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


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.....Nothing is dearer to my heart than to have a university
of our own, in the North West Frontier Province from where the
rays of learning and culture may spread not only in this area but
through out the Central Asia

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah,

the Founder of Pakistan, in his address to the students of Islamia
College, Peshawar April 12, 1948.

**THE RESPONSE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
MOVEMENTS TO SOVIET DOMINATION IN
SOUTHERN CENTRAL ASIA: A PARALLEL
BETWEEN THE BASMACHI INSURGENCY
AND THE CURRENT AFGHAN REVOLT.**

Joseph E. Fallon

An unnoticed war that has been raging between a leftist, pro-Soviet regime and rebel forces in the remote and traditionally isolated country of Afghanistan achieved intensive news coverage and produced global repercussions with the Soviet invasion of that Central Asian country in December 1979. In the military coup accomplished in April 1978, with Soviet assistance, a Marxist government, seized power in Afghanistan. However, because of the lack of popular support it was forced, to rely heavily on continuing aid from the U.S.S.R. for survival. The involvement of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of Afghanistan has now escalated from the sponsorship of coups, which allegedly installed "progressive" government, to the present massive military intervention in defence of the besieged Kabul regime. This latest Soviet action consists of the most advanced arms and technology, and tens of thousands of Soviet troops. These troops, include some percentage of indigenous Soviet Central Asians because of the close historical inter-relationship—economic, political, and cultural—between the people of Afghanistan and those in the territory which today constitutes the Soviet Central Asian Republics.

A strikingly comparable situation existed during the 1920s when the Kingdom of Afghanistan involved itself in what the Soviet regime claimed was an internal U.S.S.R. affair. The Soviet state had sponsored the overthrow of the government of the independent Emirate of Bukhara in September 1920—whose sovereignty it had recognized in the Soviet-Bukharan peace treaty of March 25, 1918—and the

temporary establishment of a "progressive" regime of liberal nationalists, the Young Bukharans, in Bukhara. The Soviet state militarily supported that new government against a popular insurrection. The Kingdom of Afghanistan involved itself in this Soviet "domestic" problem by aiding supporting and offering sanctuary to the anti-government forces known as the Basmachis. An investigation and examination of this insurgency is relevant to a proper evaluation of the present "civil war" in Afghanistan because of the many parallels between the two political events and the historical intercourse between Afghanistan and Central Asia, both Czarist and Soviet. This article bases itself on French and English literature concerning the subject.

An armed struggle against Russian domination involved most of the population of Central Asia. It began in 1918 and was known as the Basmachi insurrection. This outburst, most likely the direct consequence of the excesses of Soviet colonization and Great Russian chauvinism, appears to have been an authentic "national liberation movement". It drew considerable popular support, endured for thirteen years—despite innumerable difficulties, yet failed to realize its final political aims or objectives. It was a revolution which sought a radical transformation of the existing political structure ruling Turkestan.(1) Why did this anti-colonial war fail? Was the suppression of the Basmachi insurrection primarily the result of "mechanical" processes, limited accessibility to arms, supplies, inferior number of troops, the pressures of external factors and events? Or was it "organic" determinants, internal disunity caused by tribal jealousies and personal animosities? Or could it have been some combination of the two? This inquiry will examine the reasons for the defeat of the Basmachi movement. It probably resulted from lack of a paramount and unifying center—after the fall of the Kokand Autonomous Government (1918)—and associated symbols; absence of sufficient-

ly able, farsighted, dedicated, and charismatic leadership which could have galvanized the movement and arrested its fissiporous tendencies; and inadequate foreign assistance.

A "national liberation movement" is an armed political struggle, taking the form of a guerrilla war because of the initial military weakness of the insurgents, which attempts to free a specific territory—usually described as constituting the homeland of a distinct but oppressed ethnic group, nationality—from the political, economic, and cultural domination of a foreign power, or a dominant ethnic group in the area.

In the case of Central Asia such domination had been initiated by the Tsarist state and has been expanded and intensified by the Soviet government under the label of the spirit of friendship among the ethnic groups of the U.S.S.R. The original Tsarist program for Turkistan of encouraging an influx of Russian and Ukrainian colonists into the land, exploiting the raw materials of the region, and transforming Central Asia into a cotton colony dependent upon Russia for the importation of its basic foodstuff, has been realized by the Communists. ".....Bolshevik efforts to promote Russianism are based on the views of the Tsarist prime minister Alexander Gortchakov who said that 'Russia will bring civilisation into Central Asia' and on those of Frederick Engels who maintained that 'Russia will play the part of the bringer of civilisation to Central Asia.' In this respect too there is no difference between Gortchakov and Engels or between Tsarism and Bolshevism."(2).

Such an imperialistic attitude was candidly expressed by Grigory E. Zinoviev, a leading member of the Russian Communist Party and chairman of the Third (Communist) International, before a session of the Petrograd Soviet in 1920. Although claiming that Soviet Russia renounced all forms of exploitation he further declared that ".....we (RSFSR) cannot do without the petroleum of Azerbaijan or

the cotton of Turkistan. We take these products which are necessary for us, not as the former exploiters, but as older brothers bearing the torch of civilization."(3) However, any form of foreign domination, no matter how it is justified, legalized, or rationalized, inevitably provokes a political reaction among the suppressed indigenous population for "national" liberation.

The survival and ultimate victory of a liberation movement rests, therefore, on the support which it receives from the indigenous population. Hence, such a political organization must represent, articulate, and seek to fulfill the political aspirations of the majority of the people of the "nation". This is the theoretical core of any "national liberation movement".(4) This theory was confirmed in practice by Mao Tse-tung, who stated that "Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation".(5).

The Basmachi revolt was such a movement. This was confirmed by published Soviet sources which described it as a national drive, representing all segments of the indigenous Turkestanian population.(6) Furthermore, Soviet sources stated that the Basmachi rebels were "able to count completely on the assistance of the local population or, at the very least, its benevolent neutrality."(7) This insurrection became active against the Soviet government, inheritor of the Tsarist Empire, in southern Central Asia from 1918 to 1931. The geographical extent of this "nationalist" Muslim insurrection against Soviet Russia was described in the memoirs of Dzhamankul Dzhenchuran, a soldier in the Red army.

In 1931, I and my comrades-in-arms had to carry out a difficult campaign through the waterless sands of the Kara Kum and the wild expanses of the Ust Yurt. In unbearable heat and cold our cavalry unit destroyed

the Basmachi bands in the sands of the Kara Kum as well as in the mountains of the Pamir and Tyan Shan.(8).

Demonstrating a continuity with traditional armed resistance to Russian rule during the period 1885-1916, the Basmachi movement differed from these earlier rebellions in that it evolved into a proto-nationalism based upon an ill-defined political ideology which included Pan-Turkic, Pan-Islamic, and ethnocentric elements. This movement was strongly influenced and shaped by other developments and forces, inside and outside the region, including: Tatar intellectuals, the Jadid movement, the Persian revolution of 1906, the Young Turk revolution of 1908, and the serious land problems and economic difficulties created by Russian colonial rule.

The Basmachi revolt was the final step in an evolutionary political process that originated in the course of the 1917 Russian revolution with Turkistarian demands for autonomy, and ended with a war for "national" independence. This radicalization of political objectives was provoked by the policies pursued by the Russian Tashkent Soviet after the Communists seized power on November 15, 1917, following a seven-day battle with rival Russian factions. This armed political confrontation in Tashkent demonstrated in microcosm that throughout Central Asia the October coup was an exclusively Russian affair. This was verified in the writings of a number of contemporary political leaders and observers who reported that Turkestanians virtually failed to participate in the 1917 revolution in Central Asia. "The native population of Turkestan did not take any part whatever in the historical events of the October days. We did not at that time have any definite clearly cut national policy.(9).

However, instead of the liberation promised by Communist propaganda, a more exclusive form of Russian

colonial rule was established. According to Georgiy Safarov, member of the Extraordinary Commission sent to Turkestan by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Tashkent Soviet was pursuing a colonial policy. This policy was openly displayed at the Third Congress of Soviets in Turkestan, convened in Tashkent in November 1917 by the Communists. The indigenous population of Turkestan was not represented at this council because the European revolutionaries had declared that "Before admitting the Moslem masses to social and political activity, they must first go through a period of development and training in the socialist spirit."(10) Any doubts concerning the true intention of the Tashkent Soviet were eliminated by the adoption of the following resolution: "The inclusion of the Mussulmans in the organs of the higher Regional Revolutionary power appears at the present moment unacceptable."(11) This official decision was due to what the eminent Communist commissar Tobolin said was "the native population's uncertain attitude toward the Soviet Power; second, because of the absence of such native proletarian organizations whose representatives might be welcomed into the higher organs of our Revolutionary government."(12) That this "present moment" was to last as long as Soviet power existed was clearly expressed by Nikora, Russian Communist representative to the Congress of Turkestanian Muslims in 1917, who declared that: "The revolution has been accomplished by Russian revolutionaries, by Russian workers, and by Russian soldiers. Therefore also in Turkestan power and administration belong to us."(13).

Soviet Russian denial of Turkestanian rights pushed the people of Central Asia to take matters into their own hands. The Turkestanian National Central Council and the national district organizations convoked a special convention, the Fourth Extra-ordinary Turkestanian Muslim Congress, in Kokand on December 9, 1917, with 263 representatives in attendance from all parts of Turkestan.. Representatives of the Russian population in Turkestan were also present.

The revolution adopted proclaimed that:

The 4th Extraordinary Congress, expressing the will of the peoples of Turkestan to self-determination in accordance with the principles proclaimed by the Great Russian Revolution, proclaims Turkestan territorially autonomous in union with the Federal Democratic Republic of Russia. The elaboration of the form of autonomy is entrusted to the Constituent Assembly of Turkestan, which must be convened as soon as possible. The Congress solemnly declares herewith that the rights of the national minorities settled in Turkestan will be fully safeguarded.(14).

Furthermore, on December 11, the delegates to the Congress elected a council of 36 Muslims and 18 Russians, plus a 12-member executive committee, which constituted the Autonomous Turkestan Government. The Congress also proposed the creation of three ministerial posts for the national government of Alash Orda. This was the initial process in the reunification of the Kazakh plains (Alash Orda) and southern Turkestan (Kokand).

The resolutions of the 4th Extraordinary Congress of Turkestan Muslims was supported by a Congress of Muslim Workers and Dehqans (peasants) of Turkestan, held in January 1918 and composed of delegates from the few existing local organizations of indigenous workers—Union of Toiling Muslims and the Ittatak. This body not only sanctioned the autonomous polity but it requested the central government to dissolve the Tashkent Soviet and "to recognize the Provisional Government of Autonomous Turkestan as the only Government of Turkestan."(15).

Such a situation was intolerable to the Soviet regime in Tashkent for it threatened the continued existence of its rule in Central Asia. After labeling the Khokand Autonomous

Government as "anti-proletarian", "counter-revolutionary", and "bourgeois", the Tashkent Soviet dispatched military units under the command of Perfilev to liquidate a government which it maintained was created and supported by British imperialism.

Receiving no assistance from either Moscow (except for a non-committal message from Stalin) (16) or from the Amir of Bukhara, who feared to incur the wrath of Russia, and was hostile to the Khokand government because he felt it was dominated by liberals and Jadidists—groups he considered his enemies,(17) the Autonomous Government of Turkestan faced the fury of the Tashkent Communists alone, without money, and virtually unarmed. Forced to rely on its own resources for survival, the Khokand government entered into negotiations with the organized groups of bandits known as Basmachi, which were active throughout the province of Fergana.

The term "basmachi" was applied to two distinct social phenomena which differed in origin and objective but were nevertheless subsumed under the same label because of external similarities—both engaged in military attacks against Soviet power in southern Turkestan. Originally the term denoted organized bands of outlaws who pillaged and terrorized the inhabitants of Central Asia, both European and Turkestanian. In particular this term soon designated those criminals who, after being released from prison by the Provisional Government of Russia during the second half of 1917, had organized military bands of marauders, in groups of thirty, sixty, or one hundred, that raided and plundered much of the province of Farghana, especially around Khokand, Marghelan, and Andijan.(18) Farghana was an ideal base of operation because its topography insured security from pursuit.

Making an appeal to the national sentiment of all the

highwaymen, and each leader in particular, the government hoped to enlist the armed support of these robbers for the defense of the Khokand government, which embodied the political principle of autonomy. These outlaws, who had recently been the oppressors of the indigenous population, so thoroughly adopted the "national" ideology at that period—both in their words and deeds, that they transformed themselves into the champions of Muslim Turkestan. The Turkestanian population forgot the former brigandage of the basmachis. Instead they now viewed these men as their defenders and liberators from foreign rule.(19) However, by early February 1918, the former highwaymen, now constituting the "army" of the Khokand government, were unable to resist the reinforced Red army units besieging the city and compelled to disperse into the mountains. Khokand was destroyed on February 11 by the Red army units composed by Czech, Austrian, Magyar, and German prisoners of war. For three days the city was pillaged by the Soviet troops. Mosques and shrines were desecrated, libraries were burned, all "necessary" provisions were commandeered by the Red army, and 14,000 inhabitants were massacred.(20) At the end of that time the entire city was set on fire. After this Soviet assault, Khokand was described by the Russian observer, B. Olinsky, as a dead city.(21) A food blockade was imposed upon the surrounding rebellious territory, which created a famine in that portion of southern Central Asia that the Soviet regime made no attempt to relieve. The result was an estimated 900,000 additional people perished while thousands of others fled for sanctuary to Chinese Turkestan.(22) Alash Orda lasted another eight months, but was crushed on October 18, 1918.

This action by the Red army clouded the proclamations issued by the Soviet governments (local and central) that the new political structure was concerned with the national liberation of the formerly oppressed minorities within the Tsarist Empire. Initially, the Khokand government had sought a federation with the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. Here the prophecy of Mustafa Chokaev was realized.

.....the end of the autonomous government is also the end of the autonomous idea."(23) The destruction of Khokand led directly to the guerrilla movement known as the "Basmachi insurrection". This event was recorded in the Chronicles of Events for 1918 as follows:

20th February, Farghana district. The Autonomous Government of Khokand has been finally liquidated. The troops supporting the Khokand Autonomous Government have been partly disarmed. The fugitive elements are preparing a campaign of political banditism (Basmachestvo).(24).

This record repudiates the later Soviet historiography claiming that the Basmachi insurrection was a counter-revolutionary attempt of "feudal" forces, led by the deposed Amir of Bukhara, to re-establish that Central Asian emirate. Even when the Basmachi rebellion erupted in Bukhara in 1920, although there were supporters of the deposed but unpopular Amir among the guerrillas, the movement as a "whole" and each Basmachi commander in particular, despite the political conflicts between liberals and conservatives, refused to sanction the restoration of Amir Said Alim Khan after the liberation of the country from Soviet occupation.(25).

As a national liberation movement, the Basmachi insurrection went through four principle periods of large-scale action: 1918-1919, 1920-1922, 1922-1924, and 1926-1931. During the second period of that revolt, 1920-1922, an event occurred which had a significant impact on the further development of the guerrilla movement. This was the Soviet military invasion and occupation of the emirate of Bukhara on August 28, 1920, which forcibly transformed that Central Asian state into the Bukharan People's Conciliar Republic on September 6th. This resulted in rekindling and reinvigorating the Basmachi insurrection, which had suffered a severe reversal with the fall of the Khokand Autonomous

Government, but its character was altered. For the next eleven years, until its final collapse on June 23, 1931 with the capture of the rebel commander, Ibrahim Bek, the immediate concern of the revolt was Bukhara. Although guerrilla bands continued to combat Soviet power throughout southern Central Asia, the Basmachi rebellion had been recast from that of a champion of Turkestan independence to a popular war for the "national" liberation of Bukhara. Continuously rocked by internal disunity and displaying a proclivity toward localism, the Basmachi insurrection nevertheless manifested a resiliency to military adversity because of its successful appeal to the "national" sentiment of the indigenous population of southern Central Asia, primarily Bukhara, and its effective exploitation of Soviet political and economic mistakes.

Such success was remarkable because, in addition to internal division, the revolt was further handicapped by a lack of adequate foreign assistance. Although the insurgents received no aid from Great Britain, they did obtain some material support, limited and often antiquated, from neighboring Afghanistan. This relationship between Afghanistan and the guerrillas began after the fall of the Khokand Autonomous Government in 1918 and lasted on and off, both overtly and covertly, until the demise of the Basmachi insurrection in 1931.

In December 1919 an official Afghan delegation to Turkestan had met with the Basmachi leader of Farghana, Madamin Bek, and promised Afghanistan's support for the rebels. However, the constant rivalries and suspicions among the Basmachi guerrillas prevented any final agreement; therefore, no Afghan aid was received during that time.(26) In the winter of 1919-20 the government of Afghanistan, after the conclusion of the treaty of friendship with the emirate of Bukhara, dispatched 500 Afghan instructors and troops as a symbol of solidarity to assist in the protection of Bukhara. These forces fought in the defense

of the government of Amir Said Alim Khan during the Soviet invasion, then retreated with the deposed Amir to Afghanistan.(27) Amanullah, King of Afghanistan, also endeavored in 1920 to realize a political dream of both his father and grandfather, Habibullah and Abdur Rahman, to establish a defensive military alliance against Russia.(28) The proposed Central Asian Confederacy was to include Afghanistan, Bukhara, Khiva, and also the Basmachi-controlled province of Farghana. The alliance failed to materialize, however, because by that time both Khiva and Bukhara had been occupied by the Soviet army. While in Farghana, Shir Muhammed, who assumed leadership over the Basmachi insurgents, had declined the proposal of Amanullah. His rejection of a Central Asian alliance was based on several important elements: suspicion, jealousy, and ambition. A Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty was, therefore, ratified by Kabul in August 1921. By this treaty both countries agreed to recognize and respect the independence of Khiva and Bukhara regardless of what type of government was established in these two states.(29) It is alleged, however, that the government of Afghanistan nevertheless contributed money and material to the Basmachi insurgents, especially during the epoch of Enver Pasha. In a few cases regular units of the Afghan army are reported to have crossed the border in support of the Basmachi rebels. When the guerrillas suffered severe reversals in 1922, culminating in the death of Enver Pasha, Afghanistan officially reasserted its neutrality. Although King Amanullah was obliged to issue a royal decree prohibiting Afghans from assisting the Basmachi guerrillas,(30) the rebels were able to continue to use Afghanistan as a sanctuary, and in the late 1920s—whether with government approval or due to political turmoil in that country—to make increasing use of that state for military operations into Turkestan.

The motivation for this Afghan support especially for Bukhara, like the current sympathy of Pakistan to the Afghan guerrillas, was due to the concern of the Kabul government for its own political and territorial security. To achieve this

end it was believed that the preservation of an independent Bukharan state was essential. It failed.

Although a "national" consciousness was asserting itself among the Muslims of Turkestan during the 1920s more clearly and forcefully than had been manifested during the wars in the 18th and 19th centuries between the Central Asian emirates and Tsarist imperialism, it was still too feeble a concept by itself with which to effectively sustain an anti-colonial war. The westernized intelligentsia of Central Asia, which had formulated the "nationalist" ideal for Turkestan, and whose power reached its zenith with the establishment of the Khokand Autonomous Government, was unfortunately numerically insignificant and was alienated from the overall population they claimed to represent.

The inability of this disunited intelligentsia, principally espousing foreign political concepts, to successfully appeal to the non-urban majority of Central Asia, led to the more traditional but nonetheless equally divided elements to exert greater influence over the Basmachi guerrillas. As a result of such political confusion, each rebel chief eventually became interested only in seizing some territory, proclaiming himself bek, and ruling the land according to the traditional, feudal manner. Outside of this sphere such Basmachi leaders refused to recognize any obligations that transcended their individual self-interests.(31) These various schisms among the intellectuals, between the intelligentsia and traditionalists, as well as tribal conflicts, created a state of anarchy which destroyed the insurrection. In all probability an able, charismatic leader might have maintained internal unity, created substitute centers and symbols of resistance for Khokand, and politicized the people—awakening in them a sense of "national" identity and solidarity with the rebels, that would endure defeats and prevail over a long, depressing war. This is the essence of a successful guerrilla war. Without this type of leadership the movement was destroyed in two ways: first, the "army" was fragmented and, second,

the people were deprived of the necessary motivation, "education", and direction in achieving the goal of "national" emancipation.

Just as Soviet aggression in southern Turkestan provoked the Basmachi insurrection, so Russia's current intervention in Afghanistan has incited a popular Islamic revolt. The parallel is particularly striking between the fate of Bukhara and what is presently occurring in Afghanistan. In both instances the Red army invaded a neighboring country, which the Soviets had recognized by treaty to be a sovereign, independent state. A "progressive" regime was installed—both were coalitions in Bukhara between the Young Bukharan and the Bukharan Communist parties, while in Afghanistan a coalition was established between rival Marxist parties, the KHALQ and PARCHAM—which was subservient to the interests of Soviet Russia but alienated from the people it claimed to represent. The scope and intensity of the revolting "national" revolts against these new regimes, and the latter's total reliance on the Red army for continued existence, revealed the political bankruptcy of these "progressive, peoples' governments". In both Central Asian states the vitality of the rebels stemmed from two principal sources: the land and the people. The mountainous terrain and material backwardness, especially in communications and transportation of both Bukhara and Afghanistan, intensified the historic weakness of the central government to exert influence in the outlying provinces, thus benefiting the guerrillas. By an unstable combination of "nationalism", which stressed the separateness of peoples, and Islam, which asserts the unity of all Muslims, the rebels were temporarily able to cut across internal divisions and unite the diverse elements of a heterogeneous society in a war for "national" liberation against Soviet imperialism. However, both in Bukhara and Afghanistan, the unity achieved was imperfect. It was unable to completely overcome factionalism, tribal strife, and the tensions between liberal and conservative anti-Soviet forces. Therefore, the establishment

of a strong, centralized leadership for the rebel movement, so necessary for the success of a guerrilla war, was absent in the case of the Basmachi insurgency. Similarly, in Afghanistan the rebels are plagued by disunity. A plethora of nine rival Islamic political parties, outlawed by the Kabul government, are vying among themselves for the allegiance of the people. Confusion and interrecine fighting among these "nationalist" forces are heightened by the conspicuous absence of many of the leaders of these various parties, who remain outside of the country living in exile, principally in Pakistan.(32) The lack of such a unified command has, until the time of the Soviet invasion, hindered the Afghan rebels. In addition, the Afghan guerrillas continue to quarrel among themselves over a "list" of almost endless problems involving tribal matters.(33). The weakness thus engendered has resulted in a disunited "army" possessing neither military organization nor training. Even the influx of deserters from the Afghan regular army has not been especially helpful because most of these deserters simply surrendered their weapons to the rebels, and then crossed over to the refugee camps in Pakistan.(34)

Furthermore, this weakness is intensified by the lack of foreign military assistance, which has forced the insurgents to fight a modern, invading army with either anti-quoted or homemade weapons. In some instances, as in Herat, the rebels attacked Soviet tanks with sticks and stones. However, the limited vision and the penchant of the tribal warriors for looting—resulting in the destruction of valuable captured machinery as well as the selling of captured weapons in the bazars of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province.(35) has exacerbated the already limited amount and efficient distribution of military supplies available to the rebels. Although a neighboring state—Afghanistan in the case of the Basmachi rebels, and Pakistan for the Afghan insurgents—has served as an asylum for the political refugees, the Red army was still able to achieve military domination in Bukhara, as it is currently endeavoring to do in Af-

ghanistan. The birth and demise of the Basmachi insurgency in Bukhara was centered in the eastern mountains of that state; the present Afghan revolt began in the Kunar Valley, which lies in the eastern mountains of Afghanistan, and that is where it will end.

Despite the striking similarities in the genesis and in certain characteristics possessed by both the Basmachi and Afghan responses to Soviet oppression, sufficient dissimilarities exist that could conceivably produce a different political future for Afghanistan than that of Bukhara. Unlike the former emirate, the Afghan state was never a Russian protectorate. Beginning with Dost Muhammad, 1826-38, 1842-63, but especially with the reign of Abdur Rahman, 1880-1901, the kings of Afghanistan have been, as a rule, the advocates of limited modernizations, reforms that increase the power of the central government over the feudal system, have attempted to create a common Afghan "nationalism" for the pluralistic state, and have championed the country's unification and historic independence. These three objectives were strengthened under the impact of the Anglo-Afghan Wars of 1838-42, 1878-79 and 1919.

The justification of socialist solidarity in the face of a counter-revolutionary threat, which was the explanation for the 1920 Soviet invasion of Bukhara, is in essence the identical argument advanced by the U.S.S.R. today to vindicate its current invasion of Afghanistan. The situation, however, is dramatically different. The present crisis in Afghanistan does not involve the deposing of a reactionary Amir of a remote and isolated country in a region without paramount geopolitical significance for the other world powers. Soviet actions in Afghanistan today constitute an historic event.

It represents an important change in the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. The Russian military intervention is in a country not affiliated with the Warsaw Pact. In addition, it is the first time since the 1940s that the Soviet Union has felt suffi-

ciently confident to expand its "influence" directly and not through a proxy, such as the Cubans or Vietnamese. Similarly, it is the first time since 1945-46 when the U.S.S.R. sponsored two short-lived secessionist regimes from Iran—the "autonomist peoples' republics" of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, that Moscow is attempting to pursue an aggressive military policy in the Middle East and South Asia, if not attempting to alter the borders of its Tsarist patrimony. Finally, this area of the world—adjoining the oil fields of the Middle East, the fragile oil shipping lanes through the Straits of Hormuz, and the strategic warm water ports on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean—affects the economic life of the Western world as Bukhara never did, nor could.(36)

The extent of the Soviet invasion, now estimated at approximately 100,000 troops, undermines the credibility of Russian assertions that their military action constitutes a limited expeditionary force that will be withdrawn after the rebels have been crushed. The magnitude of the operation is also an implicit admission by Moscow of the serious resistance which is being encountered by the Red army. Afghanistan is proving to be unlike Eastern Europe. It is questionable whether the Soviet invasion can unify the loosely organized, faction-ridden Afghan guerrillas into an effective fighting force. And it is doubtful whether these rebels, so divided, can be as victorious against the Soviet Union as they had been against the Marxist regimes of Nur Mohammad Taraki and, later, Hafizullah Amin. If the Soviets are militarily successful, the policies that could be implemented by the Communists again have a precedent in Turkestan, 1925. The regimes of both Taraki and Amin had already adopted a policy of dividing the country into ethnolinguistic, territorial administrative units—possibly with the view to creating some type of Federated Socialist Republic of Afghanistan. In each such territorial-administrative unit, the language of that ethnic group which constituted the majority of the population was to be the official language of that province. Russian, however, was being introduced as

the effective lingua franca for the pluralistic population, although Pushtu remained the "official" state language. It is estimated that if such a policy is successfully enforced, within twenty years Afghan citizens from North and South would be unable to communicate with each other except through the medium of a foreign language—Russian. By adopting such a policy the Marxist regimes appear to be attempting to denationalize the concept of Afghanistan. By stressing the internal, ethnic differences of the state, the Marxist regime in Kabul appears to be endeavoring to solidify its power against future manifestations of Afghan nationalism, comparable to the 1925 delimitation of Turkestan on an ethno-linguistic basis.

It would be interesting to see whether Afghan Turkestan, which is inhabited by Turkic and Tadjik peoples, is ceded by way of a "plebiscite" in the interest of socialist solidarity and, according to Leninist principles on the right of national self-determination, to their respective eponymous Soviet Central Asian Socialist Republics. Such a reunification of these peoples can be justified by referring to the precedent of the ethno-linguistic division of Turkestan which resulted in the reunification in one "nation-state" of the Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Tadjiks. Furthermore, such a precedent exists between Marxist allies themselves by the 1945 ceding of Ruthenia by Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Socialist Republic of the Ukraine of the U.S.S.R. This action was recognized by Soviet sources as Communist respect for the national desire of the Ukrainian people for political reunification. A precedent even exists for the "transfer" of territory to the Soviet Union from Afghan Turkestan itself as was established in the 1946 "ceding" of Khushka.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, poses another more ominous possibility for the political stability and integrity of neighboring states. Whether under the monarchy, republic, or the Communists, Afghanistan has asserted its disputed claims to territory inhabited by Pushtun

and Baluchis located in Iran and Pakistan. This territory, also possessing an historic association with Turkestan, was lost by the Kabul government in a series of reversals that began in 1843. The questions must be asked: Does history teach the world anything? Where will the loyalty of the peoples of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan reside—with the Islamic umma, the existing multi-ethnic state, or the stateless "nationality"? Will the differences overcome the similarities between the Central Asian states? Or will the silence of the Western and Islamic worlds allow the other Muslim peoples of Central Asia, in Iran and Pakistan, to share the same "national liberation" as befell Bukhara, and now Afghanistan?

FOOTNOTES

1. Turkestan, as used here, refers to that geographic ex-pression of Russian territory which today includes the Kazakh S.S.R. and the Soviet Central Asian Republics of Uzbek S.S.R., Turkmen S.S.R., Tadjik S.S.R., and Kirghiz S.S.R.
2. "ERTURK" (Baymirza Hayit) "The History of the Turkestan National Movement under Bolshevik Attack", *Milli Tur-kistan*, No. 79 B, June-July 1952, p. 18.
3. Walter R. Batsell, *Soviet Rule in Russia*, (New York: p. 117.
4. Baljit Singh and Ko-wang Mei, *Theory and Practice of Modern Guerrilla Warfare*, India: Asia Publishing House, 1971, p. 71.
5. Mao Tse-tung on *Guerrilla Warfare*, S. Griffith, trans. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 44.

6. **The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia**, 1937, volume 5, p. 35, as cited by Baymirza Hayit in **Some Problems of Modern Turkistan History**, (Dusseldorf: East European Research Institute, 1963), p. 27.
7. G. Safarov, **Kolonial 'Naya Revolyutsiya** (Opyt Turkestana), Moscow: 1921, p. 91, as cited by "The Red Army in Turkestan, 1917-1920", **Central Asian Review**, Vol. XIII, No. 1, 1965, p. 35.
8. Dzhamankul Dzhenchuran. **Po sledam basmachii**, Frunze: Izdatel'stvo "Kyrgyzstan", 1966, 2nd Revised Edition, p. 3.
9. Mustafa Chokayev, "Turkestan and the Soviet Regime", **JRCAS**, Vol. XVIII, 1931, p. 406.
10. Joshua Kunitz, **Dawn over Samarkand: The Rebirth of Central Asia**. (New York: Van Rees Press, 1935), p. 85.
11. Mustafa Chokayev, "Turkestan and the Soviet Regime", p. 406.
12. Joshua Kunitz, p. 85.
13. Bulaq Basi. "The National Government of Khokand and the Alash Orda", **Milli Turkistan**, No. 70/71 B, March 1951, p. 16.
14. Mustafa Chokayev, "Turkestan and the Soviet Regime", p. 407.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 408.
16. Translation of text appeared in Alexander Park, **Bolshevism in Turkestan 1917-1927**. (New York: 1957), p. 17.
17. "The Basmachis: The Central Asian Resistance Movement, 1918-24" **Central Asian Review**, Vol. VII, 1959, p. 234.

18. Joseph Castagne, **Les Basmachis**; (Paris: Editions Ernest Leroux, 28 Rue Bonaparte, 1925), p. 14.
19. *Ibid.* p. 15.
20. Vide Pravada, Moscow, No. 133 of 1920, cited by P.T. Etherton, **In the Heart of Asia**. (London: Constable and Company Ltd, 1925), p. 154.
21. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemeicer-Quelquejay, **Islam in the Soviet Union**, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967), p. 85.
22. Vide Pravada, Moscow, No. 133 of 1920, cited by P.T. Etherton, p. 154, and Limitarius, "Turkestan Since the Revolution", **Asiatic Review**, Vol. 19, 1923, p. 606, for these statistics.
23. Bulaq Basi, p. 19.
24. Mustafa Chokayev, "The Basmaji Movement in Turkestan", **Asiatic Review**, Vol. 24, 1928, p. 280.
25. Joseph Castagné, p. 38.
26. "The Basmachis: The Central Asian Resistance Movement, 1918-24", p. 237.
27. Said Alim Khan, **La Voix de la Boukharie Opprimée**, (Paris (VI): Librairie Orientale et Americaine, Maisonneuve Feres—E'diteurs, 3, Rue du Sabot, 1929), pp. 16, 17, 23, 30, and "The Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia—Afghanistan", **Central Asian Review**, Vol. IV, No. 2, 1956, p. 172.
28. Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah, "The Federation of the Central Asian States Under the Kabul Government", **JRCAS**, Vol. VIII, No. 1, 1921, pp. 30, 31.

29. André Lobanow-Rostovsky, "Soviet Russia and Afghanistan", *Asiatic Review*, Vol. 22, July 1926, p. 361.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 360, 361.
31. Joseph Castagné, p. 63, and Mustafa Chokayev, "The Basmaji Movement in Turkestan", p. 285.
32. Nicolas Downie, "Afghan Rebels Film", *The MacNeill/Lehrer Report*, WNET/WETA Library #1122, Show #5142, Air date: January 15, 1980, p. 2.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 5.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
35. "The going price of a (captured) Russian Kaleshnikov assault rifle is £750. A Saret rocket launcher sells for £2,500.box of ammunition will fetch £500....." Nicolas Downie, p. 3.
36. One possible explanation for the Soviet military operation in Afghanistan, besides oil, opportunity, and the Brezhnev Doctrine, is the unsettling political influence that three Islamic republics—Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan on her southern borders—could exert on the Muslim population of Soviet Central Asia. The fall of a Marxist, pro-Russian regime in Kabul might possibly intensify Islamic-nationalist feelings among the Muslims of Russia.

THE SURVEY OF SOURCES FOR THE STUDY OF THE BASMACHI INSURRECTION IN CENTRAL ASIA

This "bibliography and sources survey" has resulted from a systematic search into books and journals that are in English and French, and were relevant to the topic of the Basmachi revolution.

Encyclopedias : Importance in providing a Soviet perspective to specific topics.

Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Moscow: Sovetskaja Entsiklopedia Publishing House, 1970, Translation of the Third Edition, MacMillan, Inc., New York. Soviet interpretation of the Basmachi insurrection, as well as important indigenous Central Asian movements and political events which influenced the genesis and growth of the Basmachi revolt. The presentation is historically questionable.

"Alash": Vol. 1, p. 193; "Andizhan Uprising in 1898": Vol. 2, p. 86; "Basmachi Revolt (1917-26)": Vol. 3, p. 57-58, Vol. p. 51; "Jadidism": Vol. 8, p. 539; "Karakalpakia": Vol. 11, p. 422; "Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic": Vol. 12, p. 486; "Khokand Rebellion 1873-76": Vol. 12, p. 567.

"Counter-Revolution", **Marxism, Communism, and Western Society: A Comparative Encyclopedia**, ed. C.D. Kernig, N.Y.: Herder and Herder, Vol. 2.

General description of the topic as defined by both Western and Marxist standards. Useful means in defining the nature of the Basmachi movement.

"National Liberation", **Marxism, Communism, and Western Society: A Comparative Encyclopedia**, ed. C.D. Kernig, N.Y.: Herder and Herder, Vol. 6.

Again a general outline of a specific topic as interpreted by the West and Marxists. It assists in determining whether or not the Basmachi phenomenon was indeed a colonial struggle for national independence.

Journals : Excellent sources, contain valuable information from people who were either active participants or contemporary observers of the Basmachi insurrection. These journals, especially Millij Turkistan, supplied the facts that I sought in researching the Basmachi phenomenon—its origin, evolution, and suppression. Here I obtained the facts, figures, and history of the movement, not available from most other sources, which enabled me to understand, describe, and analyze it more effectively. This information was gleaned in only a few of the numerous works which I consulted; i.e., the works of Hayit, the articles of Chokaev in the **Asiatic Review** and **JRCAS**, and the journal, **Millij Turkistan**. My substantive report, therefore, relies on these sources for my quotations and references.

Central Asian Review: 1953-1968 (Vols. 1-16) published by the Central Asian Research Center, London.

Surveyed journal extensively (entire fifteen years of its publication). Contained only one major article on the Basmachi revolt, but this was very rewarding.

Asiatic Review: Vol. 1-10, Oct. 1870 – Jan. 1886 (Asiatic Quarterly Review); 2nd Series, Vol. 1-10, Jan. 1819 – Oct. 1895 (Imperial Asiatic Quarterly Review); 3rd Series, Vol. 1-59, Jan. 1913 – Jan. 1964 (Asiatic Review) new series Vol. 1-3, 1964-1966.

Surveyed exhaustively the entire 80-year period the journal was published. Contained a number of relevant articles, including one by Mustafa Chokaev, President of the Khokand Autonomous Government: December 1917—February 1918. The journal dealt primarily and extensively with British India.

Royal Central Asian Society's Journal: Vol. 1-56 (1914-1969). Superseded by **Asian Affairs**: Vol. 57—(1970 to present).

A tremendous number of important articles relating to Russian Central Asia, during the period of the Russian Revolution and subsequent Civil War, are contained in this journal which, unfortunately, lacks a proper index. Two articles by Mustafa Chokaev, several articles by certain members of the British military missions sent to Russian Azerbaijan and Russian Transcaspian Provinces, as well as various reports by "foreign diplomats" sent to Central Asia (i.e., Bailey and McCartney) are included in this journal. The **JRCAS** is composed, almost exclusively, of travel accounts and its field of reference encompasses the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Far East, in addition to Soviet Central Asia. It is a most rewarding source of information on Turkestan during the chaotic years 1917—1924. Surveyed exhaustively, examining the fifty-five-year span of its publication.

Millij Turkestan: 1950-1953 (Vol. 67-87) bi-monthly journal of the National Turkistanian Unity Committee for the Struggle of National Liberation of Turkistan, B edition, English language.

A journal dedicated to the independence of Turkestan, which includes the unification of both Eastern and Western wings presently divided and occupied by Soviet and Chinese authorities. The journal is nationalistic, perhaps even chauvinistic, and makes certain statements that I believe are inaccurate—i.e., the Tajiks are a Turkic people, speaking a Turkic language which has borrowed and incorporated into itself some Persian words and expressions. Despite such drawbacks (which can be overcome by a cautious, careful evaluation of statements), it is, nonetheless, a gold-mine of information. The journal contains many extremely significant historical facts not mentioned by other journals or books.

Several articles were contributed by Veli Kajum-Khan, Dr. M.H. Erturk, Bulag Basi. Surveyed briefly the four available years of its publication; I hope to thoroughly examine this fascinating journal in the near future.

Card Catalogue: Consulted Columbia University Libraries (Butler, Lehman and East Asia). I have completed reviewing N.Y. Public Library—Oriental and Slavonic catalogues.

GENERAL THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS:

Important source in understanding the rise of the Basmachi insurgency, its activities, field of operation, and ultimate failure.

Cobban, Alfred. **The Nation State and National Self-Determination**, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1969.

"National Self-Determination", **Crisis and Continuity in World Politics**, New York: Random House, 1966.

Important statement concerning the role the state plays in creating the nation; i.e., France, U.K., and U.S.A. Helpful in establishing the possibility for the "objective" divisions within Turkestan to be surmounted, and the creation of a single Turkestanian state and nation achieved.

Emerson, Rupert. **From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples**, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960.

"National and Political Development", **Crisis and Continuity in World Politics**, New York: Random House, 1966.

Again elaborates on the capacity of the state to form the nation.

Johnson, Chalmers. "The Third Generation of Guerrilla Warfare", **Crisis and Continuity in World Politics**, New York: Random House, 1966.

Valuable summary of basic guerrilla theories of Mao Tse-tung, Viet Minh, and Viet Cong.

Revolutionary Change, USA: Little, Brown and Co. (inc.), 1966. Not very useful.

Koln, Hans. **Nationalism: Its Meaning and History**, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1965.

Laqueur, Walter. **Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study**, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977.

Extremely interesting but of limited value for my study.

Lenin, V. I. **National Liberation, Socialism and Imperialism**.

Helpful in establishing authoritative Marxist criteria for colonial independence struggles.

Lewis, John Wilson. **Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia**, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974.

Not relevant to my research. No theoretical model on what constitutes a guerrilla war.

Majumdar, B. N. **The Little War: An Analysis of Guerrilla Warfare**. New Delhi: Army Educational Stores, 1967.

Not the best source, but of some value. It has no index. Quotations are not all footnoted, and those that are do not give page number.

Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare. S. Griffith, trans. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961.

Sing, Baljit and Ko-Wang Mei. **Theory and Practice of Modern Guerrilla Warfare,** India: Asia Publishing House, 1971.

Excellent source on the theory of guerrilla warfare and its historical evolution in practice. Also, footnotes, index, and bibliography are good.

National Liberation Movement, Vital Problems, Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1965.

Some interest, little relevance, but mentally fatiguing to read.

REGIONAL APPLICATION OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS:

Africa

Nyere, Julius K. "Africa Must Be Free", **Crisis and Continuity in World Politics,** New York: Random House, 1966.

Interesting. Not pertinent to my research.

Middle East

O'Ballance, Edgar. **The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62,** USA: Anchor Book, 1967.

Of marginal significance to my field. One important aspect is its description of leadership struggle in the FLA.

Ottaway, David and Marina. **Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution,** USA: University of California Press, 1970.

Not useful.

Asia

Guerrilla Warfare in Asia, INTERDOC, Netherlands, 1971.

Some interesting articles, but not useful for Basmachti topic.

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