

THE SELL-OUT OF CHILE AND THE AMERICAN TAXPAYER

For two years the former U.S. ambassador to Chile has tried to tell the American public the true story of our shameful interference in the affairs of that country. In this exclusive article, Korry presents the facts that five American presidents, a Senate committee, and the press have concealed.

For two years I have devoted my life to the lonely and futile struggle of trying to tell the American people what Jimmy Carter, like Richard Nixon before him, insists must remain Top Secret

My name has been on extreme-left assassination lists, my life has been threatened by the extreme right, my reputation has been shredded by ITT and CIA agents, and my bank account has been depleted because I believe that the electorate should hear the facts of a story that has dominated the media for the past four years—what the United States did in, and to, Chile.

Carter told a press conference last November that the story still can't be told, because he has to safeguard "national security" secrets. I say that the cover-up is motivated only by the desire to protect domestic political interests, that the tale of the United States in Chile would reveal how our political system has been converted into an insiders' monopoly for the accumulation of power, wealth, and status. That's why Carter himself has had to lie to the public about this case. That's why he has heeded Nelson Rockefeller, Henry Kissinger, Teddy Kennedy, and scores of others who have privately pleaded that he let sleeping principles lie. After all, the essential "national secrets" regarding Chile are already on public record. The Senate investigation of the CIA established in 1975 exactly what was done to prevent Chile's President-elect Salvador Allende from taking office in 1970 and what was subsequently done to undermine his government.

The most recent chapter in this tale unfolded, appropriately enough, last October 31, Halloween. Our most notorious spy master, former CIA Director Richard Helms, was secretly whisked by

Carter's men at the Justice Department to a federal court to plead "no contest" to the misdemeanor of "having failed to answer [Senate Committee] questions fully, completely, and accurately, as required by law." Later that day Attorney General Griffin Bell told the press that the government had arranged in secret a strange plea bargain with Helms—the government would drop its charge of perjury (which is a felony) in return for Helms's in effect pleading guilty to a lesser offense. Helms received only a suspended sentence, and the government was spared having to put him on the stand to testify about all he knew.

The details of how the "open" Carter administration had worked out this trick-or-treat surprise for the public are fascinating. Bell had met privately with Edward Bennett Williams, Helms's attorney (who had previously worked for such clients as Jimmy Hoffa, Robert Vesco, John Connally, Teddy Kennedy, and the *Washington Post*). Despite Bell's pledge, on taking office, that he would keep an open record of such meetings, at least two sessions with Williams were concealed. Second, Bell disclosed that despite Carter's assertion (at a September 29 press conference) of total ignorance of the Helms deal, the president had personally discussed the case months earlier at an Oval Office session attended by Vice-President Mondale and Bell. Third, by stressing how good a case of perjury the government had constructed and by stating that the government had yielded only because of Helms's threat to renounce his oath of secrecy and to tell whatever he chose from his enormous reservoir of secrets, Bell was introducing a novel principle in American law: that blackmail, the sleaziest of crimes,

BY EDWARD KORRY

supersedes justice

Carter, Mondale, and Bell labored for months to make sure not only that Helms would escape unpunished, but also, and more important, that he would not be forced to take any witness stand. Their plan was to invoke "national security" to block a trial. The Justice Department sat on a federal grand jury recommendation for Helms's indictment until public interest in the case receded. The delay gave Helms's many friends in the Senate, the government, the banks, the multinationals, and even the media—everyone from David and Nelson Rockefeller, to Henry Kissinger, Cyrus Vance, and Averell Harriman, to newsmen such as Eric Sevareid—opportunity to lobby for him. Bell was also able to separate Helms from some of the more serious charges made against him—that he had conspired with ITT to commit perjury, which possibly enabled that company to defraud the government of \$92.5 million. If the former CIA director had to answer *these* charges, the public might have learned the whole story of Chile—including the names of some very high officials who told Helms to lie to the Senate.

I had been collecting evidence of these and other possible crimes for two years when, at the end of March 1976, I alerted the Justice Department. I saw myself as a victim of possible CIA and ITT perjuries and conspiracies. I intended not only to clear my name but also to show how our political system actually works and to illustrate what Ken Kesey, author of *One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest*, meant when he said that the fall of Richard Nixon was only a "ritualistic sacrifice."

I knew that the power elite would try to silence me. Ambassador Ralph Dungan, one of Kennedy's top White House aides and now a high Carter administration official, warned me in 1975: "Don't try to put that stuff on record. Don't try to take on these guys. They can murder you."

My conversion from friend and employee to enemy of the establishment began early in 1975. A brief, not unfriendly invitation from Sen. Frank Church started the process. As chairman of the newly formed Senate Select Committee to investigate the CIA and the FBI, the Idaho liberal expressed the hope that I would testify. Whenever and however he wished, I replied.

The invitation was no surprise. The Senate had been pushed into action by the revelations of CIA actions in Chile. I was ambassador to that country for four years, from October 1967 to October 1971. I had the legal responsibility for CIA actions in Chile in 1970, the year Salvador Allende was elected to lead a "popular unity" government. I had met with Nixon in the Oval Office, conferred with Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national-security adviser, and attended a session of the then supersecret "Forty Committee" in the White House only ten days before the grotesque murder of Gen. Rene Schneider, the Chilean com-

mander in chief. I had drafted most of the policy that the United States pursued throughout Allende's first year in office. Obviously, I had something to contribute to the public's demand to know the facts about the American intervention in Chile.

In June 1975, Gregory Treverton, a young Select Committee representative, telephoned me, on Senator Church's behalf, and asked for an informal interview prior to my Senate appearance. I told him that of course he could have it. A few days later the State Department rang. Would I mind if one of its men attended the interview as a silent observer? I had no objection, I answered. So on July 19 one J.J. Hitchcock arrived with Treverton at my house in Briarcliff Manor, N.Y. (I later learned that Hitchcock had just joined the State Department after years of service for the CIA.)

To prepare for their questions, I traveled to Washington, to Chicago, and even to Paris to cross-examine former colleagues

After I learned what happened in Chile, I wrote Kissinger: "You and the president . . . deliberately chose to permit me and my family to run the risk of murder. . . ."

in government. I interviewed my successor as ambassador, my deputy in the embassy, the Foreign Service Officers in the political-affairs section, the two Latin American experts on Henry Kissinger's National Security Council, the Chile specialists in the Intelligence and Research Bureau of the State Department, and my former defense attaché in Chile. The new director of the CIA, William Colby, finally agreed to see me, too. And after an exasperating wait of many weeks, I gained entry to State's archives so that I could reread all the official cable traffic to and from my embassy in Santiago.

I embarked on this search because I did not want to rely on memory. Journalism had taught me that "reality," like "respectability," is often like a stage set for a Jean Genet play—a perverse maze of mirrors in which servants are transformed into masters, dwarfs into giants, and villains into heroes.

A summary of what I knew of America's relationship with Chile illustrates that point. It shows why Watergate was not an aberration but an inevitability. It traces the straight lines from the romanticism of the Kennedy years to the sordidness of Nixon's—why, in

short, we are what we are.

(1) President Kennedy handpicked Chile and its Christian Democrat leader, Eduardo Frei, to be the progressive, democratic models for the entire Third World, to be Camelot's alternative to Cuba. Through Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who oversaw the "Special Group" in the White House that decided all CIA programs (an earlier version of the "Forty Committee"), the United States began working in 1962 for Frei's election.

(2) The Kennedys utilized every means—illegal and unconstitutional as well as legitimate—to defeat Frei's Marxist opponent, Salvador Allende. Through the CIA and other federal agencies, tens of millions of public dollars were spent on Frei's election. So overcome were the Kennedys by their fear of Castro that they even responded with public money to appeals from foreign Jesuits for federal help to combat not only "Marxism" but also "laicism" (a theological term for the widespread Free Masonry movement in Chile) and "Protestantism" (a reference to the American Pentecostal missionaries then swarming across South America).

(3) When President Kennedy and David Rockefeller both attended a Harvard University Board of Overseers meeting in 1963, Kennedy persuaded him to organize American big business for the anti-Castro crusade. The banker recruited thirty-seven leading multinationals, such as ITT, to form the Business Group for Latin America. Then Attorney General Bobby Kennedy, the supposed guardian of our laws, systematically integrated members of the same Business Group into CIA programs. As an inducement to Rockefeller, JFK pledged that he would satisfy his request for no-loss guarantees on any future investments in Latin America. The United States would sign insurance contracts against any expropriation by foreign governments of the corporations' properties. (By the time I had arrived in Chile, the taxpayer had been put on this insurance limb for \$600 million—ultrarisky Chile alone, mostly to ITT and the copper giant, Anaconda. This sum was then one-fourth of the worldwide total of such insurance issued by the United States.)

(4) In early 1964 President Johnson assured David Rockefeller's group that he would abide by Kennedy's commitments. Not only did he send all available CIA and State hands to Santiago in a frantic last-minute outpouring of cash to defeat Allende, but also he retained Ralph Dungan, Kennedy's architect of our grand design for Chile, to oversee this enormous effort. When Frei won by a landslide, Dungan's immediate reward was to be named ambassador to Chile. From there he pried from LBJ more U.S. aid per capita than any other country at peace received.

(5) Frei's Christian Democratic government achieved more social and economic progress—in education, land reform, tax collection, income redistribution—than had any previous administration. By any

fair standard, it was humanistic, democratic, progressive.

(6) The Johnson administration sent me to Chile with specific instructions to keep Allende out of power. The president himself said so, and in 1967 and 1968 Vice-President Humphrey wrote me to emphasize the importance of barring the Communists from power. In just four years the Democratic Congress approved almost \$2 billion in aid and loans for Chile.

(7) Nixon fired me briefly in early 1969 for my defense of Frei. Soon after taking office, he had settled scores with the Kennedys by secretly crossing Frei's name from the list of heads of state to be invited to Washington. Then Nixon decided to give no further aid to Chile. These decisions were, in part, Nixon's response to vigorous anti-Frei lobbying in Washington by Chilean fat cats, by their multinational allies, and by the CIA. Helms's agency had issued a National Intelligence Estimate of Chile immediately after Nixon's election. It was so unfairly critical of Frei's performance—and of progressive, socio-economic policies in general—that I had exploded in a series of cabled protests. When I said that these anti-Frei actions were foolishly designed to put the Right back into power and would result only in strengthening the Leninists and in weakening the strongest single bulwark of democracy, I promptly received a pink slip.

(When I flew to the United States to hunt

for a job, I was rehired at State's suggestion. Frei had written Nixon to seek a new copper deal, starting with a demand for majority ownership of the Anaconda properties. State preferred me to handle this hot potato.)

(8) In 1970 the Foreign Service officers in Chile concluded that an Allende victory would signify "Fidelismo without Fidel." Allende's Socialist party program had promised a fierce class war. The party's leadership had excluded for decades the pleasure-loving Allende from its Central Committee or any policymaking post. It wanted a truly revolutionary president. It had submitted reluctantly to Communist insistence that the popular Allende be its 1970 candidate, in return, it won a pledge to have veto power over every Allende government policy.

CIA penetration of the Communists and of the far more violent Socialists confirmed the fact that an Allende government intended to combine the tremendous powers of the presidency and the Chilean preference for government-run enterprise in order to gut the two fundamental freedoms of the press and of association. As an ex-newsman, I regarded as immoral any silent observation of such a process.

(9) I had been appalled by what I found in Chile in 1967. The United States had bound itself publicly to the Frei government. It had become enmeshed in the political affairs of Chile—shockingly so. Dun-

gan was described in Washington and Santiago as "a member of the Frei cabinet." He had sought to have the CIA finance the Christian Democrats into a Kennedy-like machine. He arranged with the CIA to start a weekly newspaper in Santiago; he had Frei ministers on the CIA's payroll; he consulted often with the key Jesuits; he pressured Anaconda to fire all non-Christian Democrats. The United States had taken the responsibility for every facet of Chilean life—agriculture, education, health, finance, production, savings and loans, police, and military.

I told the Johnson and Frei governments that I could not and should not play viceroy. I told them that the incestuous relationship was hurting us both. I urged that we disengage quietly and prudently, that we introduce a low-profile policy throughout Latin America, that we eliminate our military missions in Latin American countries, and that we urge the multinationals to take constructive initiatives in order to avoid confrontations over the inevitable nationalizations of copper and other holdings.

So, before Nixon's election, the official presence of the United States in Chile was slashed, every CIA program was trimmed to the bone, our military contingent was reduced to a small fraction of what it was, further "guarantees" of U.S. investments were stopped, and the Jesuits were shunned. After Nixon's election, on my own authority and despite CIA protests, I closed the weekly newspaper.

(10) The CIA convinced me in 1970 that my policies would boomerang into helping Allende. Democracy itself was in trouble in Chile. The Socialists had joined the rightists in plotting with Chilean generals to overthrow Frei. The Communists were using large subsidies from abroad to buy and sell senators and deputies, to blackmail key figures, and to plant agents in all other parties. Fascists were receiving cash and other help from Brazil to destabilize Frei. And my hands-off, "low-profile" policy was, according to the CIA, abetting the process of sapping the country's democratic vitality. The CIA said that my aloofness was being read as indifference. Indeed, since Kissinger and Nixon had tabbed the military governments of Brazil and Argentina as their Latin favorites, it appeared that I, too, had decided that democracy was no longer of any importance.

So, I agreed to do something to counter the Allende campaign. I did not follow the CIA's recommendation that the United States support Jorge Alessandri, the candidate of the Right. But I did approve the spending of money on general anti-Communist propaganda—posters, leaflets, and billboards like those the CIA had financed for years around the world.

(11) The multinationals appealed over my head to the Nixon administration for an all-out, joint effort to defeat Allende and to elect Alessandri. On April 10, 1970, David Rockefeller's group, which was renamed the Council of the Americas, proposed this covert action. Council President Jose de

CHILE

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 21

Cubas, accompanied by council staff and by Anaconda Chairman of the Board C Jay Parkinson, traveled to Washington to remind Assistant Secretary of State Charles Meyer and Office Director William Stedman that the United States had triumphed in Chile from 1963 to 1964 by joining forces with business. They offered to spend \$500,000 to elect Alessandri if the United States would also commit itself.

Meyer said nothing. He opposed such interference. But Rockefeller had recommended Meyer, a high Sears executive, to Nixon. The executive committee of the council included Harold Geneen, ITT's boss, and Donald Kendall of Pepsico, Nixon's closest friend in the multinational world and his principal client before he was elected president. Meyer dared not voice a veto that would enrage Nixon and the Rockefellers.

I learned of the Parkinson-de Cubas pitch when an envelope stamped "Secret eyes only" arrived. It contained a "memorandum of conversation" prepared by Stedman. On April 28 I sent a withering, unconditional rejection. Alessandri, I said, was the candidate of Chile's rich. The rich could give him money if he needed it. If we funded Alessandri, I said, that would arouse anti-Americanism among the 60

percent of Chileans who were opposed to any rightist. For the next six years an Alessandri government could blackmail us into giving huge amounts to keep "the Communists" at bay.

(I later discovered in the State Department archives that my candor so alarmed the White House that it told Secretary of State Rogers to collect all copies of my cable, including the CIA's and the Pentagon's. It reclassified it as "no distribution" to reduce readership to Nixon, Kissinger, Rogers, and a few aides.)

Stedman wrote me in May to "applaud the destruction you wrought" and to report Meyer's private delight.

(12) The Nixon-Kissinger-Helms team asked me to consider the military overthrow of Allende even before he was elected. In August, a month before the election, I recommended that the United States follow a "cool but correct" policy with any Allende government. I ruled out the alternatives of knee-jerk hostility or embrace. Immediately, a hush-hush Washington cable asked about a fourth possibility, military overthrow. My answer was no.

(13) President Frei sent a provocative message directly to Nixon immediately after the election: "The odds are fifty to one that Allende will turn Chile into another Cuba."

(14) Chilean plotters of the Right and center, including some of Frei's lieutenants, contacted Allende's opponents in the Chi-

lean military soon after the election. They arranged for American multinational managers to meet the most conspiratorial of the plotters: a General Viaux. The Forty Committee overruled my orders to the U.S. military to avoid any contact with the Chilean military. Instead, it asked me to consider scenarios by which the Chilean army might move. The richest man in Chile, publisher Augustin Edwards, a close friend of Donald Kendall and the Rockefellers, arranged via the CIA to meet me a few days after the election. Before fleeing to the United States that day, Edwards said that he wanted to ask me only one question: "Will the U.S. do anything militarily -- directly or indirectly?" My answer was no.

This background was imprinted in my mind five years later, in mid-1975, as I walked into CIA Director William Colby's office to meet him for the first time. I was convinced that the United States had had no covert action with the Chilean military while I was in Chile; I was positive that there had been no U.S. interference in the electoral process beyond the modest programs that I had approved. I would swear-- indeed I had to the Senate -- that there had been no U.S. complicity in the murder of General Schneider by General Viaux's men.

Nonetheless, I wanted to read Colby's secret Senate testimony on Chile in April 1974. Months later, the media revealed that the new CIA director had told of the United States, spending \$8 million from 1970 to 1973 to "destabilize" Allende and Chile. And, to my astonishment, the *New York Times* said that I had played a key role in these CIA schemes even though I had left Chile two years before Allende's overthrow; it added that I, like Helms, had lied about it.

Colby refused to let me read his testimony. "National security" forbade his telling me a word of it, he said. So I summarized my understanding of U.S. actions in Chile. He listened without comment. When I told him that I was about to debate *Times* reporter Seymour Hersh at a college in my hometown as part of a campus "truth squad" campaign, Colby nodded approvingly. Where and when? his aide asked.

The debate took place only a few weeks before the arrival of Treverton and Hitchcock for their interview. Greg Treverton's questions were gentle, his manner solicitous. He asked for, and I gave, a candid review of my experience and analysis. Then he focused on two key issues: the assassination of General Schneider and the actions of ITT. I rattled off the many steps that I had taken to forestall any rash U.S. involvement, including arranging for the jailing of Allende's most likely assassin in the Chilean military, and I expressed my bitterness at the *Times*'s assertions of my complicity in the alleged CIA plots. This reply provoked Treverton to turn toward the silent Hitchcock and whisper: "Don't you think we can tell him?" Then he swore me to secrecy. "There was a CIA plot with the military," he said. It was code-named Track

II (to distinguish it from my open endorsement of Frei's public, constitutional schemes to block the Chilean Congress's confirmation of Allende's election). Treverton disclosed that a Helms-White House cable had been sent behind my back to the CIA station chief in Santiago. "It instructed him to do everything possible to stop Allende from taking power."

Nixon, Kissinger, and Helms had agreed that neither I nor State should be told a word of this. The CIA promised General Viaux a lifetime annuity and safe passage from Chile if his plot to kidnap General Schneider backfired. A few days before this feeble-minded scheme to provoke an army takeover of Chile was put into action, however, the White House suddenly ordered the CIA to cut loose from Viaux.

"Why," I exclaimed to Treverton, "that's because I saw Kissinger and Nixon on October 12. I told the president that Allende's ratification was certain and that only lunatics would be snared by any military plotters."

"My God," I said as Treverton's news sank in, "Colby set me up."

I had, in effect, debated Hersh and many others as Colby's spokesman. Colby had encouraged me to disseminate information that he knew to be very wrong and very self-destructive. No less worse for me was another implication of the concealment, by Nixon, Kissinger, and Helms, of Track II. The CIA station chief and the State Department officers in my embassy had told me in early 1971 that I was at the head of an assassination list. Even though the number-two man on that list, Frei's former interior minister, was machine-gunned to death that June, I had shunned all but the most minimal protection because I thought it wrong to act guiltily or fearful if the United States had clean hands. As I wrote Kissinger after I'd learned of Track II: "You and the president, and others, deliberately chose to permit me and my family to run the risk of murder rather than give me the choice that knowledge [of Track II] would have granted."

Treverton ended the interview with two assurances: one, that he would write a full summary, send me a copy for review, and circulate it to the full committee; two, that I would have a timely hearing with the senators before any report on Chile was written.

Autumn came, and neither pledge was kept. By phone and by letter Church and Treverton set dates for my testimony but then fobbed me off with excuses. When I learned that my predecessor (Dungan) and my successor (Nat Davis) had testified in secret, that my CIA station chief and defense attaché had also appeared, and that the Select Committee's report was in final draft, I fired off a twenty-eight-page letter to Church, protesting my exclusion. Without detailing the scandalous details of the Kennedy-Johnson era, I summarized how and why the United States had acted in Chile for ten years and the CIA had accumulated such unmatched power.

My letter was hidden from the full committee. Instead, two interim reports were rushed out, concerning Chile and CIA-linked assassinations, including Schneider's. These reports slyly and extensively rewrote history in order to shield both the Kennedys and the Rockefellers. They converted Allende into an innocent hero destroyed by Nazi-like Americans only because he was a "socialist" and only because Nixon was the U.S. president. The reports completely suppressed the fact that I had spent a full year as ambassador trying to reach almost any kind of accord with Allende as well as the fact that Allende himself had written Nixon, praising my efforts. Instead, isolated sentences were plucked from cables—some not even written by me—to depict me as partly responsible for Schneider's murder and the plots against Allende. Yet I had never been asked a single question about those cables and had never been permitted even to appear to swear to the facts. The commit-

●

**An influential
Washington friend warned me:
"If you insist on
pursuing this matter . . . you
will know anguish
beyond anything you have
experienced."**

●

tee even concealed Treverton's written conclusion, in his report on me, that it was "obvious"—five years after the event—that I still didn't know of Track II.

For appearance' sake, the committee invited me to testify at its one public hearing after the two reports were published in December 1975. As the very last witness late in the day, I was allowed to make only a brief, formal statement of twelve minutes, no substantive questions were asked, and I was dismissed. I submitted for the record my letter to Church and my 1971 cable from Santiago, summarizing my efforts to live and let live with Allende.

These documents were eventually published in the form of appendices in the committee's hearings. By then, though, only a few historians would hear of them. And, I discovered, reporters were being told by some people in ITT, by the CIA, and by some senators that I was a perjurer who was now off his rocker.

Determined to force out the truth, I appealed to Leonard Marks, an influential Democratic lawyer in Washington and the former head of the U.S. Information Agency. I asked him to help me win the right to testify fully and freely. He called

back several days later, with this advice: "If you insist on pursuing this matter, I tell you as a friend that you will know anguish beyond anything you have experienced."

A few minutes later Jack Anderson rang. He had been tipped, he said, that I had been "in bed" with ITT and "on the take" from it. I offered him a chance to read my copious files. He never did.

Next I decided to complain to the Justice Department that I was being deprived of my civil rights. News of that decision caused some movement in the Select Committee. I won the right to testify again—without artificial constraints. Again two promises came from the committee counsel: that at least one Republican and one Democratic senator would attend the secret hearing and that my testimony would later be made public. Neither promise was kept.

The hearing was conducted in a small, inconvenient hotel room. Except for Howard Baker, who looked in for ten minutes, no other senator heard a word. The deputy counsel sought again and again to choke off embarrassing disclosures. I was there only to correct the record about myself, he insisted.

"Where is the proof of your statements?" he and others on Church's staff demanded. On March 23 I returned with a suitcase full of documents, including the text of my April 28, 1970, cable turning down the Council of the Americas' pitch to the government for a joint anti-Allende action plus the State Department letter applauding this veto, a confidential history of the Rockefeller Council as written by a member, the official Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) record of how ITT and other council members received special treatment from Kennedy and Johnson in their insurance contracts, and hundreds of cables attesting to my actions.

That same day the committee staff handed me the transcript of my secret testimony to review "for national security deletions before it is released." But I deduced from some comments that the Select Committee was about to go out of business and that all the photocopying and editing that day was a charade. As one young staffer whispered: "They just want to find out what you have."

The next day I sent a registered letter to committee counsel F.A.O. Schwarz, Jr., with a copy to Attorney General Edward Levi. Schwarz and others, Senator Church included, were guilty of obstructing justice, I said. They had deliberately ignored evidence concerning ITT and other multinationals, and they had kept the truth from the public.

They had, in fact, concealed from public scrutiny a network of under-the-table deals that would make Watergate look like a bedtime story. Swept under the rug was the complicity of ITT, Geneen, the Rockefellers, and such Chileans as publisher Edwards with Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, many senators, and the CIA. No

CHILE

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 90

mention was permitted of how Rockefeller had started his council at JFK's behest and how in 1964 Edwards and another Chilean had attended an anti-Allende strategy session of top multinational executives in David Rockefeller's office at 410 Park Avenue. The meeting was convoked by LBJ's man for Latin America, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann. He told the gathering how important the defeat of Allende was to the White House. The CIA officials in attendance took it from there. In follow-up huddles they suggested how the multinationals might do "their part" for the national interest by chipping in cash, material, and influence to elect Frei and not a rightist, as they preferred.

Mann came to Rockefeller's office on the heels of his most important "success." On March 31 Brazil's generals overthrew the democratically elected government of João Goulart. The toppling of the leftist Goulart—he was very much like Allende, and his removal reads like a step-by-step rehearsal for the Chilean's ouster six years later—involved the CIA, key multinational members of the Rockefeller group, and the Pentagon. The secretary of defense was Robert McNamara (now head of the World Bank), and his deputy was Cyrus Vance, when the Pentagon ordered a U.S. naval

task force with paratroopers to sail for Rio to put down any resistance to Goulart's dismissal.

John McCone headed the CIA then, with Helms as his deputy. When McCone resigned in 1965, he joined ITT's board of directors. He also remained a paid consultant to Helms. Such arrangements are common. Men whose minds are chockablock with secrets gleaned in government about congressmen, senators, heads-of-state, and civil servants, at home and abroad, are put at the service of our most potent executives.

McCone approached Helms about Chile on behalf of Geneen in the spring of 1970, only a few weeks after my veto of the Council of the Americas' secret proposal for a joint CIA-Big Business program. Within days ITT launched an intensive campaign at the White House to override my decision.

This lobbying was coordinated with the activities of Edwards and other Chileans close to the council and to the CIA. Two ITT "public relations" men, Robert Berellez and Harold Hendrix, worked closely in Santiago with Edwards's agents. Edwards, in turn, was in daily contact with the CIA, just as he was from 1963 to 1964. The CIA informed all three men of the Track II conspiracy in September 1970. When I barred Hendrix and Berellez from access to the embassy two weeks later, because of their intrigues, they wired malicious cables to ITT. Indeed, their bitterness toward me was echoed by

Geneen, Helms, Kissinger, and Kendall, each of whom lamented to their cronies that I had "lost Chile to the Communists," because I had not allowed the United States to go all out for Alessandri.

Because all of this information—and much more—was being suppressed from the public, and because what I saw as a conspiracy to destroy my reputation was also shielding crimes, on March 25, 1976, I wrote to Attorney General Levi, demanding an investigation. Six weeks later Levi handed my complaint to the Justice Department for action.

Levi, a former president of the University of Chicago, displayed a unique independence and courage, for he recognized that he would arouse a fellow cabinet member, Dr. Kissinger, and the entire establishment. After all, Kissinger had covertly intervened to stop similar investigations during the three previous years. Levi's predecessor, William Saxbe, had heeded Kissinger's frantic warning that "national security" would be threatened if Helms were to be indicted and to testify.

So laden was Helms's memory bank with embarrassing data about Democrats as well as Republicans that "liberals" like Senators Church and Mondate went along with the backstage cover-up. That's why, for example, at the very height of the furor over the revelations of the CIA's activities in Chile, Kissinger, McNamara, Averell Harriman, Senator Symington, and other nota-

bles came to *Washington Post* columnist Tom Braden's home in early 1975 in order to give Helms a festive send-off on the eve of his return to Iran, where he had been sent as U.S. ambassador.

Later that year, though, when the Senate inquiry into the CIA seemed to show that Helms had committed perjury, word leaked that Helms intended to blow the whistle on various high officials if he ever had to face jail. Kissinger, of course, was one likely victim of Helms's wrath because of his role in the Nixon-CIA-ITT conspiracy in Chile. Such leaks were intended to intimidate President Ford and Attorney General Levi.

Levi ignored them and instead spurred the Justice Department to send two of its attorneys to my home in June 1976 to take a sixty-two-page deposition from me. It contained names, dates, cable references, and other documentation for breaking the case. Immediately, I received a letter from the Justice Department, which stated: "Your candor and cooperation have provided a refreshing relief from what we are more accustomed to encountering."

My deposition contained three specific charges. First, perjury by ITT's top executives, by Helms and other CIA officials, and by "various government officials." Second, conspiracy to defraud the taxpayer. In December 1974 ITT had been awarded \$92.5 million in an insurance payment for its nationalized telephone company in Chile. ITT, I charged, in addition to lying about its

cooperation with the CIA to stop Allende, had also concealed its bribes of Allende's associates from 1971 to 1972. In the legal sense, these were "provocative acts" that would, I think, have voided the insurance. (ITT, incidentally, "persuaded" high officials in the present Chilean dictatorship to pay the company even more for its nationalized telephone company.) My third accusation was the conspiracy of Senator Church and his committee's staff and counsel to deprive me of my civil rights in order to conceal crimes and to obstruct justice.

The Justice Department ruled against investigating Senate actions but wrote me that it would pursue the perjury and fraud charges that had been so long pigeonholed. Meantime, the campaign to shut me up resorted to bribes, continued threats, and libels about my mental health. In 1975 Kissinger, for "compassionate reasons," offered me jobs in his State Department. And in 1976, as I edged closer to the bone, his top aide, Larry Eagleburger, asked me on the telephone if "they" couldn't fix a job for me with a multinational like Pepsico! "Don't you understand," I said, "that I intend to force out the truth about Kendall [of Pepsico] and the others?" I never heard again from that quarter.

A break in the case finally came in November 1976. ITT's Hendrix had plea-bargained. Rather than face a perjury

charge for having denied to the Senate that ITT had cooperated with the CIA, the retired public-relations man talked about the \$350,000 that ITT had smuggled into Chile to Allende's enemies. In federal district court in Miami, without a word to the press (as in the Helms indictment one year later), Hendrix was given a suspended sentence of three months.


The media also ignored Helms's resignation in January 1977 as ambassador to Iran. Notified quietly that he was under grand jury investigation, he returned to Washington and retained the crafty Williams who, like Nelson Rockefeller, had also served on the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Jimmy Carter's election brought the slow wheels of justice to a halt. A new attorney general and his team had to be recruited and installed. To try to force out the truth, during this hiatus I used the one-day hearing held on January 11 on the nomination of Cyrus Vance as secretary of state.

Once again Frank Church stage-managed my isolation. He scheduled my testimony for 2:00 P.M., only fifty minutes after Vance, the media, and the audience had left for lunch. Church was the only senator present as I traced Vance's ties to the Rockefeller's, the CIA overthrow of Brazil's democratic government in 1964, all the "linkages which gave us Vietnam in the 1960s, assassination plots, and the dark legacies of all manner of covert operations." How could the man who helped the Brazilian generals get into power, I asked, be a convincing spokesman for Carter's human-rights program? How could he influence the Chilean dictatorship when it knew another well-kept secret: the Brazilian military government provided "technical" help for the overthrow of Allende and the installation of a police state in Chile?

Carter named fellow Georgian Griffin Bell as his attorney general, and soon I heard well-informed whispers of backstage deals to quash the indictments of Helms and Geneen. Since I had already decided to bring my own suit for damages against ITT and its chairman, Geneen, and to name Nixon, Helms, John Mitchell, and others as co-conspirators, I telephoned the Justice Department to inform it of my court filing and to warn that I intended to lay out all the facts.

The Carter administration's reply was the sly plea bargain with Helms last November. Carter, Mondale, and Bell defended their action as the first instance of an indictment of a CIA official by any government. The "respectable" media, led by the *Times*, the *Washington Post*, CBS, and *Time* applauded in editorials written by men who are good friends of Helms, of Vance, of Mondale, et al. They described the White House action as fair and practical. For them, as for Helms, silence is golden.

For my part, I cling to the fading dream that there is meaning behind the words "equal justice," "the inalienable rights of every American," and "the whole truth and nothing but the truth." 



"You've held office on all levels. Tell me, is the sex better on a local, county, state or federal level?"