The 22d also manages a versatile all-jet cargo fleet of C-141B Starlifters and C-130 Hercules aircraft, which can be used to airlift troops and supplies throughout the world in both war and peace time as needed. Some of the aircraft can even be reconfigurated to act as flying hospital wards to evacuate and care for casualties in emergency situations.

Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, the 22d Air Force has an exemplary record of responding rapidly and reliably to world problems, and handling even the most difficult assignments in a superior fashion. For example, Operation Homecoming was implemented by the 22d Air Force. As many of my colleagues may recall, Operation Homecoming was the name given to the Air Force's plan to bring home the Vietnam war POW's after the United States withdrew from the conflict in Southeast Asia, a difficult and sensitive assignment indeed.

Mr. Speaker, I am proud of the 22d Air Force. I am proud of the well trained and highly motivated people who man the 22d and I am proud of its essential role in maintaining our Nation's military preparedness and thereby preserving our national security. I salute the headquarters of the 22d Air Force and the men and women who serve there.●

SCOTTSDALE HIGH SCHOOL 1922-83

HON. ELDON RUDD

OF ARIZONA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, June 3, 1983

● Mr. RUDD. Mr. Speaker, last week, the oldest school in one of our Nation's fastest growing cities—Scottsdale High School of Scottsdale, Ariz.—graduated its last senior class after 60 years of operation. The historic school's closing this year marks the end of an institution which represents a fulfilling education and life experience for some 10,000 graduates since its first class of three graduates in 1923, but Scottsdale High School will be remembered for more than its rewarding academic program.

When the school first opened in 1922, Scottsdale was an almost exclusively rural community separated from nearby Phoenix by unpaved roads, small farms, and sparse economic activity. Families sent their children to Tempe Normal School, now know as Arizona State University, for precollege schooling by apprentice teachers, for there were no other high schools in the area at the time. The community of Scottsdale had perhaps a few hundred residents then.

One longtime alumnus, Lester Mowry, who was in the school's first 4-year class of 1927—a total of 10 students—recalls that students had to carry their own seats for class in the school's auditorium.

Sixty years later, Scottsdale High School remains located in the heart of the downtown section of a city whose streets, buildings, and other famous standing structures are intertwined with the outskirts of the Phoenix metropolitan area, populated by almost 2 million people. The city of Scottsdale, one of our country's biggest tourist attractions due to its desert surroundings and old West setting, has about 100,000 residents and a growth-oriented economy that continues to foster change.

The growth of Scottsdale High School over the decades preceded the dramatic changes in the "Valley of the Sun," as the major influx of people first occurred in the 1950's, the same timeframe Scottsdale High was expanding into a district system of several schools. A farming community was beginning to turn into a residential community, and as the high school expanded, so did the whole area.

As the community expanded, the population spread out along with newer schools outside of the downtown area of Scottsdale. Because of declining enrollments, the local school board chose to close down the historic Scottsdale High, and it goes without saying that this was a difficult decision for many of the school's students, faculty and administration, and the list of accomplished alumni.

The real tributes to Scottsdale High School will remain in the memories of those who were associated with it, but I would like to share with my colleagues in Congress the May 27, 1983, news article, "Last Rite: Scottsdale High Closes With Class of 1983," printed in the Arizona Republic.

[From the Arizona Republic, May 27, 1983]

LAST RITE: SCOTTSDALE HIGH CLOSES WITH CLASS OF 1983

(By William La Jeunesse)

SCOTTSDALE.—For the Scottsdale High School graduating class of 1983, there will be no homecoming.

After 60 years of education and thousands of memories, Scottsdale High officially has closed.

On Thursday night, an audience of 2,000 jammed into Scottsdale High stadium to watch the 335 seniors of the class of '83 write the final chapter to this city's oldest high school.

"I feel very unique to be recognized and remembered," Ronda Johnston, 18, said. "I am glad to graduate but sad because I know ours is the last generation of so many that have passed through here, and I don't want the tradition to die.

"I always hoped that I could bring my kids here and show them where I went to high school and that they could go here.

"But the saddest thing is we have no homecoming to come home to."

The school board voted Jan. 18 to close Scottsdale High because of declining enrollment.

"Whether these buildings stand or not, Scottsdale High will always be with you," an emotional Evelyn Caskey, Scottsdale High principal, told the graduates.

It was a bittersweet ending for the high school, teachers and students. The 36-acre Scottsdale High site is in the center of downtown. With a price tag estimated at $20 million, the buildings are expected to be leveled to make room for an office building or hotel-convention center complex.

More than 70 Scottsdale teachers and about 900 students will be transferred to the district's other four high schools next fall.

As for the graduates Thursday night, they said they were happy to graduate and embark on new challenges but sad to see their alma mater close.

"SHS was a second home and a place to grow," Roxanne Gentry, student-body president, said in her graduation-night speech. "Above all, it was a great education.

"As the closure lurked upon us, the truth became clear. In five short months, our alma mater would cease to exist. We proud seniors on this proud night are feeling excitement, maturity and the expectations of our dreams. So go, fellow classmates, and fulfill your dreams."

Kymberly Leicht, the senior-class president, added, "It feels like the beginning of my life, but I know it is also an end.

"I know I can never come back . . . to see all these friends again. Underneath all these smiles, there is sadness. SHS has been good to all of us."

The commencement address was delivered by Mark Scharenbroich, youth-development manager at Josten's, a ring-marketing company.

"The two greatest things a parent can give a child is roots and wings," Scharenbroich told the audience.

"To you parents," he said, "it is time to let go of that little hand.

"To you graduates, always cherish your family. Your gift to them is your honest appreciation of their love. When these ceremonies end, wrap your arms around them. Never be embarrassed to show love for your family."

The school band played Aaron Copland's Fanfare for the Common Man, which was followed by brief addresses by school board President Sue Doggett and Superintendent Phil Gates, who said, "Goodbye, good luck and God bless."●

THE SITUATION IN GUATEMALA—PART II

HON. DAVID R. OBEY

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, June 3, 1983

● Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, in his speech on Central America last month, President Reagan said that, "We do not view security assistance as an end in itself, but as a shield for democratization, economic development, and diplomacy."

It is the reality which lies behind that shield in Central America, however, that raises serious questions about the administration's policies in that region and their chances of success over the long run. Nowhere is this more so than in Guatemala.

The Reagan administration moved closer to the Rios Montt government after that regime came to power in a coup in March 1982. The United States increased foreign assistance and the Guatemalan Government was allowed to purchase military equipment from us for the first time since 1977. The administration wants Congress to approve $50 million in security-related

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aid for fiscal year 1984, an increase of about 400 percent.

The United States improved relations with Guatemala despite credible reports that the Guatemalan Government was carrying out a campaign of destruction, terror, and death against Guatemalan Indians and peasants in the countryside. Amnesty International, for example, reported that Guatemalan forces massacred more than 2,600 Indians and peasant farmers in a new counterinsurgency program launched after Gen. Efrain Rios Montt came to power.

The brutal nature of the regime that emerges from these reports raises basic questions about U.S. policy there: Is it in our interests to support a government that makes war on its own people? Can such policy succeed over the long run?

Two recent articles describe in detail the situation that exists behind the administration's shield in Guatemala. I recommend them to my colleagues.

[From the New York Times, Mar. 13, 1983]

IN AMERICA'S NAME

(By Anthony Lewis)

BOSTON, March 12—What follows is for readers with strong stomachs.

"We were told again and again of government soldiers, in uniform, arriving at a village, rounding up men and women and shooting them.

"But they apparently don't waste bullets on children. They pick them up by the feet and smash their heads against a wall. Or they tie ropes around their necks and pull them until they are strangled. We heard of children being thrown in the air and bayoneted."

That is not a description of what happened in Cambodia years ago under the genocide regime of Pol Pot. It is an account of what is being done right now by the Government of Guatemala—a government that has the support of the President of the United States.

The accounnt comes from a New York lawyer, Stephen L. Kass, who has just been interviewing refugees from Guatemala. He and another specialist in Latin American affairs, Robert L. Goldman, professor of international law at American University, went to southern Mexico to speak with refugees who had recently crossed the border.

Can such horror stories really be true? I asked Mr. Kass.

"We were told this kind of thing over and over along the border," he answered. "We were told it by men, we were told it by women, we were told it by children—at different places, by people who could not have known each other."

The two lawyers, who were looking into the situation for the Americas Watch Committee, interviewed refugees in Spanish at the Pacific Ocean end of the Mexican-Guatemalan border. Then they flew to airstrips in a mountainous jungle region to visit two refugee camps a mile or two from the central part of the border.

Between 50,000 and 80,000 Guatemalan peasants have fled across the porder in the last year or so. The flow is continuing—several thousand have come into organized refugee camps in the last two months.

"We believe there is a continuing pattern of almost indiscriminate violence directed at Indian peasant communities," Mr. Kass said. "Any village regarded by the local army commander as not firmly supportive of government efforts to destroy subversion is regarded as subversive itself—and, as such, a free-fire zone.

"It is a level of butchery that seems unimaginable but is true.

"When survivors from these villages try to live in the hills, the army destroys their crops. We heard that repeatedly, again from many different people. Helicopters are used to patrol the tillable areas and fire on people who try to grow things.

"And in our conversations with even the poorest Indians, they knew the United States supplied the helicopters and supported this government."

General Efrain Rios Montt installed himself as president of Guatemala in a coup last March. When President Reagan toured Latin America last year, he met General Rios Montt and rejected criticism of Guatemala's human rights record. "Frankly," Mr. Reagan said, "I'm inclined to believe they've been getting a bum rap." The Administration then announced that Guatemala would be allowed to buy spare parts for helicopters and aircraft, after years of embargo.

The reality of what government forces do in Guatemala—or for that matter the El Salvador Army's continuing butchery of civilians—contrasts almost comically with the noble images President Reagan evoked in asking Congress to send more military aid to Salvador. Our goal in Central America, he said, is "to replace poverty with development and dictatorship with democracy." We insist on a "legitimate road to power," not rule "without the consent of the people."

If the Reagan Administration were candid with the American people about its policy in Central America, it would say something like this:

"The governments we support in Guatemala and El Salvador do not live up to our most modest idea of decency. They murder their own citizens in large numbers, and the few rich brutally oppress the many poor. Moreover, they pay little attention to our views. Guatemala won't even let the International Red Cross look at its prisoners, and El Salvador has not convicted one official for the thousands of murders. But they are our allies against communism. They serve our strategic interest, and that is why we must support them."

The Administration will not say that—because Americans would not stand for it. We are not that kind of people. We do not want such horrors condoned in our name: not even to put down communism—if the policy would, which it will not.

And I wonder about Ronald Reagan. There is a real possibility that he believes all those hypocritical statements about how Central America would be fine if only the Communists left it alone. If he knew what was happening—if he knew that children were being murdered—would he actually want to pay that price?

[From the New Republic, Apr. 11, 1983]

THE GUNS OF GUATEMALA—THE MERCILESS MISSION OF RIOS MONTT'S ARMY

(By Allan Nairn)

On April 20, 1982, government troops entered the village of Acul in Guatemala's northwest highlands. According to an eyewitness, "They searched the houses and pulled the people out, and took us to the churchyard. The lieutenant walked up and down, pointing at people, saying These will go to hell, these will go to heaven. The ones he said would go to hell they took out to be shot. They tied them up and kicked them and gave them karate chops to the throat. One soldier had a big knife and he stuck it into their genitals and hacked them on the neck and on the back. The people were crying and crossing themselves. The soldiers pulled out one boy and put him up against the big tree. They said they were going to shoot him because he was against the government. They took the others to the cemetery with their hands tied behind their backs. They dug a big ditch and lined them up at the edge. We all had to come and watch. The lieutenant said they were going to be shot because 'you haven't educated your children, your children are going around with scum, and that doesn't suit us. But we're not going to throw their bodies on the roadside, we're just going to shoot them.' He said this was the new law of Rios Montt. They shot each one with a bullet in the face from about a meter away. Parts of their brains spilled out and scattered into the ditch." By the end of the day twenty-four lay dead. The next day the troops killed twenty-two more.

According to figures compiled by Amnesty International, at least 12,000 unarmed civilians have died by violence in Guatemala since 1978. Last year Amnesty reported that 2,600 had been killed between July and March 23, when General Efrain Rios Montt seized power in a military coup. By December, however, army massacres had become more sporadic and the pace of guerrilla raids had slackened. These developments were widely interpreted to mean that the government had begun to curb human rights abuses and had succeeded in crushing the guerrillas.

The interpretation was wrong on both counts. The number of massacres fell because the army had completed the first stage of a major operation designed to depopulate the rural villages that are the guerrillas' logistical and political base. The guerrilla's level of activity fell because their village support network had been disrupted. During this operation, I conducted interviews with several dozen soldiers and officers in the field, as well as with refugees and government officials. What they said points to the conclusion that Rios Montt's strategy was based on organized killing, torture, and bombing of unarmed civilians—a round of carnage that can be expected to resume as soon as guerrilla activity reaches a sufficiently threatening level. And far from crushing the guerrillas, the counterinsurgency drive has left their corps of armed combatants essentially intact, while sowing bitterness among the peasant survivors.

Rios Montt, who was trained in counterinsurgency at Fort Bragg and served in 1973 as director of studies at the Pentagon's Inter-American Defense College in Washington, D.C., brought the Guatemalan Army back into the mainstream of international counterinsurgency theory. General Romeo Lucas Garcia, whom Rios Montt toppled in the coup, had attempted to fight the guerrilas with an uncoordinated series of rural massacres. In the urban areas, Lucas undertook a campaign of assassinations that destroyed a powerful popular movement of trade unionists, professionals, clergy, students, slum dwellers, and moderate politicians; he recklessly continued these highly visible killings long after their political objective had been accomplished. Besides bringing international condemnation of Guatemala's human rights abuses, Lucas's actions actually increased guerrilla strength.

Rios Montt curtailed the politically disastrous urban assassinations. He shifted to a program of centralized planning, local and international public relations, and, as an army strategy document put it, "establishment of a scheme for control of the population"—forced labor "civil patrols" used for road repair, surveillance, and army-led mili-

tary forays. The cutting edge of the strategy was a series of province-by-province sweeps by massed troops to clear the tiny mountain villages and to resettle much of the population in army-controlled towns. The sweeps concentrated the killing in a few brief but fierce bursts. After the phalanx had run out of villages in one region and moved on to the next, it could be said that violence in the first region had diminished and human rights improved. By October this claim could be made for the country as a whole.

As the sweeps began, in the provinces of Chimaltenango and Alta Verapaz and Baja Verapaz, the level of killing—the highest in Guatemalan history—shocked even traditionally reserved elements of the local establishment. "Not even the lives of old people, pregnant women, or innocent children were respected," said Guatemala's Conference of Catholic Bishops in a May 27 pastoral letter. "Never in our history has it come to such grave extremes." In an unprecedented series of editorials in May, the conservative El Grafico, the country's leading newspaper, stated: "Massacres have become the order of the day. . . . How is it possible to behead an 8- and 9-year-old child? . . . We do not deserve aid as long as this keeps occurring."

At the same time, the United States Embassy was assuring visitors that human rights conditions had dramatically improved and that if abuses were occurring they were contrary to policy. By way of proof, they distributed copies of the army's "Code of Conduct Toward the Civil Population," twelve-point guide to counterinsurgency etiquette that admonishes soldiers not to "flirt or take liberties with the women," and to "show special affection and respect for the aged and children."

On May 24 Rios Montt set the stage for the sweeps through Quiché and Huehuetenango, the provinces with the heaviest guerrilla activity, by announcing that he would grant amnesty to all guerrillas and collaborators who turned themselves in before July 1. After the amnesty had expired, and resident of a village believed to be collaborating with the guerrillas would be considered fair game. On June 30 Rios Montt declared on television that "today we are going to begin a merciless struggle," and issued a decree that ordered all men age 18 to 30 to present themselves for military service. The decree stated that the army would "proceed with a vigorous and firm military action to annihilate the subversion that has not understood the good intentions of the government."

According to soldiers and officers who participated in the action last July, August, and September, the sweeps were directed not at armed guerrillas but at civilians in villages suspected of guerrilla collaboration. Rios Montt had outlined the rationale in a May 17 interview. "The problem of the war," he explained, "is not just a question of who is shooting. For each one who is shooting, there are ten working behind him."

According to Lieutenant Romero Sierra, who commands a 20-man patrol base at La Perla, a northwest highlands plantation, the sweeps were directed from the top. Field commanders like Sierra receive their orders through a chain of command which places only three steps—the minister of defense, the army chief of staff, and a colonel in the provincial capital—between themselves and Rios Montt. The commander receive daily orders from the colonel, and maintain hourly radio contact with his headquarters. "I advise him that 'I'm going to Tutzuhil with twenty men.' He knows everything. Everything is controlled." All field actions must be reported in the commanders' daily "diary of operations," which is reviewed and criticized in monthly face-to-face evaluations. "We're on a very short leash," Sierra said.

Sierra, who directed the sweeps through his patrol area of 20 square kilometers and 10,000 people, told me that thousands of civilians were displaced but that "in the time I've been here [two-and-a-half months] no subversives have fallen. Lots of unarmed people, women refugees, but we haven't had actual combat with guerrillas."

Each patrol officer, after describing the success of his sweep, would casually point to this local mountain and say that 50 to 75 guerrilla combatants were still at large. Lieutenant Sierra estimated that 70 guerrillas were moving in the mountains immediatley surrounding La Perla. "There are lots of them around here," said Miguel Raimundo, a sergeant in Nebaj, a medium-sized army-occuped town south of La Perla. "It's hard to fight them. There are about 300 of them—the ones who fight."

Just outside Nebaj, more than 2,500 peasants had been resettled on an army airstrip. "They didn't want to leave voluntarily," explained Felipe, a corporal who manned the 50-caliber machine gun that dominated the town from the church belfry. "The government put out a call that they would have one month to turn themselves in. So now the army is in charge of going to get all the people from all these villages."

Sergeant Miguel Raimundo, who was guarding a group of 161 suspected guerrilla collaborators (which included 79 children and 42 women), said, "The problem is that almost all the village people are guerrillas." According to camp records, these peasants had been rounded up in army sweeps through the villages of Vijolom, Salquil Grande, Tjolom, Parramos Chiquito, Paob, Vixaj, Quejchip, and Xepium. Sergeant José Angel, who commands a 40-man platoon based at La Perla, explained the procedure. "Before we get to the village, we talk with the soldiers about what they should do and what they shouldn't do. They all discuss it so they have it in their minds. We coordinate it first—we ask, what is our mission?"

According to José Angel, "One patrol enters the village from one point, on another side another patrol enters. We go in before dawn, because everyone is sleeping. If we come in broad daylight they get scared, they see it's the army, and they run because they know the army is coming to get them."

The army has a policy about such behavior. "The people who are doing things outside the law run away," the sergeant said. "But the people who aren't doing anything, they stay." He said he had seen cases where "lots of them ran, most of a village. They ran because they knew the army was coming."

Miguel Raimundo cited three cases where villaged fled en masse. "All the villages around here, like Salquil, Palob, or here in Sumal, they have a horn and there's a villager who watches the road. If the soldiers come, he blows the horn. It's a signal. They all go running."

For the soldiers, the killing of fleeing, unarmed civilians has become a matter of routine. I asked Felipe, the Nebaj corporal, how the villagers react when the troops arrive.

"They flee from their homes. They run for the mountain."

"And what do you do?"

"Some we capture alive and others we can't capture alive. When they run and go into mountains that obligates one to kill them."

"Why?"

"Because they might be guerrillas. If they don't run, the army is not going to kill them. It will protect them."

"Among those you have to kill, what kind of people are they? Are they men or women?"

"At times men, at times women."

"In which villages has this happened?"

"Oh, it's happened in lots of them. In Acul, Salquil, Sumal Chiquito, Sumal Grande."

"In those villages, about how many people did you kill?"

"Not many, a few."

"More than ten? More than twenty? More than a hundred?"

"Oh no, about twenty."

"In each village?"

"Yes, of course. It's not many. More than that were captured alive."

José Angel, the sergeant at La Perla, recalled a similar experience in the village of Chumansan in the province of Quezaltenango. "When we went in, the people scattered," he said. "We had no choice but to shoot at them. We killed some. . . . Oh, about ten, no more. Most of them got away."

According to accounts from soldiers and survivors, the army follows a consistent step-by-step procedure after entering a village. First, Sergeant José Angel explained, "We go into a village and take the people out of their houses and search the houses." Among the items the soldiers look for are suspiciously large stocks of grain or beans. The army takes what it can use and burns the rest. Next, he said, "You ask informers who are the ones that are doing things, things outside the law. And that's when you round up the collaborators. And the collaborators—you question them, interrogate them, get them to speak the truth. Who have they been talking to? Who are the ones who have been coming to the village to speak with them?"

The interrogations are generally conducted in the village square with the entire population looking on. I asked José Angel how he questioned people. He replied, "Beat them to make them tell the truth, hurt them."

"With what methods?"

"This one, like this [he wraps his hands around his neck and makes a choking sound]. More or less hanging them."

"With what?"

"With a lasso. Each soldier has his lasso."

The day before, in Nebaj, an infantryman who was standing over the bodies of four guerrillas who had been executed a few hours before demonstrated the interrogation technique he had learned in "Cobra," an army counterinsurgency course for field troops. "Tie them like this," he said, "tie the hands behind, run the cord here [around the neck] and press with a boot [on the chest]. Knot it, and make a tourniquet with a stick, and when they're dying you give it another twist and you ask them again, and if they still don't want to answer you do it again until they talk." According to sergeants and infantrymen of Nebaj and La Perla, the tourniquet is the most common interrogation technique. Live burial and multilation by machete are also used.

The director of an ambulance squad in one of Guatemala's largest provinces said that roughly 80 percent of the bodies recovered by his unit have their hands tied behind their backs and show signs of strangulation. The bodies are usually naked and have been finished off by 5.56 millimeter bullets (the kind used in the army's assault rifles) fired at close range into the chest, or by puncture wounds to the neck, generally consisting of four intersecting slices, characteristic of the army's four-flanged bayonet.

The soldiers said they expect those they question to provide specific information, such as the names of villagers who have talked with or given food to guerrillas. Failure to do so implies guilt, and brings immediate judgment and action. "Almost everyone in the villages is a collaborator," said Sergeant Miguel Raimundo. "They don't say anything. They would rather die than talk."

When I asked Miguel Raimundo about the interrogation method, he replied: "We say, if you tell us where the guerrillas are, the army won't kill you. . . . If they collaborate with the army, we don't do anything."

"And if they don't say anything?"

"Well, then they say, 'if you kill me, kill me—because I don't know anything,' and we know they're guerrillas. They prefer to die rather than say where the companeros are."

According to Sergeant José Angel, it is common for suspected collaborators to be pointed out, questioned, and executed all on the same day. Explaining how he extracted information so quickly, he said, "Well, they don't talk like that voluntarily. You just have to subdue them a little to make them speak the truth."

After the interrogations have been completed, the patrol leader makes a speech to the survivors gathered in the village square.

"We tell the people to change the road they are on, because the road they are on is bad," said José Angel. "If they don't change, there is nothing else to do but kill them."

"So you kill them on the spot?"

"Yes, sure. If they don't want the good, there's nothing more to do but bomb their houses."

José Angel said he had participated in operations of this kind in the provinces of Sololá and Quezaltenango in which more than 500 people were killed. He and other soldiers said that smaller villages are destroyed with Spanish, Israeli, and U.S.-made grenades. Boxes of these grenades could be seen stacked in the Nebaj ammunition dump. The soldiers said they also used a 3.5-inch U.S.-made shoulder-held recoilless rocket that was designed as an antitank weapon but is effective against people and straw huts. At the La Perla headquarters, one such launcher was sitting next to boxes of "explosive projectile" rockets from the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant.

For larger operations, José Angel said, patrols called in army planes and helicopters to bomb the villages. The helicopters are U.S.-manufactured Hueys and Jet Rangers. (Until January 1983, when the State Department rescinded the Carter Administration's 1977 ban, the sale of spare parts for the helicopters had been withheld on human rights grounds.) The bombs include U.S.-made 50-kilogram M1/61As, twelve of which were stacked in the base munitions dump in Nebaj. José Angel said he had seen such bombs dropped from Huey helicopters in Pujujil and the surrounding cantons in Sololá. The ambulance squad leader cited six cases in his province where survivors told of being bombed from planes and from blue and white (the color of the Jet Rangers) helicopters. He said he had observed craters, shattered houses, and trees marked with heavy shrapnel. On December 8, at the graduation ceremonies of the Military Aviation School, the army gave a public demonstration of bombing from Huey helicopters.

The American Embassy would neither confirm nor deny that U.S. helicopters were being used for bombing, but a senior diplomat said that if they were, it would not be a violation of U.S. intent. "If you're engaged in a war, you bomb and you strafe," the official said. "If you have a fort you've got to take out, you save lives. That's what we did in World War I and World War II."

Some Guatemalan officers contend that although helicopters are widely used for bombing, they are of greater tactical importance for surprise entry. "When you go in on foot," said Lieutenant Cesar Bonilla, the officer in charge of the villagers resettled at the Nebaj airstrip, "they see the patrol three kilometers away and know you're coming. But with air transport, you land different units in the area, all the units close in rapidly, and the people can't go running away."

Bonilla said that this type of operation could only be executed by several helicopters at once. "With just one helicopter you scare them away and there's no control." The United States' refusal to sell spare parts had grounded much of the fleet, so Lieutenant Bonilla was encouraged by reports that the Reagan Administration was considering a change in policy. "That would be wonderful," he said. "With six helicopters, for example, the airborne troops would land all at once before they could make a move. The nicest, the ideal, the dream, would be a surprise: suddenly, pow! Helicopters with troops!" As he spoke, he made machine-gun noises and waved his Galil toward the refugee shacks. "Ta, ta, ta, ta, ta! All at once from the air! Pow! No escape routes. That would be ideal."

The day before this conversation, a peasant family in Bonilla's camp, interviewed in their shack outside the view of soldiers, described such an assault on their village. "Two times they came there in helicopters," said one of the men. "They would come in and land and the people would retire and they would always kill a few. They flew over, machine-gunning people from the helicopter." The family said that five were killed in the strafing.

This family, like its neighbors, was moved out of its village and told that the army would provide for its security, food, and housing. This is the "beans" component of General Rios Montt's heralded "beans and rifles" program. Removed from their houses and fields, the people must depend on the army. Such relocations are a standard counterinsurgency tactic. Rios Montt, however, has succeeded in portraying them as part of an economic reform program. The relocations make the army the well-publicized partner of international organizations that answer the government's plea to aid the villagers. Many foreign observers, unfamiliar with how and why the army resettled the people, are impressed by the sight of an army feeding and housing a peasantry it has been accused of massacring.

By September the sweep was coming to an end, and the next stage of the operation was beginning. "Up here there aren't any villages anymore," said José Angel, speaking of the patrol areas around La Perla. "There used to be, but then the soldiers came. We knew that such and such a village was involved, so we went to get them. We captured some and the rest of the people from the village ran away. They're hiding in the mountains. Now we're going to the mountains to look for them."

Going into the mountains to track down refugees meant going to guerrilla territory. According to the soldiers and refugees who have come down from the mountains, many villages fleeing the army wander through the hills alone, armed only with machetes and an occasional hunting shotgun. But some make contact with guerrilla patrols that act as their guides, sometimes sending them toward the relative safety of the Mexican border.

In some regions, the army has abandoned armed pursuit in favor of a strategy of waiting until hunger and disease flush out the villagers, who must live off weeds, roots, and quick-growing vegetables while staying constantly on the move. This tactic scored its first major success in mid-October, when several thousand refugees from the San Martin Jilotepeque area in Chimaltenango, many of whom had been in the hills since February following a series of massacres during the Lucas period, came down and surrendered to the army, asking for food. Nobody knows how many refugees are in the mountains. In May, before the Quiché and the Huehuetenango sweeps, the Conference of Catholic Bishops estimated that the number of refugees (not all of whom are living in the mountains) exceeded one million. Guatemala's total population is seven million.

Major Tito Arls, commander of the Nebaj base, said in mid-September that 2,000 people from the area of Sumal Grande had fled to the mountains and would be pursued by foot patrols and helicopters. Sergeant José Angel said his platoon went on such operations frequently. I asked José Angel what his troops did when they find refugees.

"At times we don't find them. We see them but they get away."

"But when you do find them, what do you do?"

"Oh, we kill them."

"Are they a few people or entire villages?"

"No, entire villages. When we entered the villages we killed some and the rest ran away."

Under the army's policy, a peasant found outside the army-controlled towns can be in mortal danger. "We know the poor people from close up and far away," said Sergeant Miguel Raimundo. "If we see someone walking in the mountains, that means he is a subversive. So we try to grab him and ask where he's going; we arrest him. And then we see if he is a guerrilla or not. But those who always walk in the mountains, we know they are guerrillas. Maybe some of them will be children, but we know that they are subversive delinquents. I've been walking in the mountains for a year now, and just in the mountains, one by one, we've captured more than 500 people."

Like his fellow sergeants and lieutenants, Miguel Raimundo is comfortable with the army's assumptions. "A woman told me yesterday that the soldiers kill people, that the soldiers killed her husband. But I told her that if the soldiers killed her husband it was because he was a guerrilla. The soldier knows whom to kill. He doesn't kill the innocent, just the guilty. And she said, 'No, my husband wasn't doing anything.' So I said, 'And how do you know it was nothing? How do you know what he was doing outside?' 'No,' she said, 'because he never went anywhere.' 'Yes,' I said, 'That's because he was a collaborator.'"

It is possible that Rios Montt's strategy will succeed in isolating and demoralizing the guerrillas. But it is more likely that it will end up strengthening them. For all the relative sophistication of Rios Montt's approach, it has relied largely on violence directed at the civilian population. And it was such violence, after all, that made the guerrillas a threat in the first place. In 1967 and 1968, the Guatemalan Army, assisted by U.S. advisers, did succeed in defeating the guerrillas of the eastern provinces of Zacapa and Izabal with a campaign that took 5,000 to 10,000 civilian lives. But those insurgents numbered only a few hundred and were poorly organized. By 1978 the guerrillas had reorganized, established political links with the peasantry, and expanded their combat force. When the army began killing peasants whom speculators were evicting from the land, the guerrillas were ready to take

advantage of the resulting popular resentment. It was Lucas's counterinsurgency campaign that made the difference. His massacres and assassinations sent the guerrillas waves of new recruits and transformed them from a militarily marginal force into a powerful movement.

Severe as Lucas's spasms of violence were, however, they pale in comparison to the death and dislocation sown by Rios Montt's systematic sweeps. Today there are tens of thousands of Guatemalans roaming the mountainsides and living in the villages and camps who have lost husbands, wives, parents, children, friends, and homes, and who carry with them graphic memories of a brutal encounter with their government. Rios Montt's destruction of the rural social structure has set back the guerrillas, but has left them alive to organize and fight another day.

On March 23, the anniversary of his coup, Rios Montt modified the state of siege. Speaking on television in the wake of the Pope's visit, the General, who is an evangelical Protestant, said, "We know and understand that we have sinned, that we have abused power, and we want to reconcile ourselves with the people." Rios Montt has talked this way before, even while directing the bloodiest of his military campaigns. And it is hard to see how any kind of reconciliation can be achieved without the kind of basic political and economic changes that have been steadfastly resisted ever since a C.I.A.-sponsored coup brought the military to power in 1954. It is equally hard to see how such changes can be made as long as the army and the oligarchs continue to rule.

Neither Efrain Rios Montt nor the officers and politicians constantly plotting to replace him can expect ultimately to achieve a military victory. They are more likely to find themselves on a downward spiral—having to kill more and more to stave off the consequences of the killing they have done before. Whether the guerrillas succeed in using this situation to fashion a victory of their own is another question. But it appears that given the logic of the Guatemalan struggle, the war is theirs for the losing.●

FOOD IRRADIATION

HON. MANUEL LUJAN, JR.

OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, June 3, 1983

● Mr. LUJAN. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to share with you and my colleagues a very remarkable technological achievement by my constituents. The Albuquerque office of CH2M Hill, the Nation's sixth largest consulting engineering firm, was recently awarded the American Consulting Engineers Council's "Honor Award" for its newly developed food irradiation process.

CH2M Hill is to be commended for this accomplishment. Their process is doubly beneficial, for it not only treats food but also helps reduce nuclear waste. Called Byproducts Utilization, it derives beneficial uses from nuclear waste through low level doses of gamma radiation from cesium-137 to disinfect fruit, control trichina in pork, and preserve foods.

Mr. Speaker, I wish to add my congratulations to CH2M Hill for the remarkable achievement which is more fully described in an article from the firm's Spring 1983 Reports.

FOOD IRRADIATION USING NUCLEAR BYPRODUCTS TO DESTROY PESTS AND PARASITES

(By Serge Gregory)

Radioactive wastes are usually considered a dangerous byproduct of nuclear technology. But that isn't the whole story. These wastes have provided the heat to generate power in remote locations, a source of light where external power sources are not available, and the means to disinfect municipal sewage sludge. Now fresh foods are being irradiated to make them safer for human consumption.

LOW DOSES

Irradiation may seem an unlikely method of preventing contamination. However, a low dose of ionizing energy can inhibit sprouting in onions and potatoes, destroy insects that infest fruit and slow down the ripening process—all without making the food radioactive or changing its flavor.

This technology was originally developed in the United States in the late 1940s, but was stifled in 1958 by a regulatory ruling that classified irradiation as an additive rather than as a process like boiling or freezing. Researchers had a difficult time testing irradiation using the same techniques required for testing food additives.

Since then, safety testing technology and scientists' understanding of radiation chemistry have advanced significantly. In 1980, after 25 years of research, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration proposed a regulation stating that food irradiated with low doses (less than 100 kilorads) be considered safe for human consumption.

NOW IN USE

That same year, a World Health Organization expert committee recommended that foods treated with doses up to 1,000 kilorads be considered safe. Many nations, including Japan, the Netherlands and the Soviet Union, now use this technology as a means of increasing food shelf life and inhibiting sprouting. As an added advantage, components of existing nuclear wastes can be used, eliminating the need to store them.

The U.S. Department of Energy has developed a Byproducts Utilization Program to promote the beneficial use of wastes from plutonium production. One such applications is the use of gamma radiation from cesium-137 for food irradiation. CH2M HILL has been assisting the Department of Energy in identifying and developing these technologies, and in making them available to potential users (see Reports, Winter 1980).

"Food irradiation has attracted a lot of attention recently and shows significant promise," said Scott Ahlstrom, deputy program director of CH2M HILL at the firm's Albuquerque, New Mexico, office. "So, we're helping develop a variety of applications, including controlling trichina in fresh pork and disinfesting citrus fruits and apples."

PORK

The project team is working with several universities, government laboratories and the National Pork Producers Council to study the feasibility of using irradiation to eliminate trichina in pork. (Trichina is a parasite that can grow in humans.) The pork industry has set itself the task of ensuring that fresh pork is trichina-safe by 1987.

Industry conditions are being simulated at Sandia National Laboratories' irradiation facilities in Albuquerque. The effectiveness and economic feasibility of implementing a large-scale pork irradiation program are being verified.

FRUIT

CH2M Hill has also developed the conceptual design for a transportable irradiator. Such a facility will support U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) research on irradiation as an alternative to pesticides and fumigants.

For example, Florida currently controls fruit flies in citrus fruits prior to export by fumigating the fruit with ethylene dibromide (EDB). The Environmental Protection Agency has identified EDB as a suspected carcinogen and now plans to bar its use as a fumigant. As a result, the USDA is investigating irradiation as an energy-efficient alternative to cold storage and vapor-heat treatment when EDB is banned.

Significant foreign markets have embargoed the importation of apples from Washington because of the presence of codling moths in that state. With the development of the transportable irradiator, the USDA will be able to test the effectiveness of irradiation in controlling this destructive pest, as well as pests in other states, without having to build separate facilities. In addition, the transportable device enables food processors to test the irradiation process at their existing facilities in the way it would be used if implemented.

GREATER ACCEPTANCE

These programs are demonstrating that irradiation is a safe, efficient method of reducing reliance on potentially hazardous chemicals.

But Jacek Sivinski, CH2M HILL's program director, sees even greater international implications. "Food quarantine barriers now limit trade among nations," said Sivinski. "Many exports now on the 'block' list could be made safe for import by countries that are seeking these foods on the world market."●

THE TRADE CLARIFICATION ACT OF 1983

HON. RICHARD T. SCHULZE

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, June 3, 1983

● Mr. SCHULZE. Mr. Speaker, as you know, I have opposed the extension of most-favored-nation treatment to nonmarket-economy countries which have historically maintained oppressive human rights and emigration policies or which have demonstrated a national policy of unfair and predatory trade practices. I opposed the granting of MFN status to the People's Republic of China because of the certain knowledge that China would use the relaxed access to our domestic markets in order to exploit artificial price differentials between China's economy and our own. History has proved that industries targeted by nonmarket-economic systems cannot long withstand the pressure.

The phenomenon is not limited to China or to other Communist countries. As the trend toward nationalized industries continues in hitherto capitalist, market economies, the difficulty in maintaining a level playing field in our domestic markets is exacerbated. We have seen the Socialist Government in France carry out its campaign promises to nationalize the major