

How Reagan is raising your gas bill  
Rebecca West on feminism • Michael Kinsley on trade

GUASO

Guatemalan Solidarity Committee  
P.O. Box 31908  
Seattle, WA 98103 (206) 536-0825


# THE NEW REPUBLIC

20 copies  
87¢ each page  
\$50.00



## GUATEMALA BLEEDS

In the villages  
with RFA, Noalt's army  
by Allan Noyes



The merciless mission of Ríos Montt's army.

## THE GUNS OF GUATEMALA

BY ALLAN NAIRN

ON APRIL 20, 1982, government troops entered the village of Acul in Guatemala's northwest highlands. According to an eyewitness, "They searched the houses and pulled the people out, and took us to the churchyard. The lieutenant walked up and down, pointing at people, saying 'These will go to hell, these will go to heaven. The ones he said would go to hell they took out to be shot. They tied them up and kicked them and gave them karate chops to the throat. One soldier had a big knife and he stuck it into their genitals and hacked them on the neck and on the back. The people were crying and crossing themselves. The soldiers pulled out one boy and put him up against the big tree. They said they were going to shoot him because he was against the government. They took the others to the cemetery with their hands tied behind their backs. They dug a big ditch and lined them up at the edge. We all had to come and watch. The lieutenant said they were going to be shot because 'you haven't educated your children, your children are going around with scum, and that doesn't suit us. But we're not going to throw their bodies on the roadside, we're just going to shoot them.' He said this was the new law of Ríos Montt. They shot each one with a bullet in the face from about a meter away. Parts of their brains spilled out and scattered into the ditch." By the end of the day twenty-four lay dead. The next day the troops killed twenty-two more.

According to figures compiled by Amnesty International, at least 12,000 unarmed civilians have died by violence in Guatemala since 1978. Last year Amnesty reported that 2,600 had been killed between July and March 23, when

Allan Nairn, a journalist specializing in Central America, spent four months last year in Guatemala.

General Efraín Ríos Montt seized power in a military coup. By December, however, army massacres had become more sporadic and the pace of guerrilla raids had slackened. These developments were widely interpreted to mean that the government had begun to curb human rights abuses and had succeeded in crushing the guerrillas.

The interpretation was wrong on both counts. The number of massacres fell because the army had completed the first stage of a major operation designed to depopulate the rural villages that are the guerrillas' logistical and political

base. The guerrilla's level of activity fell because their village support network had been disrupted. During this operation, I conducted interviews with several dozen soldiers and officers in the field, as well as with refugees and government officials. What they said points to the conclusion that Ríos Montt's strategy was based on organized killing, torture, and bombing of unarmed civilians—a round of carnage that can be expected to resume as soon as guerrilla activity reaches a sufficiently threatening level. And far from crushing the guerrillas, the counterinsurgency drive has left their corps of armed combatants essentially intact, while sowing bitterness among the peasant survivors.

Ríos Montt, who was trained in counterinsurgency at Fort Bragg and served in 1973 as director of studies at the Pentagon's Inter-American Defense College in Washington, D.C., brought the Guatemalan Army back into the mainstream of international counterinsurgency theory. General Romeo Lucas García, whom Ríos Montt toppled in the coup, had attempted to fight the guerrillas with an uncoordinated series of rural massacres. In the urban areas, Lucas undertook a campaign of assassinations that destroyed a powerful popular movement of trade union-



FINCA, LA PERLA, SEPTEMBER 1982.  
PHOTOGRAPH BY JEAN-MARIE SIMON/VISIONS.

ists, professionals, clergy, students, slum dwellers, and moderate politicians; he recklessly continued these highly visible killings long after their political objective had been accomplished. Besides bringing international condemnation of Guatemala's human rights abuses, Lucas's actions actually increased guerrilla strength.

Ríos Montt curtailed the politically disastrous urban assassinations. He shifted to a program of centralized planning, local and international public relations, and, as an army strategy document put it, "establishment of a scheme for control of the population"—forced labor "civil patrols" used for road repair, surveillance, and army-led military forays. The cutting edge of the strategy was a series of province-by-province sweeps by massed troops to clear the tiny mountain villages and to resettle much of the population in army-controlled towns. The sweeps concentrated the killing in a few brief but fierce bursts. After the phalanx had run out of villages in one region and moved on to the next, it could be said that violence in the first region had diminished and human rights improved. By October this claim could be made for the country as a whole.

**A**S THE SWEEPS BEGAN, in the provinces of Chimaltenango and Alta Verapaz and Baja Verapaz, the level of killing—the highest in Guatemalan history—shocked even traditionally reserved elements of the local establishment. "Not even the lives of old people, pregnant women, or innocent children were respected," said Guatemala's Conference of Catholic Bishops in a May 27 pastoral letter. "Never in our history has it come to such grave extremes." In an unprecedented series of editorials in May, the conservative *El Gráfico*, the country's leading newspaper, stated: "Massacres have become the order of the day. . . . How is it possible to behead an 8- or 9-year-old child? . . . We do not deserve aid as long as this keeps occurring."

At the same time, the United States Embassy was assuring visitors that human rights conditions had dramatically improved and that if abuses were occurring they were contrary to policy. By way of proof, they distributed copies of the army's "Code of Conduct Toward the Civil Population," a twelve-point guide to counterinsurgency etiquette that admonishes soldiers not to "flirt or take liberties with the women," and to "show special affection and respect for the aged and children."

On May 24 Ríos Montt set the stage for the sweeps through Quiché and Huehuetenango, the provinces with the heaviest guerrilla activity, by announcing that he would grant amnesty to all guerrillas and collaborators who turned themselves in before July 1. After the amnesty had expired, any resident of a village believed to be collaborating with the guerrillas would be considered fair game. On June 30 Ríos Montt declared on television that "today we are going to begin a merciless struggle," and issued a decree that ordered all men age 18 to 30 to present themselves for military service. The decree stated that the army would "proceed with a vigorous and firm military

action to annihilate the subversion that has not understood the good intentions of the government."

According to soldiers and officers who participated in the action last July, August, and September, the sweeps were directed not at armed guerrillas but at civilians in villages suspected of guerrilla collaboration. Ríos Montt had outlined the rationale in a May 17 interview. "The problem of the war," he explained, "is not just a question of who is shooting. For each one who is shooting, there are ten working behind him."

According to Lieutenant Romeo Sierra, who commands a 20-man patrol base at La Perla, a northwest highlands plantation, the sweeps were directed from the top. Field commanders like Sierra receive their orders through a chain of command which places only three steps—the minister of defense, the army chief of staff, and a colonel in the provincial capital—between themselves and Ríos Montt. The commanders receive daily orders from the colonel, and maintain hourly radio contact with his headquarters. "I advise him that 'I'm going to Tutzuhil with twenty men.' He knows everything. Everything is controlled." All field actions must be reported in the commanders' daily "diary of operations," which is reviewed and criticized in monthly face-to-face evaluations. "We're on a very short leash," Sierra said.

Sierra, who directed the sweeps through his patrol area of 20 square kilometers and 10,000 people, told me that thousands of civilians were displaced but that "in the time I've been here [two-and-a-half months] no subversives have fallen. Lots of unarmed people, women refugees, but we haven't had actual combat with guerrillas."

**E**ACH PATROL OFFICER, after describing the success of his sweep, would casually point to his local mountain and say that 50 to 75 guerrilla combatants were still at large. Lieutenant Sierra estimated that 70 guerrillas were moving in the mountains immediately surrounding La Perla. "There are lots of them around here," said Miguel Raimundo, a sergeant in Nebaj, a medium-sized army-occupied town south of La Perla. "It's hard to fight them. There are about 300 of them—the ones who fight."

Just outside Nebaj, more than 2,500 peasants had been resettled on an army airstrip. "They didn't want to leave voluntarily," explained Felipe, a corporal who manned the 50-caliber machine gun that dominated the town from the church belfry. "The government put out a call that they would have one month to turn themselves in. So now the army is in charge of going to get all the people from all these villages."

Sergeant Miguel Raimundo, who was guarding a group of 161 suspected guerrilla collaborators (which included 79 children and 42 women), said, "The problem is that almost all the village people are guerrillas." According to camp records, these peasants had been rounded up in army sweeps through the villages of Vijolom, Salquil Grande, Tjolom, Parramos Chiquito, Paob, Vixaj, Quejchip, and Xepium. Sergeant José Ángel, who commands a 40-man platoon based at La Perla, explained the procedure. "Be-

fore we get to the village, we talk with the soldiers about what they should do and what they shouldn't do. They all discuss it so they have it in their minds. We coordinate it first—we ask, what is our mission?"

According to José Angel, "One patrol enters the village from one point, on another side another patrols enters. We go in before dawn, because everyone is sleeping. If we come in broad daylight they get scared, they see it's the army, and they run because they know the army is coming to get them."

The army has a policy about such behavior. "The people who are doing things outside the law run away," the sergeant said. "But the people who aren't doing anything, they stay." He said he had seen cases where "lots of them ran, most of a village. They ran because they knew the army was coming."

Miguel Raimundo cited three cases where villages fled en masse. "All the villages around here, like Salquil, Palob, or here in Sumal, they have a horn and there's a villager who watches the road. If the soldiers come, he blows the horn. It's a signal. They all go running."

**F**OR THE SOLDIERS, the killing of fleeing, unarmed civilians has become a matter of routine. I asked Felipe, the Nebaj corporal, how the villagers react when the troops arrive.

"They flee from their homes. They run for the mountain."

"And what do you do?"

"Some we capture alive and others we can't capture alive. When they run and go into the mountains that obligates one to kill them."

"Why?"

"Because they might be guerrillas. If they don't run, the army is not going to kill them. It will protect them."

"Among those you have to kill, what kind of people are they? Are they men or women?"

"At times men, at times women."

"In which villages has this happened?"

"Oh, it's happened in lots of them. In Acul, Salquil, Sumal Chiquito, Sumal Grande."

"In those villages, about how many people did you kill?"

"Not many, a few."

"More than ten? More than twenty? More than a hundred?"

"Oh no, about twenty."

"In each village?"

"Yes, of course. It's not many. More than that were captured alive."

José Angel, the sergeant at La Perla, recalled a similar experience in the village of Chumansan in the province of Quezaltenango. "When we went in, the people scattered," he said. "We had no choice but to shoot at them. We killed some. . . . Oh, about ten, no more. Most of them got away."

According to accounts from soldiers and survivors, the army follows a consistent step-by-step procedure after en-

tering a village. First, Sergeant José Angel explained, "We go into a village and take the people out of their houses and search the houses." Among the items the soldiers look for are suspiciously large stocks of grain or beans. The army takes what it can use and burns the rest. Next, he said, "You ask informers who are the ones that are doing things, things outside the law. And that's when you round up the collaborators. And the collaborators—you question them, interrogate them, get them to speak the truth. Who have they been talking to? Who are the ones who have been coming to the village to speak with them?"

The interrogations are generally conducted in the village square with the entire population looking on. I asked José Angel how he questioned people. He replied, "Beat them to make them tell the truth, hurt them."

"With what methods?"

"This one, like this [he wraps his hands around his neck and makes a choking sound]. More or less hanging them."

"With what?"

"With a lasso. Each soldier has his lasso."

**T**HE DAY BEFORE, in Nebaj, an infantryman who was standing over the bodies of four guerrillas who had been executed a few hours before demonstrated the interrogation technique he had learned in "Cobra," an army counterinsurgency course for field troops. "Tie them like this," he said, "tie the hands behind, run the cord here [around the neck] and press with a boot [on the chest]. Knot it, and make a tourniquet with a stick, and when they're dying you give it another twist and you ask them again, and if they still don't want to answer you do it again until they talk." According to sergeants and infantrymen of Nebaj and La Perla, the tourniquet is the most common interrogation technique. Live burial and mutilation by machete are also used.

The director of an ambulance squad in one of Guatemala's largest provinces said that roughly 80 percent of the bodies recovered by his unit have their hands tied behind their backs and show signs of strangulation. The bodies are usually naked and have been finished off by 5.56 millimeter bullets (the kind used in the army's assault rifles) fired at close range into the chest, or by puncture wounds to the neck, generally consisting of four intersecting slices, characteristic of the army's four-flanged bayonet.

The soldiers said they expect those they question to provide specific information, such as the names of villagers who have talked with or given food to guerrillas. Failure to do so implies guilt, and brings immediate judgment and action. "Almost everyone in the villages is a collaborator," said Sergeant Miguel Raimundo. "They don't say anything. They would rather die than talk."

When I asked Miguel Raimundo about the interrogation method, he replied: "We say, if you tell us where the guerrillas are, the army won't kill you. . . . If they collaborate with the army, we don't do anything."

"And if they don't say anything?"

"Well, then they say, 'if you kill me, kill me—because I don't know anything,' and we know they're guerrillas."

They prefer to die rather than say where the *compañeros* are."

According to Sergeant José Angel, it is common for suspected collaborators to be pointed out, questioned, and executed all on the same day. Explaining how he extracted information so quickly, he said, "Well, they don't talk like that voluntarily. You just have to subdue them a little to make them speak the truth."

After the interrogations have been completed, the patrol leader makes a speech to the survivors gathered in the village square.

"We tell the people to change the road they are on, because the road they are on is bad," said José Angel. "If they don't change, there is nothing else to do but kill them."

"So you kill them on the spot?"

"Yes, sure. If they don't want the good, there's nothing more to do but bomb their houses."

José Angel said he had participated in operations of this kind in the provinces of Sololá and Quezaltenango in which more than 500 people were killed. He and other soldiers said that smaller villages are destroyed with Spanish, Israeli, and U.S.-made grenades. Boxes of these grenades could be seen stacked in the Nebaj ammunition dump. The soldiers said they also used a 3.5-inch U.S.-made shoulder-held recoilless rocket that was designed as an antitank weapon but is effective against people and straw huts. At the La Perla headquarters, one such launcher was sitting next to boxes of "explosive projectile" rockets from the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant.

**F**OR LARGER OPERATIONS, José Angel said, patrols called in army planes and helicopters to bomb the villages. The helicopters are U.S.-manufactured Hueys and Jet Rangers. (Until January 1983, when the State Department rescinded the Carter Administration's 1977 ban, the sale of spare parts for the helicopters had been withheld on human rights grounds.) The bombs include U.S.-made 50-kilogram M1/61As, twelve of which were stacked in the base munitions dump in Nebaj. José Angel said he had seen such bombs dropped from Huey helicopters in Pujujil and the surrounding cantons in Sololá. The ambulance squad leader cited six cases in his province where survivors told of being bombed from planes and from blue and white (the color of the Jet Rangers) helicopters. He said he had observed craters, shattered houses, and trees marked with heavy shrapnel. On December 8, at the graduation ceremonies of the Military Aviation School, the army gave a public demonstration of bombing from Huey helicopters.

The American Embassy would neither confirm nor deny that U.S. helicopters were being used for bombing, but a senior diplomat said that if they were, it would not be a violation of U.S. intent. "If you're engaged in a war, you bomb and you strafe," the official said. "If you have a fort you've got to take out, you save lives. That's what we did in World War I and World War II."

Some Guatemalan officers contend that although heli-

copters are widely used for bombing, they are of greater tactical importance for surprise entry. "When you go in on foot," said Lieutenant Cesar Bonilla, the officer in charge of the villagers resettled at the Nebaj airstrip, "they see the patrol three kilometers away and know you're coming. But with air transport, you land different units in the area, all the units close in rapidly, and the people can't go running away."

Bonilla said that this type of operation could only be executed by several helicopters at once. "With just one helicopter you scare them away and there's no control." The United States' refusal to sell spare parts had grounded much of the fleet, so Lieutenant Bonilla was encouraged by reports that the Reagan Administration was considering a change in policy. "That would be wonderful," he said. "With six helicopters, for example, the airborne troops would land all at once before they could make a move. The nicest, the ideal, the dream, would be a surprise: suddenly, pow! Helicopters with troops!" As he spoke, he made machine-gun noises and waved his Galil toward the refugee shacks. "Ta, ta, ta, ta, ta! All at once from the air! Pow! No escape routes. That would be ideal."

The day before this conversation, a peasant family in Bonilla's camp, interviewed in their shack outside the view of soldiers, described such an assault on their village. "Two times they came there in helicopters," said one of the men. "They would come in and land and the people would retire and they would always kill a few. They flew over, machine-gunning people from the helicopter." The family said that five were killed in the strafing.

This family, like its neighbors, was moved out of its village and told that the army would provide for its security, food, and housing. This is the "beans" component of General Ríos Montt's heralded "beans and rifles" program. Removed from their houses and fields, the people must depend on the army. Such relocations are a standard counterinsurgency tactic. Ríos Montt, however, has succeeded in portraying them as part of an economic reform program. The relocations make the army the well-publicized partner of international organizations that answer the government's plea to aid the villagers. Many foreign observers, unfamiliar with how and why the army resettled the people, are impressed by the sight of an army feeding and housing a peasantry it has been accused of massacring.

**B**Y SEPTEMBER the sweep was coming to an end, and the next stage of the operation was beginning. "Up here there aren't any villages anymore," said José Angel, speaking of the patrol areas around La Perla. "There used to be, but then the soldiers came. We knew that such and such a village was involved, so we went to get them. We captured some and the rest of the people from the village ran away. They're hiding in the mountains. Now we're going to the mountains to look for them."

Going into the mountains to track down refugees meant going into guerrilla territory. According to the soldiers and refugees who have come down from the mountains, many

villagers fleeing the army wander through the hills alone, armed only with machetes and an occasional hunting shotgun. But some make contact with guerrilla patrols that act as their guides, sometimes sending them toward the relative safety of the Mexican border.

In some regions, the army has abandoned armed pursuit in favor of a strategy of waiting until hunger and disease flush out the villagers, who must live off weeds, roots, and quick-growing vegetables while staying constantly on the move. This tactic scored its first major success in mid-October, when several thousand refugees from the San Martín Jilotepeque area in Chimaltenango, many of whom had been in the hills since February following a series of massacres during the Lucas period, came down and surrendered to the army, asking for food. Nobody knows how many refugees are in the mountains. In May, before the Quiché and the Huehuetenango sweeps, the Conference of Catholic Bishops estimated that the number of refugees (not all of whom are living in the mountains) exceeded one million. Guatemala's total population is seven million.

Major Tito Arias, commander of the Nebaj base, said in mid-September that 2,000 people from the area of Sumal Grande had fled to the mountains and would be pursued by foot patrols and helicopters. Sergeant José Angel said his platoon went on such operations frequently. I asked José Angel what his troops did when they find refugees.

"At times we don't find them. We see them but they get away."

"But when you do find them, what do you do?"

"Oh, we kill them."

"Are they a few people or entire villages?"

"No, entire villages. When we entered the villages we killed some and the rest ran away."

**U**NDER THE ARMY'S POLICY, a peasant found outside the army-controlled towns can be in mortal danger. "We know the poor people from close up and far away," said Sergeant Miguel Raimundo. "If we see someone walking in the mountains, that means he is a subversive. So we try to grab him and ask where he's going; we arrest him. And then we see if he is a guerrilla or not. But those who always walk in the mountains, we know they are guerrillas. Maybe some of them will be children, but we know that they are subversive delinquents. I've been walking in the mountains for a year now, and just in the mountains, one by one, we've captured more than 500 people."

Like his fellow sergeants and lieutenants, Miguel Raimundo is comfortable with the army's assumptions. "A woman told me yesterday that the soldiers kill people, that the soldiers killed her husband. But I told her that if the soldiers killed her husband it was because he was a guerrilla. The soldier knows whom to kill. He doesn't kill the innocent, just the guilty. And she said, 'No, my husband wasn't doing anything.' So I said, 'And how do you know it was nothing? How do you know what he was

doing outside?' 'No,' she said, 'because he never went anywhere.' 'Yes,' I said, 'That's because he was a collaborator.' "

It is possible that Ríos Montt's strategy will succeed in isolating and demoralizing the guerrillas. But it is more likely that it will end up strengthening them. For all the relative sophistication of Ríos Montt's approach, it has relied largely on violence directed at the civilian population. And it was such violence, after all, that made the guerrillas a threat in the first place. In 1967 and 1968, the Guatemalan Army, assisted by U.S. advisers, did succeed in defeating the guerrillas of the eastern provinces of Zacapa and Izabal with a campaign that took 5,000 to 10,000 civilian lives. But those insurgents numbered only a few hundred and were poorly organized. By 1978 the guerrillas had reorganized, established political links with the peasantry, and expanded their combat force. When the army began killing peasants whom speculators were evicting from the land, the guerrillas were ready to take advantage of the resulting popular resentment. It was Lucas's counterinsurgency campaign that made the difference. His massacres and assassinations sent the guerrillas waves of new recruits and transformed them from a militarily marginal force into a powerful movement.

**S**EVERE as Lucas's spasms of violence were, however, they pale in comparison to the death and dislocation sown by Ríos Montt's systematic sweeps. Today there are tens of thousands of Guatemalans roaming the mountainsides and living in the villages and camps who have lost husbands, wives, parents, children, friends, and homes, and who carry with them graphic memories of a brutal encounter with their government. Ríos Montt's destruction of the rural social structure has set back the guerrillas, but has left them alive to organize and fight another day.

On March 23, the anniversary of his coup, Ríos Montt modified the state of siege. Speaking on television in the wake of the Pope's visit, the General, who is an evangelical Protestant, said, "We know and understand that we have sinned, that we have abused power, and we want to reconcile ourselves with the people." Ríos Montt has talked this way before, even while directing the bloodiest of his military campaigns. And it is hard to see how any kind of reconciliation can be achieved without the kind of basic political and economic changes that have been steadfastly resisted ever since a C.I.A.-sponsored coup brought the military to power in 1954. It is equally hard to see how such changes can be made as long as the army and the oligarchs continue to rule.

Neither Efraín Ríos Montt nor the officers and politicians constantly plotting to replace him can expect ultimately to achieve a military victory. They are more likely to find themselves on a downward spiral—having to kill more and more to stave off the consequences of the killing they have done before. Whether the guerrillas succeed in using this situation to fashion a victory of their own is another question. But it appears that given the logic of the Guatemalan struggle, the war is theirs for the losing.