy is often made out to be synonymous with free decision-making by the majority: at the state level, in industry, etc. To be sure, the dominance of the minority over the majority, which is the case in all one-party societies, is undemocratic. But majority rule *per se* is not a guarantee of democracy. Paradoxically, it is the right of the minority to abide by its own views, its own way of life, its distinctive paradigm, that is the true yardstick and guarantee of democracy. Otherwise democracy is simply impossible. Certainly, the pros and cons of the dictatorship of the minority over the majority or, conversely, the dictatorship of the majority over the minority could make for a lively debate. But there is no doubt that democracy exists only where minority rights are safeguarded.

Here is a graphic example to illustrate this contention: the technological leader of the world, the ultramodern United States of America, has been home for centuries to the Amish, a Protestant sect that eschews the benefits of civilization for religious reasons. The Amish, who today number at most 50,000, live primarily in Pennsylvania, in villages without electric power, modern machinery or modern means of transportation. They wear the garb of the seventeenth-century German-Swiss Protestants; their conservatism goes so far that they reject buttons and use only lacing. They work the land with horsedrawn implements, produce everything they need, reject television and telephones, do not intermarry, don't read newspapers or listen to the radio, and have always refused to serve in

the military, even when universal conscription was the law of the land. In short, the Amish live as if, outside of their emigration to America, the world stood still since the Reformation. In fact, the Amish, like millions of other Europeans and Asians, moved to the New World precisely because that was the only place where they could live in accordance with their sectarian belief that all progress was from the Evil One.

And so in a country once described by Mayakovsky as "standing on the propeller, an electro-dynamo-mechanical one," a curious spectacle presents itself: ultramodern airliners land and take off at ninety-second intervals at the municipal airport; four or five columns of motor cars dash along the highway; helicopters buzz overhead—and watching those activities from a safe distance is a knot of spectators, an Amish family dressed in the peasant style of Martin Luther's times, even the children wearing wide-brimmed black hats. The scene is so incongruous that the initial reaction of a startled onlooker is that "this must be a movie set."

However paradoxical it may seem, it is this very opportunity for its people to live as they please (even for such open foes of all progress as the Amish) that is the basis on which the richest and most powerful civilization in human history has emerged and blossomed within a mere two centuries. If the authorities, even representing the majority, tried to make a minority change its way of life, scientific and technological progress would soon grind to a halt as well. Minority rights are the best guarantee of the well-being of the entire society and, hence, of the majority. ■

MIHAJLO MIHAJLOV

## From the land of glasnost

Soviet initiatives concerning Afghanistan, which have opened a way to a just political settlement of a difficult and bloody regional conflict, have called forth a sense of concern and irritation on the part of the American "ultras," who want to preserve at any cost the hotbed of tensions in Asia. How, and by what methods could they cast a shadow on these initiatives—they are racking their brains at the New York-based ultra-right organization that ostentatiously calls itself "Freedom House." And an idea came to mind: On the eve of the Afghan-Pakistani negotiations in Geneva, why not spread the notion that Soviet proposals are nothing but "crafty maneuvers" which were designed simply to "deceive the West?"

Once decided it is done. The specialists of disinformation at "Freedom House" quickly scraped together the fantastic version that, although the Soviets have announced their decision to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan, in reality they have no intention of carrying this out. What proof is there? Please—here it is. It turns out that Moscow intends to do nothing less than to "camouflage" their forces —composed of soldiers born in Soviet Central Asia—"in the guise of Afghans," and, after giving them Afghan identification papers, leave them secretly in Afghanistan. Nonsense, it's nothing but nonsense—you say. But, it's precisely this nonsense that the right-wing newspaper the *Washington Times* found to its liking and ran an article of such content.

We should add that this so-called "Freedom House" is closely allied with the military-industrial complex of the U.S.A. and with Zionist centers, and it is not the first time that this organization has fabricated such anti-Soviet falsehoods. At one time for example, they started circulating crude fabrications about "violations of human rights," which allegedly take place in our country. They have literally inundated Congress and the American bourgeois press with a call "not to trade with the USSR," and "to boycott the Olympic Games in Moscow." After having circulated the plan about "secretly masking" Soviet troops to look like Afghans," these specialists in creating rotten anti-Soviet sensations are clearly striving to beat their own previous record in creating falsehoods. This is the time to rename "Freedom House"—"House of Lies." ■

IRINA KORNILOV, POLITICAL OBSERVER OF TASS
Moscow
2 MARCH 1988

## More on glasnost

"The *American Atheist* is the most militant and popular of atheist publications...(last July it criticized the Soviet Union's glasnost policies for being too tolerant on believers.)" ■

RELIGION WATCH

## Noriega's new friends

Ruben Dario Souza Batista, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Panamian People's Party (the Communist Party of Panama) in an interview with *Rude Pravo,* the Communist party daily in Czechoslovakia:

"Our Party is convinced that General Noriega expresses the will of the Panamian people to create an independent democratic country with the participation of the masses and progressive policies...

He (Noriega) has developed into a strong politician who is able to pull our people together for the defense of national rights in the face of American aggression...

The United States would like to create a puppet government in Panama, which would maintain only one kind of foreign relations—with the U.S. It is necessary to break this bilateralism; it is necessary to negotiate with all nations about the Panamian crisis, namely with the Soviet Union and other Communist nations. Panama is strategically important...

The people are prepared to defend our country. Volunteers are getting military training." ■

RUDE PRAVO
4 MAY 1988

# Against the Grain

## *The Real Choices*

Gerald L. Steibel

Barring some brainstorm at Atlanta, the Democrats won't put Jesse Jackson on their ticket. That will be a shame on two counts. First, it lends support to the slogan that became the conventional wisdom of the primaries: "He's not electable; he'll scare away too many white voters." That's the kind of argument restaurateurs and real estate agents used to use, and it's no less unworthy when adopted by politicians trying to be "pragmatic."

Jackson has a second and more compelling claim to a place on the Democratic ticket. He is where the Democratic Party has been heading for the past twenty years. He embodies that evolution more authentically than Michael Dukakis and articulates it more bluntly than any of the others on tap. Precisely because he doesn't fudge on the broader implications, indeed proclaims them proudly, he is the man to confront the electorate with the stark choices that, one way or another, will have to be made.

Both men say the same thing about the core what-is-to-be-done issue—redirecting substantial funds from defense to social programs. What about national commitments and security after the cuts? Dukakis sounds impatient with the question. He'll manage the defense establishment more efficiently, get the allies to shoulder more of the burden, etc. These are platitudes that fob off the unpleasant need to think about America's place in the world—a task that awaits the next president.

Jackson has no such problem. He has a world view that answers all the questions. It calls not for perestroiking the defense structure but shrinking the necessity for it by turning America's concerns and energies fully toward the Third World. Downgrade the U.S.-Soviet conflict, engage the underdeveloped countries with material and political aid, apply the military savings to health, education, welfare and all the rest of Jackson's ambitious goals. The view, right or wrong, leaves nothing hanging.

Jackson's Third Worldism is outrageous to many of us because of the people he has embraced there. But to him, Castro, Assad, Arafat and Ortega are not thugs and tyrants but liberators and leaders. Their lands and their masses are where the future lies, not with the Europeans or the other developed countries. In any case, these leaders have the power and are the ones we must deal with.

If this were an aberration within the Democratic party, Jackson could be dismissed as an extremist. But it isn't. Jimmy Carter played on the same theme in his "we have put the inordinate fear of communism behind us" speech at Notre Dame in 1977. His national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, wrote the book behind the speech, stressing the centrality of the Third World as the arena where the real competition between democracy and totalitarianism would be fought out against the "technotronic revolution." Carter sent Andrew Young as ambassador to the U.N., where he got into trouble for talking too intimately to some of the Third World radicals. To Jackson, he was only a little ahead of his time.

Carter and Brzezinski did not go as far as Jackson has, of course. Young was dropped, and they pulled back considerably as Soviet depredations in Afghanistan once again impressed on this country's leadership where the immediate threats loomed. But the idea did not die.

Jackson's antecedents don't stop there. Twenty years ago, Eugene McCarthy was galvanizing large Democratic audiences with his barbs at power-oriented policies. J. William Fulbright's strictures on the "arrogance of power" evoked similar cheers. George McGovern rode that sentiment to the nomination, and passed the guidon to Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro. Today, the Henry Jackson kind of strong-defense Democrat is almost invisible within the party.

In the universities, the same strain of thought is gaining hegemony. Stanford is replacing significant parts of its core-culture curriculum with non-Western offerings, while students on campus are chanting: "Hey, hey! ho, ho! Western culture's gotta go!" Other universities are making similar revisions, while at lower educational levels English as the established language is an endangered species.

As eight years of Reaganite nationalist assertiveness run down into renewed detente with Russia and China, these ideas may be the harbinger of what is to come. They must be debated, however, in the forum that counts—the presidential clash. With Jackson in either top spot on the ticket, the Democrats would be putting their muscle where their hearts are, going to the country with an agenda that spells a sea-change in the perceptions that have prevailed since the end of the Second World War.

It would also galvanize Bush, compel him to fire back with the heaviest conservative artillery available. The "issueless" campaign would come alive with a bang. It would make a lot of people nervous, but they would not be bored. Everyone would have to face what he or she wants for this country and is willing to work or fight for.

Dukakis versus Bush will be a far different game. Both will battle for the "centrist" label, Dukakis maneuvering to his right and Bush coming on as a more "moderate" Reagan. That's standard politics, which the political scientists hail as the essence of the system. Politics takes the extremist edges off the issues, enforcing compromise and ensuring that they don't split the country beyond repair. A sound principle, not to be flouted airily. But muddied issues at some times in a democracy's life demand unmuddying, however painful. This, I submit, is one of those times. ■

# The Press in Transition

Leonard R. Sussman

A Soviet journalist calls glasnost "the prize of the present power struggle" that is going on in the Soviet Union. The USSR, he says, is "not the shining house on the hill, not the only winner in history," and capitalism is a "reasonable system."

• South Korea's minister of information tells me he stopped his predecessors' policy of issuing "guidelines" to the independent newspapers, and press freedom has arrived along with a democratically elected, pluralistic legislature.

• Journalists in Istanbul publicly stand before the prime minister and ask that remaining hindrances to press freedom in Turkey be removed.

• UNESCO's new director-general calls for a "free and uninhibited flow of information" worldwide, not once mentioning the "new information order" that frightened Western journalists and governments for a decade.

* * *

These are clear signs of the press in transition, a reflection of countries moving toward different forms of permissive political behavior for citizens. All, inevitably, call it "democratization." The word and the new political acts are translated differently in the diverse governmental systems. Whatever the difference, and whatever the national histories and immediate motivations, political changes of some magnitude—similar, if not directly related—are clearly under way in Istanbul, Seoul and Moscow. These diverse "societies in transition" have developed a press in transition.

At press-freedom meetings this spring in Honolulu, Istanbul and Seoul, the main theme was the encouraging though halting trend toward openness and diversity—with negative reports of press-control trends from a few places. Transitions can move in several directions. The press is the first to feel the movement either way.

Reports by the World Press Freedom Committee (WPFC), meeting in Hawaii, underscored the problems. WPFC missions to Singapore and Hong Kong produced mixed results in persuading leaders of these "economic miracle" states to sustain press freedom. Clearly, political freedom (bolstered by press freedom) does not automatically follow economic development. But then it has long been a myth that political liberty must await higher GNPs.

## Turkey: public demands

Six years ago, the military council that ran Turkey would not have listened patiently to three journalists, one a fellow citizen, publicly demanding the abrogation of remaining press-control laws, and the release of those imprisoned for expressing their beliefs. Yet civilian Prime Minister Turgut Ozal did exactly that on 9 May at the ceremonial opening of the International Press Institute's annual assembly. It is likely Istanbul was selected for this meeting because Turkey is a country in transition, and its press typically works in a grey area between freedom and control. The first speaker, Juan Luis Cebrian, outgoing IPI chairman and editor of *El Pais*, Madrid, called Turkey a "limited democracy."

**The individual journalist must be aware of his responsibility to the citizens to provide accurate news and information, and access to diverse views. But the journalist's sense of professional integrity, not the government, should be the enforcer.**

It is "serious and alarming," he said, "that there are people locked in prisons whose only crime is the free expression of their opinions." Turning to his host, Mr. Cebrian said, "The press, Mr. Prime Minister, can and must collaborate with you, with freedom of options, to make complete democracy...a reality." It is normal, he added, for governments and newspapers to be in opposition, precisely because the press provides an "objective response" to the abuses which any constitutional power tends to commit.

IPI's director, Peter Galliner, was more specific. He praised the prime minister for reforms he had made, but said that "restrictive press legislation is still in existence (and) remains a constant threat to the media." He mentioned newsprint prices raised 200 percent in the past sixteen months, the embargo on advertising by state banks in some newspapers regarded as critical, and excessive fines imposed on publications by the judiciary. He noted, too, that a more stringent law on the press had been drafted, but dropped.

Just before the prime minister spoke, the prominent Turkish journalist, Hasan Cemal, concluded that his country still has "a long way to go before we can say that the process of redemocratization is completed." One young Turkish observer told me the public challenges to the prime minister before he spoke were rude and un-Turkish.

Prime Minister Ozal responded with diplomatic courtesy. He dwelt at length on economic reforms which he had instituted, and said without elaborating that press freedom now exists in Turkey. Indeed, both he and the news media have "democratized" somewhat since the generals returned

to the barracks. Old taboos of press coverage are dropping slowly. The Kurds still may not be mentioned, except to deprecate "separatists." Islamic fundamentalism cannot be mentioned. The military must receive only "constructive" criticism. The first military correspondent to cover this important sector of society, may, however, soon be added to the domestic press.

## Reverses in press freedoms

Transitions away from press freedom were detailed in India, South Africa and, strikingly, the United Kingdom. The Indian government's assault on two major newspapers, the *Indian Express* and the *Statesman*, was described by Cushrow Irani, managing director of the *Statesman*, and a member of the Advisory Council of Freedom House. The *Express* has been raided, and many court cases brought against it. The *Statesman* has suffered economic penalties, and been made the target of a disparaging campaign. The status of press freedom in India has steadily worsened, Mr. Irani said.

In South Africa, two "alternative" newspapers had just been banned, and four more were threatened with closure. "Most South African journalists in this room," said Raymond Louw, editor of the defunct *Rand Daily Mail*, "have a stack of complaints against them." Some complaints concern the "tone" of articles. The minister who issues a warning or ultimately bans a paper does not have to specify the particular "offenses."

The lesson, said Mr. Louw, is that before the present South African government came to power forty years ago, press freedom in his country was "at much the same level as in Britain."

What, then, may be the lesson of the United Kingdom today? Donald Trelford, editor of the *Observer*, had only a discomfiting response—a warning of press freedom's transition-in-reverse. Trelford said that the British press is "now a good deal less than 'half free' in a number of crucial areas." He cited the introduction of the Contempt of Court Act, the Criminal Justice Act, the failure to reform the Official Secrets Act, the abuse of the Law of Confidentiality, and the "crude political harassment of the once-proud BBC and the Independent Broadcasting Authority." He said, "our troubles have only just begun."

He mentioned the controversial Spycatcher Case in which the government prevented British newspapers from mentioning revelations in the book by a former British agent. Yet the book circulated in the UK and elsewhere, and was being widely reviewed abroad. In that case Sir Robert Armstrong, the cabinet secretary, was asked by the judge whether he thought a newspaper had a duty to publish information about corruption and illegality in high places. No, said the official, the newspaper's duty is to pass on such information to the police, or failing that, send a letter to the prime minister. This, said Trelford, would be laughable were it not for fear that such limitations "will soon be enshrined in law in a new Official Information Act presently being drafted."

The highlight of the Istanbul assembly was the performance of two Soviet journalists on a panel with Irish, Italian, Austrian and American journalists, all chaired by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, one of the wealthiest capitalists, a Moslem, and a former refugee commissioner of the United Nations.

Gennadi Gerasimov, spokesman of the Soviet Foreign Office, was scheduled to appear. When he did not, it was assumed by some that he was held in Moscow when Sergei Grigoryants, the editor-publisher of the leading independent Moscow magazine, *Glasnost*, was arrested in his office days before Gerasimov was to speak in Istanbul. Grigoryants was sentenced to a week in prison, and his files and printing equipment were confiscated. Gerasimov may have faced harsh questions about the Grigoryants arrest. Strangely, not a single query was put to the Soviet speakers present. The IPI board agreed to send a strong letter to Moscow deploring the treatment of Grigoryants.

This incident and the words of the Soviet journalists amply demonstrated both the limitations of glasnost and the significant changes wrought in its name. Alexander Pumpyanksy of *Novoe Vremia (New Times)*, for example, captured the international press audience with candor and humor. He said that while glasnost has produced some improvement in domestic coverage of Soviet news, almost no change is apparent in the foreign field in which he works. He used to get considerable information from Gennadi Gerasimov when they worked together in the United States. Now, he said, he cannot get anything from Gerasimov, though foreign correspondents in Moscow find him more communicative than his predecessors.

Pumpyanksy said his own stories are sometimes withheld because they are too critical of the U.S. "This is not a good time to be critical," he is told. "You are good for bad times, but these are better times."

He can be critical of his own country now, though. He told the old story of an American asking a Soviet man whether he has as much freedom at home. "I can criticize the president of the United States," says the American, "can you do the same?" Of course, is the response, "I, too, can criticize the president of the United States." Pumpyanksy went further. Glasnost, he said, is a developing process, "the prize of the present power struggle," which he called the movement toward "democratization." The climate of the country is being changed, he added, and the "myths" in Soviet affairs—the "religious"-like beliefs of decades—are being killed. Glasnost, he added, is realism, not dogma, not falsities. He said, "We are not the shining house on the hill, not the only winner in history," and "we should take lessons from the West." The Soviets, he said, are trying to kill the "enemy image," and the "trenches psychology." He recalled the story of the small child who noticed, and was the only one to say that the king had no clothes. "We should say our leaders are badly dressed," and added, turning the political line into a quip, "if they are dressed in a Soviet suit." Laughter.

He continued, "Our system of elections is not perfect." It is, he said, "selection, not election." The USSR needs economic as well as political democracy, he added, and

must recognize that its past was "totali..." He stumbled over the word, and said, laughing, "Sorry, I cannot say the word even now."

His Soviet colleague, Vladimir Milyutenko of the government's Novosti press agency, provided recent polling data on Soviet public attitudes toward glasnost. Eighty percent of those responding said glasnost is a reality in everyday life, one-third saying it is irreversible, two-thirds saying it must be made permanent. But, then, one must assume, two-thirds believe it *is* reversible. Perhaps that, too, is glasnostian realism.

The most subtle, yet penetrating comment on glasnost came from Fei Wang, head of the All-China Journalists' Association. He described his own fifty years in Chinese journalism as sometimes "successful and failing, triumphant and painful." He could recognize the Soviet media's past "officialism, propagandism, lack of information, and its habit of reporting only the good news and not the bad, and turning a blind eye towards and not reporting the negative and gloomy aspects of Soviet society."

Wang said there are "less and less long, windy and boring articles which are full of dogmatism and cliché." (The same comments, I believe, could be made about the Chinese press today.) In the Soviet Union, said Wang, "these changes have brought a new atmosphere" but also "very stubborn resistance from those old thoughts, old habits, and old forms."

He used international Communist history to ask a telling question. He quoted Palmiro Togliatti, the late Italian Communist leader, who said in 1956 that in the USSR the "proletarian dictatorship" degenerated into a Party dictatorship, then into a dictatorship by a few in the Politburo, and finally into Stalin's personal dictatorship. Wang said the Soviet Union "lost its capacity to rectify its own mistakes [or prevent]...tragic errors and crimes from happening." The "Soviet leadership adopted a stance of complete rejection of Togliatti's thesis and even criticized it," Wang said.

He asked the key question: "If the supreme leaders of the Soviet Union still enjoy the privilege of being devoid of public supervision and criticism, then how can a recurrence be prevented; a recurrence, under certain circumstances, of a tragedy similar to that of Stalin's previous dictatorship?" He added, "In countries where power is highly concentrated, without checks, 'power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely.'"

His prescription: "Freedom of the press is also needed in socialist countries, if not more. There should be a medium that is independent and yet responsible, serious yet lively, to bring out fully its function of spreading information, reflecting public opinion, and carrying out supervision so that we can better serve and benefit the people."

Conor Cruise O'Brien, the Irish statesman and author, acknowledged that glasnost has changed the image of the Soviet Union in the world as no other change in public relations in this century. He paraphrased the reaction of President Reagan to these changes: "Once upon a time there was a good guy, Lenin. Then followed a bad guy of the Evil Empire, Stalin. Now, Gorbachev, a good guy, will bring us back to the good old days of Lenin!" O'Brien said he hopes glasnost succeeds, and believes Soviet "patriotism" will support reforms. But he feels that Eastern Europe may be the Achilles heel of glasnost. Eastern European governments are not sustained by people's patriotism, he said, and glasnost there will take a revolutionary form. The USSR will then have to decide what to do about it. That may set back the clock in the Soviet Union, he said. While not inevitable, such fear is justified, he added.

Paul Lendvai, who was imprisoned in Hungary for journalistic activity in the 1950s and is now head of the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation, said that journalists in Eastern Europe are the promoters of all social change in their countries. But, he added, "you still risk your life" doing so.

**Alexander Pumpyanksy of *Novoe Vremia (New Times)* captured the press audience with candor and humor... "Our system of elections is not perfect." It is "selection, not election." The USSR needs economic as well as political democracy, and must recognize that its past was "totali..." He stumbled over the word, and said, laughing, "Sorry, I cannot say the word even now."**

Piero Ottone, editor of *La Repubblica*, Milan, criticized on grounds of principle the Soviet spokesmen and others defining glasnost. They are giving only pragmatic reasons for opening the system, said Ottone. No one is saying, with Voltaire, "I disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it."

## South Korea: new freedoms

Before the meeting in Istanbul this writer visited South Korea, another country in transition, where the press has suddenly found new freedoms. I had last visited Seoul in 1974, en route to South Vietnam to help conduct a week-long seminar on press freedom. South Korea then seemed to oppress its journalists no less than wartime South Vietnam. Though the major independent newspaper, *Dong-A Ilbo*, was still publishing in 1974, the government had severely limited the paper's access to news, demanded that the daily fire many of its staff, and forced advertisers to withdraw their ads.

Freedom House responded then by issuing a special citation to *Dong-A Ilbo* and its publisher, Kim Sang Man. The citation, signed by then U.S. Senator Margaret Chase Smith, Freedom House board chairman, received worldwide attention. The citation noted that *Dong-A Ilbo* since its founding in 1920 had fought domestic authoritarianism

and Japanese occupiers, and was still resisting press restrictions with "courage and determination."

My return to Seoul, at the invitation of Dr. Kim, since decorated by Queen Elizabeth, was a reminder that *Dong-A Ilbo* had maintained its independence and editorial integrity. Not coincidentally, my first call in Seoul was on the new minister of information, Chung Han Mo. He said I came at a propitious time. That same week, there had been crucial political changes. The party of President Roh Tae Woo (and the information minister) had lost control of the National Assembly. This was the first time since 1950 the ruling party was denied the majority of seats in the Assembly. And last year, for the first time since 1971, the first direct presidential election was held, and a peaceful inauguration conducted.

I asked how this was reflected in press-government relations. Minister Chung said that since last 29 June, when the president made his declaration pledging reforms, there has been freedom of the press in Korea. The government's intention was further revealed, he said, because they chose him, a poet and university professor, to head the Information Ministry. Formerly, the post was held by journalists-turned-censors. Most important, said the minister, the former regimes' procedure of intimidating the press ended last June.

He referred to the "guides" which previous administrations had given the press. These were instructions the Ministry would put on paper for its own personnel. They would then telephone to the newspapers "requests for cooperation." Certain coverage was designated "possible," "impossible," or "absolutely impossible." Political or economic pressures, in some cases imprisonment, awaited recalcitrant journalists. I had samples with me of the hundreds of press guides phoned in the past. The system surfaced when a former Ministry staffer leaked the information, and received a prison term for doing so. The minister told me that since last year no phone calls had been made to "guide" the press. This was confirmed by journalists later.

I said that it must be harder now for the ruling party to govern with an opposition legislature. There are now "four ruling parties," he replied, and they must build a consensus. The press, therefore, has a role in this process. Now, he said, it is the media's responsibility to fashion that role. Some twenty new papers have received government authorization to publish. Registration now is just a formality, he added, not a means of controlling the content of newspapers. Indeed, many journalists fired at the demand of earlier governments are now starting a major new daily.

Minister Chung asked me what Freedom House has to say about the news media serving the society responsibly. This is the perennial question of transitional governments fearful of freeing the press. "Shouldn't you watch whether the press violates human rights?" he asked. I assured him that responsible journalism is the other side of the coin of press freedom. The individual journalist must be aware of his responsibility to the citizens to provide accurate news and information, and access to diverse views. But the journalist's sense of professional integrity, not the government, should be the enforcer.

Capping the IPI assembly (and repeated two weeks later at the annual meeting in Rome of the International Federation of Newspaper Publishers), was a significant pledge by Federico Mayor Zaragoza, new director-general of UNESCO. The Spanish biochemist recognizes that a decade of controversial communications programs provided some reasons for the withdrawal of the United States and the United Kingdom from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Mayor promised that UNESCO's news and information programs hereafter would be "positive and undogmatic [and would] emphasize pluralism, and a free and uninhibited flow of information."

That, after twelve years of controversial debates at UNESCO, was a clear, promising statement devoid of threats to Western-style communications. Indeed, "uninhibited" had replaced "balanced." The old formula, "free and balanced flow," suggested that governmental balancing of news and information would undermine the freeness of any flow. Mayor's speech did not mention the most controversial term in the UNESCO communications litany: a new world information and communication order. That key term—heatedly contested for years by Western journalists and governments—was missing not only from Professor Mayor's speech but from the current draft of the new Medium Term Plan. That will govern the organization for six years. That significant change must still be approved by the Executive Board, but it reveals the intention of the new director-general.

The Medium Term Plan includes, however, a brief closing reference to the "free and balanced flow of information." Professor Mayor, asked about this in Istanbul, was clearly surprised to discover that the term appears in the document. He repeated his own commitment to the "free and uninhibited flow of information." Debate over this word, and indeed the entire "new information world" concept, is not over. It will almost certainly heat up anew. The stakes include the obvious, fundamental challenges to press freedom. That freedom should not be made hostage to sharing new communication technologies and training with developing countries. Professor Mayor clearly indicated his commitment to enlarging communications-support programs. Western agencies and governments now agree to assist communications development, provided information controls are not part of such programs. But political and communication ideologues will not easily drop their struggle to impose their brand of "a new information and communication order."

This, despite the fact that so many countries—East, West and nonaligned—are in political and economic transition, as are their news and information channels.

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# Trade & the Rights of Workers

Eugenia Kemble

On 24 December 1987 Chile's duty-free access to American markets was suspended indefinitely. On that date, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced that the privilege granted under the Generalized System of Preference (GSP), which affected some $60 million in goods, was suspended because "Chile does not comply with the requirements of our laws." The worker rights provisos of the Trade and Tariff act of 1984 were specifically mentioned.

By Christmas Day Chilean newspapers reported sharp official reaction. Labor Minister Alfonso Marquez de la Plata issued a statement arguing that the decision was "arbitrary and discriminatory," constituted "imperialist aggression," and that "a group of opposition political leaders has traveled the world over seeking funds to sustain a campaign, the like of which has never been seen before, to oppose our government's work."

The Chilean labor leaders who supported the AFL-CIO's submission of the case and provided extensive documentation on Chile's labor practices have been accused of disloyalty to their country. The labor minister has written to the International Labor Organization (ILO) stating that worker rights discussions should be held only within the framework of the ILO.

The American action against Chile was the result of a petition filed by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) that in 1988 has also identified eight other governments as gross and systematic labor rights violators. They are Thailand, Indonesia, Haiti, Malaysia, the Central African Republic, Syria, Burma and Turkey. A year earlier, three other repressive governments lost GSP benefits, (Romania, Nicaragua and Paraguay), largely as a consequence of previous complaints from the AFL-CIO.

## Striking a raw nerve

The worker rights cases, and especially the four suspensions to date, have struck a raw nerve with these governments and business organizations whose members reap the benefits of the lowered tariffs. USTR announced last July that it would investigate six of the 1987 complaints filed by the AFL-CIO. Almost immediately, most of the governments involved began to try to persuade the U.S. government (and the AFL-CIO) that their labor policies were much better and more humane than the U.S. labor movement had alleged.

Within weeks, Thai government officials were knocking on the labor federation's doors to explain how difficult it is to enforce child labor laws. The government of South Korea sent a copy of its entire labor code to AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland so that he could see for himself just how nicely it reads. (A new and more liberal labor code was enacted by the end of 1987, so something must have been wrong with the one that was mailed to Washington earlier in the year.) Turkey's Employers' Associations Confederation said that claims made in the AFL-CIO case "could only be the product of an ill and crooked mind." Taiwan's diplomatic mission in Washington stepped up a never-ending stream of justifications for its labor policies and began circulating copies of employment and labor statistics which, curiously, are published in English in Taipei.

Unfortunately, in rejecting the AFL-CIO's 1987 petitions the Reagan administration's latest signal to these governments could relax their inclinations for reform. On 1 April 1988 the Office of the USTR announced that GSP benefits would continue for all countries charged as violators by the AFL-CIO, presenting lopsided and incomplete claims that these countries were taking steps to remedy their worker rights policies. Only the Central African Republic, where the USTR acknowledges that "the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively is not recognized and does not exist," (the major independent union, the Union Générale des Travailleurs du Centrafrique [UGTC] was banned in 1981) is judged to have demonstrated sufficient hostility to worker rights to warrant continued scrutiny. (Even before the USTR's 1 April decision, in February 1988, the secretary general of the Confédération Nationale des Travilleurs Centrafrique, a more compliant successor union to the UGTC, was seized by the militia, held in jail, his car seized, his home searched and all trade union material confiscated.)

The proposition that the rights of working men and women be considered in the application of international trade arrangements is not new. Worker rights and trade were first linked by Congress as long ago as 1890, when the McKinley Tariff prohibited the importation of goods made by convict labor. The concept was broadened in the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 which prohibited the importation of goods made by "convict labor and/or forced labor" and by "indentured labor under penal sanctions." In 1983, when Congress and the president enacted the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), the idea was amplified to include the basic rights of ordinary workers.

## A new legal leverage

In rather rapid succession a series of trade measures were enacted, thereby creating a new leverage in American law for worker rights advocates. Building on the Caribbean Basin Initiative law, which urged the president, at his dis-

cretion, to take into account a country's labor policies before granting its products duty-free access to American markets, the newly reauthorized Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 went further and *mandated* such consideration in order for a country to be eligible for GSP.

The Act reauthorized the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which had been created in 1974 to provide duty-free access to the U.S. for products from developing countries. In 1984, Congress established as a requirement for participation in the GSP that developing countries must accord and endorse "internationally recognized worker rights" summarized as: 1) freedom of association; 2) the right to organize and bargain collectively; 3) freedom from forced labor; 4) a minimum age for child labor; and 5) working conditions including minimum wages, hours of work and occupational safety and health. Even if a country does not live up completely to these standards, GSP eligibility can be granted if the president determines that a developing country is actively "taking steps" to respect these fundamentals. The president must report annually on every eligible country's status.

In 1985, similar provisos were attached to the law governing the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a quasi-public body that provides insurance to U.S. businesses investing in selected foreign countries.

Finally, should the provision on worker rights that is included in the now vetoed trade bill be maintained in a revision of the bill or a substitute, noncompliance with worker rights practices could become the basis for charges of unfair trade practices. Further, U.S. trade negotiators are directed to attempt to include worker rights in the new round of international trade standards discussions.

## Linking worker rights & trade benefits

Linking worker rights to trade benefits has critics in many quarters. Some maintain that low labor costs, based ultimately on the exploitation of individual men and women, provide whatever comparative advantage less developed economies have and enable many of their economies to be at all competitive. Successful worker rights initiatives, others say, will drive them out of the world market. Still others question the motives of the American labor proponents of the policy, suggesting that their real inspiration is protectionist, their goal to cut off trade. "The crocodile tears for 'exploited' foreign workers are hypocrisy squared," wrote Michael Kinsley in the *Washington Post.*

Yet the tradition of trying to punish human rights violators through economic sanctions, irrespective of development level or domestic impacts, is longstanding. In some cases conditions are known to be so profoundly repressive of human rights that development theorists and motive-analysts remain largely silent.

Certainly development strategies merit deliberation. As for motive, the mounting U.S. trade deficit coupled with consumer awareness that many of the imported goods are produced by exploited foreign labor, have heightened the sensitivity of many Americans. They have also increased support for labor's long-standing proposals that workers rights amendments be included in trade legislation.

But, in fact, the AFL-CIO has targeted countries for rights violations irrespective of the volume or balance of trade. The amounts of GSP trade involved in countries targeted in the AFL-CIO's 1987 cases ranged from $220,000 from the Central African Republic to $4.1 billion from Taiwan. The AFL-CIO has also changed its position on some petitions, as new circumstances warrant. In the Philippines, for example, after the new Aquino government changed the labor law and included new labor rights in its new constitution, the AFL-CIO withdrew the petition that had been lodged while Marcos reigned. The American labor movement's interpretation of these laws has always rested on the actual situation of workers in the countries affected, not on trade considerations.

Whatever the consequence of accusations charging bad

## Worker Conditions

In October 1986 Jorge Millan, president of the Chilean Laboratory Workers Union, was detained by individuals who entered his home identifying themselves as members of the National Investigation Central (CNI). While agents remained to interrogate his family, others forced him into a van and drove him around for three hours. He was questioned threateningly about a training course he was scheduled to attend in the United States, sponsored by the AFL-CIO's American Institute for Free Labor Development. Terrorized, he listened as the agents debated among themselves ways of killing him, by strangulation or slitting his throat. In the end a pistol was put to Millan's head and the trigger pulled three times on empty chambers; he was then released.

In Bangkok, Thailand factory workers often work very long hours—the poorest among them eking out an existence by living in factory compounds twenty-four hours a day; as newly arrived rural immigrants they are unable to pay for housing. Some of these are children who have been leased to the factories by their parents who thereby collect on the wage.

In Malaysia, the secretary general of the Malaysian Trades Unions Congress (MTUC) has been ordered incarcerated for two years in a detention center 200 miles from Kuala Lumpur. He has had no trial or public hearing, only a detention order accusing him of "activities deemed detrimental to the sustenance of inter-ethnic good will among the people constituting a multiracial society."

In the Central African Republic (CAR) (even prior to a decision by the United States Trade Representative's Office to continue GSP benefits for that country), the secretary general of the Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs du Centrafrique (CNTC) was seized in February 1988 by the ruling party's militia, held three days and questioned by the head of presidential security. His car was seized, and his home searched—all trade union materials found were confiscated. The CNTC is the only labor organization allowed to exist in the Central African Republic, its more independent predecessor having been banned in 1981. Even it, the USTR acknowledges, cannot organize or bargain collectively.

motive, the fundamental issue remains whether or not the U.S. will allow the use of a preferential policy in circumstances characterized by egregious exploitation and violation of basic labor rights. Certainly it is appropriate to look behind the high-minded goals to see what is happening to the workers involved in the economies of countries that take advantage of this proffered special access—to ascertain, in other words, to what degree a trade policy established to stimulate economic development benefits those who labor in its behalf.

Should international commerce nurtured by U.S. preferential policies rest on these types of labor systems? These are systems that employ seven-year-olds in sweatshops; jail trade union leaders for demonstrating; insist on worker allegiance to a state philosophy; deny representation rights to those with legitimate grievances or maintain worksites where employees are routinely maimed and killed.

Should trade benefits granted by a government that professes a commitment to fundamental human rights in its international engagements, ever contain conditions requiring respect for basic democratic opportunities and freedoms for workers?

## The issue—basic rights

To answer these questions requires, obviously, that one consider what participation in one of these "developing economies" means for the quality of life or the rights of a nation's workers. This is much more than a trade matter. The power and profits associated with trade advantages explain why the matter of workers' concomitant circumstances has been linked to trade and trade policy. But the issue is basic rights.

It is too early to tell what kinds of counter-measures those governments charged with violations of worker rights will take to make the U.S. uncomfortable in pursuing this policy. That Chile, for example, should appeal to the ILO to bail it out of its predicament on labor rights is indicative of just how key a step forward the new American worker rights legislation is. The International Labor Organization is an international agency belonging to the U.N. family where labor, business and government representatives arrive at consensus views on international labor standards, which are embodied in "conventions," treaties that governments can then enforce.

The ILO conventions on freedom of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the conditions of work are the basis for those labor standards itemized in the GSP law. These ILO standards are the only definition of "internationally recognized worker rights," without which it would be difficult to reach agreement on, much less legislate or make judgments about, what constitutes worker rights.

In the end, however, the ILO can do little more than draw attention to nations that are chronic labor oppressors, many of which wield considerable power even within the ILO's own deliberative mechanisms. Those who have struggled for years to bring international attention to bear on worker rights violators at the ILO see the American trade and labor rights legislation as an historic first that may finally prompt guilty countries to take remedial action. The U.S. is the first country to come up with a mechanism of this sort to enforce the ILO standards.

Any judgment on what comes of linking trade to labor rights must rest thus far on the Reagan administration's implementation of the revised Generalized System of Preferences since implementation of the OPIC law takes its cues from GSP decisions and there is as yet no general trade bill. To date, four countries have lost GSP benefits, none of them countries with large volumes of GSP trade with the United States (ranging from a high in 1987 of $87 million from Chile to a low of $7.6 million in 1986 from Paraguay). The Reagan administration nevertheless engaged in a lengthy process before making decisions on any of them. The announcement on Chile was made only at the end of 1987, and this after three years of wrangling with the AFL-CIO and the Chilean government. This year's 1 April announcement brought a rejection of all six of the AFL-CIO's cases, except for a slap on the wrist for the Central African Republic in the form of a decision to maintain the investigative review for another year.

Nevertheless, there is general agreement from all quarters that the decision on Chile is significant partly because of the delicacy with which this administration is handling its dealings with Chile and partly because the Chilean government overdid both its promises to reform and its protestations. Administration insiders acknowledge that had Chile continued to receive benefits once it had blatantly refused to fulfill its own promises, all interested parties, not to mention other GSP beneficiary countries, would have regarded the process as a sham, to be easily ignored.

It is still too early to tell if this approach will lead to serious worker rights reform. Much depends on how scrupulous the law's administrator's are about its enforcement. As the process moves forward it should be made increasingly apparent that the stand being taken is motivated mainly by a desire to expand labor rights. Should the new trade law ever come to pass and any major American trader face stiff pressures based on labor rights, presumably it could be pressed to opt for backing labor change over withdrawal of trade. The proposition that the foreign policies of democracies should have a moral component is hardly new. The United States has a long history of employing both economic and defense policies to create or maintain democratic possibilities. And while many argue convincingly that our government has often fallen short in consistently granting its largess to those truly committed to justice and freedom, the idea that such linkage deserves consideration no longer faces serious challenge. Today, judgments as to the moral character of any nation's political system supposedly affect the U.S. position on the granting of international loans, most favored nation status, and economic and military aid. It is time that duty free access to American markets and the granting of other trade advantages be added meaningfully to this list. ■

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# The Millennium of Christianity in Kievan Rus'

### An Appeal for Religious Freedom in the Soviet Union on the Occasion of the Millennium of Christianity in Kievan Rus'

To Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union

**I.** 1988 marks the Millennium of Christianity in Kievan Rus'. While this anniversary has special meaning for the Christian community throughout the world, it also provides an occasion for all men and women of goodwill to celebrate the great and varied spiritual heritages carried by the peoples of the Soviet Union—Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist.

Religious freedom has been acknowledged as a fundamental human right in such landmark steps towards the growth of international law as the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Helsinki Final Act and the U.N. Declaration Against All Forms of Religious Intolerance—agreements to which the Soviet Union has solemnly pledged its adherence. The international community recognizes that respect for such fundamental human rights as religious freedom is an essential building block of peace, within and among nations.

Unhappily, present state policy in the U.S.S.R. puts pressure on religious believers of all faiths, and circumscribes the activities of religious communities. We join with believers in the Soviet Union who hope that this remarkable anniversary, the Millennium of Christianity in Kievan Rus', can become the occasion for fundamental change in Soviet state policy and practice toward religious communities.

We the undersigned, Americans of many different creeds and political persuasions, joined by a common concern for human rights and peace, appeal to you, General Secretary Gorbachev, to honor your nation's commitments to international agreements on the fundamental human right of religious freedom.

We are heartened by the progress our two countries have made in the area of arms reduction, and by your call for a new era of openness in the Soviet Union.

We note the resolution of a number of individual emigration and prisoner cases.

But we urge deeper, more permanent change, commensurate with your commitment to *glasnost, perestroika,* and democratization. Thus we urge you to redress the continuing pattern of discrimination and harassment against religious believers in your country.

We believe that significant progress in the matter of human rights, and especially on the fundamental right of religious freedom, will contribute to a new pattern of relationships between our countries, and thereby enhance the prospects of peace.

**II.** We join in solidarity with believers of all faiths in the Soviet Union, urging you to undertake immediately the actions necessary to effect these specific constitutional and legal steps toward full religious freedom in the U.S.S.R.:

• We urge that Article 52 of the Soviet Constitution be amended so that citizens of the USSR are guaranteed the right, not only to "religious worship," but also to "form religious associations and disseminate religious beliefs" on terms of full constitutional equality with atheistic organizations and atheistic propaganda. We urge you to restore to all religious associations the full status of "juridical person" under Soviet law.

• We urge that the Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. of April 8, 1929 (and its equivalents in other Soviet republics, as amended by a decree of the R.S.F.S.R. Supreme Soviet Presidium of June 23, 1975), and the equivalent laws "On Religious Associations" adopted subsequently in other Union republics, be repealed.

In particular, we urge you:

—to return to individual religious groups the houses of worship, religious artifacts and religious books which have been expropriated by the authorities;
—to restore the right to construct and own new houses of worship;
—to allow religious instruction of children, young people and adults outside the public school system;
—to lift the ban against charitable activities by religious groups;
—and to end the requirements of preliminary state "registration" of religious associations and the clergy.

• We urge that Articles 142 and 227 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code (and their equivalents in other republican criminal codes), as well as the March 18, 1966 Decrees of the R.S.F.S.R. Supreme Soviet Presidium "On the Application of Article 142 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code" and "On the Administrative Liability for the Violation of the Legislation on Religious Cults" (and the equivalent decrees adopted by the Supreme Soviet Presidia of the other

Union republics), be repealed as contrary to the constitutional separation of church and state.

• We urge you to publish and submit for public reconsideration, with the participation of religious believers, all hitherto secret or only partially-published decrees and instructions setting the structure, powers, and procedures of the Council for Religious Affairs [C.R.A.] attached to the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, its republican and oblast branches and commissioners. We urge that you assure representation on the C.R.A., at all government levels, of representatives of religious believers, and that the activities of the Council for Religious Affairs be guaranteed full legality and publicity *(glasnost)*.

• We urge you to legalize the Greek Catholic (Uniate or Ukrainian Catholic) Church and other religious groups (such as, for example, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church) that were banned by the Stalin government, and to restore to these religious groups the churches, houses of prayer, religious artifacts, monastic and seminary buildings, and other confiscated property necessary for their religious activities.

**III.** The fundamental right of religious freedom, as codified in the U.N. Declaration Against All Forms of Religious Intolerance, has many concrete expressions in daily life. Therefore we urge the following:

• A general amnesty should be declared for all religious prisoners of conscience.

• Religious believers should be able to practice their faith without interference, harassment, or persecution. The requirements for compulsory state "registration" of religious congregations and the clergy, prior to their starting their activities, should be abolished, along with the prerogative of state authorities to veto any members of congregations' executive and auditing committees. Membership on these committees (including chairmanship) should be open to the clergy.

• Religious communities should enjoy the freedom to preach, to publish, and to disseminate their teachings through the mass media. Independent religious publishing institutions should not be hindered in their work.

• Parents should be able to transmit their faith to their children without being harassed or discriminated against on this account. Religious organizations should be able to conduct institutions of religious education without state interference. Clergy should be allowed, with parental permission, to provide religious instruction to children. School children and students at secondary or university levels should not be pressured to join organizations espousing atheism; punished for declining to do so; or otherwise be denied equality of educational opportunity and advancement on account of their religious beliefs and practices.

• The state should not interfere in the appointment of seminary faculties, and should relinquish its control over the appointment of candidates to seminaries.

• Religious believers, including children, should be able to absent themselves from work or from school on religious holidays.

• Believers who wish to emigrate from the Soviet Union on religious grounds should be allowed to do so.

• Believers, clergy, and religious groups in the Soviet Union who wish to maintain contacts with fellow-believers and religious institutions throughout the world should be free to do so.

• Religious communities should enjoy the full rights of social organizations in the Soviet Union. Religious communities should be able to solicit funds for charitable activities, to engage in works of charity, to own property, and to participate in organizations such as temperance societies.

• Religious services should be permitted in hospitals, prisons, and homes for the aged. Religious believers should be able to wear religious symbols, and to have access to religious literature, while they are in hospitals, prisons, and homes for the aged.

**IV.** Establishment of these basic guarantees of the fundamental right of religious freedom is an important measure of the status of human rights in the Soviet Union. We call on you, Mr. General Secretary, to demonstrate your commitment to peace by assuring all the peoples of the Soviet Union the right of religious freedom, which is an essential guarantor of peace. We appeal to you, on this occasion of the Millennium of Christianity in Kievan Rus', to join with us in working for an international community committed to defending the dignity of human beings as a fundamental requisite of peace. ■

*The above appeal, which has already been signed by over 250 religious, political and intellectual American leaders is a project of the James Madison Foundation in cooperation with the Puebla Institute and the Trinitarians.*

## Book Views

# The Anomaly of Ethiopia

Edward W. Desmond

In years to come when historians weigh the Reagan Doctrine, Ethiopia is bound to show up as a strange anomaly. In every respect, the country was and remains a perfect candidate for Reagan's policy of supporting anti-Communist rebels trying to overthrow a regime backed by Moscow. There is not one rebel group, but several, including two especially well-organized and successful organizations in Tigray and Eritrea. What is more, they are fighting to overthrow Mengistu Haile Mariam, quite possibly the most bloody-handed tyrant holding power in the world today. Yet for all the support the Reagan administration doled out to Nicaragua's contras—inept boyscouts in comparison with the remarkable Eritrean rebels—and Jonas Savimbi's formidable UNITA in Angola, hardly a word has been said about Ethiopia.

There are sensible if not necessarily persuasive reasons why Washington never took up the cause of Ethiopia's rebels, but there are also plenty of bad reasons. Foremost among the latter is widespread ignorance of Ethiopia's history since the revolution and the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974. Little has been written about what happened following his succession, and much of what is in print tends, strangely enough, to blame the U.S. for the radical cast of Mengistu's regime today, and even for the famine of 1984-'85. In his very important and highly readable *Ethiopia, the United States and the Soviet Union*, David A. Korn, the U.S. chargé d'affaires in Addis Ababa from mid-1982 to mid-1986, sets out to set the record straight and does so quite admirably.

Korn traces the key episodes in Mengistu's murderous rise through the ranks of the revolutionaries to become the terrifying and slightly mad ruler he is today. He also explains the decay of U.S.-Ethiopian relations during those years, the rise of Soviet influence, and Addis Ababa's response to the famine—perhaps the truest indicator of the regime's irresponsibility.

Korn's account of Mengistu's rise in the *Dergue*, the committee formed to rule after the emperor's overthrow, is not especially fresh, but it has not been told nearly often enough as a cautionary illustration of Mengistu's capacity for cold-blooded killing. Mengistu, Korn recounts, in 1975 unilaterally ordered a military assault on the home of Gen. Aman Andom, at one point chairman of the *Dergue*, in which the general was killed. Aman was a moderate who favored a negotiated settlement in Eritrea, and he stood between Mengistu and power. How many other political rivals died in Mengistu's climb to absolute power in 1977 and afterwards may never be known. But Korn paints a complete enough picture to counter anyone who looks on Mengistu as a misunderstood Third World nationalist, or a slightly addled but benign Marxist. In a forthcoming book Dawit Wolde Giorgis, a former Ethiopian foreign minister and head of Ethiopian relief operations until he defected in 1986, delivers the same indictment in the even more vivid hues of a first hand account.

**ETHIOPIA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION**
**by David A. Korn, Southern Illinois University Press, 1986. 217 pp. $24.95, cloth.**

If Mengistu is dependent on the Soviets, wasn't it the U.S. that drove him to excess and friendship with Moscow? No matter what Soviet client state is in question, that analysis puts in its inevitable appearance. In the case of Ethiopia, President Carter's inept handling of the Somali-Ethiopian war over the Ogaden is often cited as the main cause of Mengistu's tilt eastward. As Korn points out, Carter did bungle an effort to "win" Somalia back from the Soviets. In 1977, the U.S. promised to send Somali President Siad Barre, jilted by Moscow in favor of Mengistu, defensive arms just as Somalia invaded Ethiopia's Ogaden desert. Carter abruptly backed off, enraging the Somalis, who felt betrayed, and the Ethiopians, who accused the U.S. of perfidy.

Yet these and other incidents do not change the fact that Mengistu's geopolitical trope was clearly established by the time he took power. As Korn points out, Mengistu and the *Dergue* first secretly asked Moscow for arms in 1974. The tilt toward Moscow was inevitable for two reasons. First, Mengistu's followers viewed themselves as radicals with a revolutionary program. Association with the U.S., the emperor's main backer, was an embarrassment. What was more, the U.S. was not likely to supply the armaments Mengistu wanted for a vastly expanded army that is today over 300,000 strong—the largest military force in black Africa.

As for U.S. policy, Carter cut off arms supplies in 1977 in response to Mengistu's bloody antics and his contacts with Moscow. At the same time, the Carter administration went to embarrassing lengths in high-level

diplomatic contacts to reassure the violent regime that the U.S. did not object to its domestic policies, including the radical agrarian program that has led to famine. Indeed, Carter offered to continue development aid if one hitch could be overcome: compensation for the $30 million in expropriated U.S. property. Mengistu refused and U.S. development aid finally ended in 1979—long after Mengistu's terrible human rights record and close ties to the Soviets were well established.

From the late 1970s until the first media alarms over the famine in the fall of 1984, hardly a word was heard about Ethiopia, though the wars in Tigray and Eritrea raged on, as did Mengistu's efforts to transform Ethiopia's peasants into model collectivists. The story of the famine is still widely untold because most news coverage tended to focus on the striking images of starving people. Rarely did it test the explanations for the disaster offered by Addis Ababa and Western relief agencies. As Jason Clay and Bonnie Holcomb have shown in their critical work, *Politics and the Ethiopian Famine 1984-1985* (Cultural Survival, 1986), the main causes had as much to do with Mengistu's disastrous agricultural policies as with drought.

Korn does not address those questions, but he does shed light on some notorious episodes that cast Addis Ababa's role during the famine in a highly questionable light. Korn, for example, recounts how the Western diplomatic community made an appeal to Mengistu for trucks to transport food to stricken areas. At the time, October 1985, food stocks were all but exhausted in Makelle, the capital of Tigray, and the Ethiopian army had for weeks refused to organize a convoy into the city. Mengistu simply ignored the request, and the Western agencies set about organizing a food airlift on their own. Writes Korn: "This was to become a regular pattern; as the Ethiopian government defaulted on its responsibilities, Western governments stepped in to fill the resultant void."

Why didn't Mengistu do more to help his people? Korn hints at one answer when he recalls a conversation with an Ethiopian official who blurted out "food is a major element in our strategy against the secessionists." Was Mengistu trying to starve his enemies? Insurgent areas were among some of the worst hit, and resettlement, Mengistu's coercive scheme to move several hundred thousand peasants to fertile southern areas, was also aimed in part at the rebellious regions. In his forthcoming book, Dawit Wolde Giorgis suggests another answer: Mengistu barely believed the famine was happening because it was such an embarrassing demonstration of the revolution's tragic outcome.

Famine is only one face of Ethiopia's tragedy; endless war is the other. In Tigray and Eritrea this spring rebels routed Ethiopian army units in some of their biggest victories since 1977. Elsewhere in the country, smaller rebel groups were also on the move. Should the U.S. aid them in overthrowing a despot like Mengistu? Korn, by virtue of his position as a career diplomat, is silent on the question. Most U.S. State Department officials oppose military aid, fearing it might lead, among other things, to a Balkanization of the Horn. There is also the question of whether it would be right to exacerbate war in a country already so devastated by fighting and famine.

But the West is obligated to act in some way to curb Mengistu. Widespread high-level denunciation might be the place to begin, and the West could take economic action against the state even while continuing food aid. Perhaps Western leaders could test Gorbachev's friendliness by asking him to lean on his client. Relief agencies will fuss that such actions would jeopardize their operations, and they may be right, though it seems unlikely that Mengistu would survive the internal and foreign pressures such action would produce. The alternative is bleak: Wait out Mengistu's regime for many years to come, while feeding the survivors of its horrendous malfeasance.

*Edward W. Desmond is a staff writer for* Time *magazine.*

*(Continued from page 4)*

democracy. Stalinist Marxism-Leninism has done everything to prevent the development of such a theory. So the question arises: What does democracy—in economics, politics, freedom of the press, of the sciences, of the individual and his social organizations—mean under the common ownership of the means of production?

The brutal fact is: nobody knows! And this is the monumental dilemma facing such enlightened leaders as Gorbachev: they have to democratize their society without knowing how to do so!

This is not the place to attempt the monumental task of creating such a theory of democracy. No doubt it will be the work of generations of scientists and the common people. However, my guess is that this type of society will first of all have to implement the great democratic achievement of Western capitalist society, not by copying them slavishly, but by applying them creatively to their specific needs. In addition, one will have to develop new and higher forms of democratic institutions, not only because of specific new social needs, but, also because of new scientific and technological ones. For instance, the computerization of society will not only make it possible, but also necessary to create completely new democratic institutions by which the people as a whole can decide on political issues and control more effectively its political representatives.

The fact is that if mankind wants to continue to exist, it must revolutionize its democratic institutions in both world systems. This indeed may initiate a completely new age in human history, the dawn of human development which Marx described as the end of man's prehistory and the beginning of his true history. ■

Franz Loeser
*Köln, West Germany*


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