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REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF

"BREAK POINT"

ACTIONS AND STRATEGIES

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INTRODUCTION

This paper is prepared to review and examine the principles and actions underlying the recently announced position of Indian governments. This position asserts that "tribes as political entities are not now nor have they ever been a part of the Canadian federation." Furthermore, Indian governments are seeking a "trilateral conference on the political status of Indigenous peoples in Canada to clarify their political relationship to the United Kingdom." The Indian position also asserts that "Canada should not be permitted to become a wholly independent state through the patriation of their constitution from Britain until Indian government political status is clarified." This paper is organized in rough chronological order in terms of events and the evolution of ideas. It ends with an analysis of political impact, as well as an analysis of short-term and long-term objectives and timetables which may be used as a future guide.

RESTATEMENT OF PROBLEMS AND PREMISES FOR ACTION

Unlike its counterparts in other parts of upper North America, the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs (UBCIC) quickly recognized the political significance of recently proposed actions by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to "unilaterally repatriate the Canadian Constitution" (the British North America Act) as these actions would affect the political existence of tribes. In response the UBCIC formulated its understanding of this proposed process in the following terms:

1. As a former colony and now a member of the Commonwealth, the Canadian State is seeking to elevate its "political status" to a completely independent state from that of a state under the legislative control of the United King-

dom.

2. By virtue of treaties, agreements, and accepted British proclamations, the tribes in upper North America are politically associated with the United Kingdom, taking their protection from her.
3. The United Kingdom has assumed a role as "trustee" in connection with the tribes and must therefore seek to preserve, protect and guarantee the tribes' right to self-government and their right to hold, use or dispose of their own property (including but not limited to: land, minerals, water, wildlife and timber) for the benefit of tribal peoples.
4. By virtue of the British North America Act, the United Kingdom designated the federal government of Canada as the administrator of its trusteeship in connection with the tribes. As the administrator of the trusteeship, Canada assumed the duties of providing social and health services, economic aid and technical assistance to benefit the tribes and their resources.
5. The Canadian State is now pursuing a course of action which will nullify tribal rights and tribal identity by capriciously assuming ownership of tribal territories and control over individual tribal members. (Tribal lands and resources now exceed 40% of upper North America and are valued in amounts beyond a trillion Canadian dollars).
6. For tribes to maintain their distinct identity as political entities, they must work to establish a clarification of their political identity before the Canadian State receives its final independence from the United Kingdom.

In accordance with these terms, the UBCIC set in motion a comprehensive process to inform its member Indian governments about the nature and extent of what was to become a "State of Emergency." The "State of Emergency" was formally declared at the Annual Conference of the UBCIC in October, 1980. Mobilization of indigenous communities and Indian governments was declared essential, with an emphasis on political action, legal actions and diplomacy. George Manuel, President of the UBCIC stated the immediate problem: Prime Minister Trudeau is moving to patriate the Canadian Constitution from the United Kingdom. The first formal step of that process is scheduled for completion by December 10th, when the Canadian Parliament is expected to formally authorize the submission of a request to the Queen of England and the British Parliament. President Manuel further noted that, if the Canadian Parliament takes the dramatic step of requesting patriation on December 10, then Indian governments and the people they represent will no longer be recognized as having distinct rights. "Indian nations will be terminated swiftly and with a stroke of the pen!" President Manuel added. The October 1980 General Assembly of the UBCIC extended a "full mandate" to

"prevent patriation of the Canadian Constitution" and take whatever political and legal measures necessary to insure the future of Indian nations in upper North America.

The long-term problem faced by Indian governments was later stated to be: Can the "first nations of Canada" regain their natural place among the family of nations in the world if Canada's independence is delayed? How can the first nations achieve a political status among other nations which insures their future political, economic and cultural existence?" The immediate problem of causing a delay in Canadian independence and the long-term problem of first nations' political status needed to be confronted in a very short span of time. Indeed, the short-term problem had to be dealt with during a period of less than twelve weeks.

To meet the immediate and future problems it was necessary to formulate political and legal action strategy and time table which would have immediate impact by December 10 while laying the foundation for carrying out the long-term strategy at the same time.

The general strategy for the short-term was two-fold:

1. Organize a "grass roots" understanding of the State of Emergency with an emphasis on "reshaping indigenous opinion toward Canada." Indigenous people should understand the need to have a personal commitment to the security and continuity of their families and their own nation and not consider themselves as "Canadian" or even members of the Canadian society.
2. Canada and the United Kingdom must be forced to deal with the first Nations on an equal footing. Each of these countries must recognize that what they considered to be an internal domestic problem is, in fact, a matter of "grave international importance." Such a focus would help create an atmosphere where both Canada and the United Kingdom could be "embarrassed into delaying consideration of Canada's independence" and indeed cause them to take steps (which we would propose) to resolve the "Indigenous question" before they finally consider Canada's independence.

The political strategy, therefore, contained an "internal" organizational element and an "external" organizational element. To accomplish the short-term objective of "delaying Canada's formal request to the Queen of England," a carefully orchestrated set of political and legal actions would be necessary. To accomplish the long-term objective of "organizing a united force of First Nations to meet Canada and the United Kingdom on an equal political footing" would require internal political organization and international diplomacy. If successful, the combined efforts to meet both the short-term and long-term objectives would produce radical changes, coming from 113 years of political, economic and social domination by Canada, the First Nations would assume their place among the family of nations. With this achievement, the First Nations would become a potentially powerful political and

economic force in the world community, certainly equal to any peoples on earth. The First Nations would have liberated themselves from social, political and cultural denigration long imposed on them by Canada. The First Nations would truly be on the road to fully exercising self-government and self-determination. Both of these concepts would become realities and not mere theory.

#### REVIEW OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE FIRST NATIONS PRIOR TO DECEMBER 10, 1980

1. As the organizational fabric the UBCIC undertook an extensive process of briefing and reviewing the issues with members of selected indigenous tribes and bands. Communications with counterpart organizations in other parts of upper North America were carried out to determine the extent of political support among the First Nations. Organizational efforts were undertaken to establish a "Constitutional Express" physically involving "grassroots" peoples in the effort to force a delay in Canadian independence. The early steps had been taken to organize an "internal social, economic and political infrastructures" of indigenous peoples and First Nations which would function as the fundamental power and authority for future actions both internally and externally. In other words, steps were being taken to form a new political confederation of indigenous nations which would be the basis for forming a new political and economic climate in upper North America.
2. The Constitution Express was formed to dramatize indigenous political power in opposition to immediate Canadian independence. It would serve as a means to insure grass roots participation directly in political actions taken in connection with the Canadian State, the United Kingdom and other First Nations. The focal points of actions following the Constitution Express was the All Chiefs Conference, Queen Elizabeth's representative, the Governor General and the government of Canada with particular emphasis on Prim Minister Trudeau's Office.
3. The goals to be achieved at the All Chiefs Conference included:
  1. Gaining agreement on the nature of the problems and commitment of the First Nations' leaders to a plan of action.
  2. Defining a commitment of all chiefs to the formation of an Indigenous Provisional Government, which would serve as the "national" government of indigenous peoples in upper North America with the authority to carry out the external policies of Indian governments in dealings with Canada, Britain and other countries.
  3. Designate a chiefs council which would formalize the

new provisional government constitution and organize the new process for indigenous government ratification within six months.

While the first objective at the All Chiefs Conference was not achieved, as a result of formal document ratification a broad consensus was in fact achieved. The other two objectives were achieved by unanimous consent.

4. The goals to be achieved with the Governor General included an oral presentation by indigenous leaders which stated the problems indigenous peoples have with Canada's rapid movement toward independence. The Governor General was formally presented with a Bill of Particulars and petition which officially stated the concerns of the First Nations and concluded by inviting the British government to join representatives of the First Nations and representatives of Canada in internationally supervised discussions concerning the status of Indian Nations in Canada. The petition contained references to the idea that Indian nations want to discuss "ways in which our special status can be integrated into the federation of Canada." While this idea does not necessarily represent the actual status Indian nations seek to achieve, the point was inserted to:
  - a. prevent political assertions that Indian Nations are 'separatists,' and
  - b. force-open the political door for discussions before 'constitutional patriation' so as to insure the opportunity exists for Indian Nations to make a choice about their individual or collective political future.

With the submission of the Bill of Particulars and Petition, the objectives were achieved with respect to the Governor General.

5. The objectives to be achieved with respect to the Canadian government included submitting a Bill of Particulars and Petition of the government of Canada and a possible organized testimony before the special Canadian Parliamentary Committee. This testimony would be concerned with formalizing a legislative request to the Queen of England and the British Parliament. The second objective of submitting testimony to the Parliamentary committee was set aside in favor of merely transmitting a Bill of Particulars and Petition to the executive offices of the Canadian government. A suitable Bill of Particulars and Petition was transmitted to the offices of Prime Minister Trudeau, spelling out the concerns of the First Nations' governments and inviting the government of Canada to join the I.P.G. and the British government in internationally supervised discussions concerning the

political status of the Indian Nations of Canada. The objectives concerning the Canadian government were fully achieved.

The accomplishments of the First Nations in Ottawa were profound and extensive. Not only had the process begun by the UBCIC raised the 'political ante' for Britain and Canada, but it had also forced increased political awareness among the First Nations leadership and their constituents. This stage represented only the completion of a first small step in the much larger processes yet to come.

While logistics and debriefings were being concluded in Ottawa the next small step was already underway in New York to organize political pressure on both Canada and the United Kingdom in the international community. This step involved the following:

1. By way of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) formal inquiries and communications had been made to selected UN missions and the UN Secretariat in late October. Subsequent communications with these missions and the secretariat were undertaken by a special WCIP delegation in late November, 1980. This WCIP delegation was directed to open communication channels, lay the ground work in New York and continue on to Europe to open doors and lay ground work for future First Nation missions.
2. On December 1 the UBCIC/WCIP advance person arrived in New York to finalize arrangements for submission of a Bill of Particulars and Petition to the UN Secretary General scheduled for December 8, 1980. The objectives for this New York trip were as follows:
  - a. Arrange a meeting with the Secretary General or his designated representative so the UN could formally receive the Bill of Particulars and Petition inviting the UN to intercede on behalf of the Indian Nations of Canada to facilitate a Trilateral Conference on the Political Status of Indigenous Peoples in Canada.
  - b. Arrange up to thirteen consultation meetings with selected UN missions to review the Bill of Particulars and secure potential backing for UN actions.
  - c. Arrange for public ceremonies to be conducted.
  - d. Arrange a reception for the representatives of the newly authorized Indigenous Provisional Government (IPG) by selected non-governmental organizations, and representatives of U.S. tribal governments.
  - e. Arrange facilities for housing the IPG delegation

and appropriate meeting facilities.

- f. Organize a public affairs effort to gain as much media coverage (particularly in Canada, Britain, Western Europe and third world countries) as possible.
- g. Arrange for an extensive briefing of IPG delegates on issues, politics, logistics and schedules.

The principle focus for all arrangements was to arrange for the highest ranking UN official to receive the Bill of Particulars and to arrange meetings with those UN Missions which may have the greatest future potential political importance to the IPG both within the UN framework and within the global community generally. UN officials were persistent in their efforts to push the interests of the IPG into the category of 'domestic Canadian affairs and the Human Rights Commission.' WCIP and UBCIC efforts were focused on promoting the external character of the IPG's concerns and more in the direction of political and economic sections of the United Nations. Through careful discussions with representatives of the Norwegian and Canadian missions it was possible to create pressures within the United Nations to force the Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization to represent the UN Secretary General in a meeting with a delegation representing the IPG. In terms of political importance, this Under-Secretary General would help make the point that the IPG was both serious and politically correct. Indigenous representatives agreed to meet with a representative of the Under-Secretary General for Human Rights as a concession to that part of the UN while we placed greater importance on the meeting with the Under-Secretary for Political Affairs. Two meetings were thus arranged.

Specific UN missions were selected on the basis of their political importance within the UN and within other International mechanisms. The criteria used was as follows:

1. Membership in the UN Committee of 24 concerned with trusteeship and decolonization.
2. Membership in the Nordic Council.
3. Membership in the Commonwealth.
4. Signator to the Helsinki Accords and European Court of Justice.
5. Member of the Non-Aligned Movement.
6. Member of the UN Human Rights Commission.

On the basis of these criteria we arranged meetings with the following:

Tanzania (1,3,6)  
Yugoslavia (1,4,5,9)  
India (1,3,5,6)  
United Kingdom (3,4,6)  
Australia (1,3)  
Norway (2,4,6)  
Finland (2,4)

Denmark (1,2,4)  
Iran (1,6)  
Ireland (1, influential re. UK)  
Cuba (1,5, Chair and 6)  
Trinidad-Tobago (1, Chair, 3)  
Canada (3,4,6)

From early discussions with UN officials it was clear that in order to gain serious consideration of the Bill of Particulars and Petition by the Secretary General at least one country would have to sponsor consideration. It was decided to concentrate on the Committee of 24 because it represented the greatest potential political opportunity for UN consideration of the IPG's petition. It also represents a politically potent element of the UN which has had considerable success dealing with conflicts between 'colonized' peoples and the countries which wield control.

All of the meetings were attended by delegations representing the IPG in numbers of two to five persons. Each delegation had a principle spokesman and a recorder. All of the political and logistical objectives were accomplished as anticipated.

#### ANALYSIS OF SHORT-TERM IMPACT

The short-term objective of forcing a delay in Canadian constitutional patriation was achieved as demonstrated by the fact that the Canadian Parliamentary Committee decided to postpone its final decision until February 6, 1981. Another short-term objective of beginning the process of 'politicizing the indigenous peoples' was also achieved through direct popular participation in the process and through a substantial amount of public press. The well organized 'Constitutional Express' and the formal authorization of an IPG by the All Chiefs Conference combined to impress on everyones' mind just how serious the indigenous peoples of Canada are in their efforts to remain politically distinct peoples. The indigenous peoples have begun to create political pressures among themselves, within Canadian society and within the British government which have already elevated the political debate beyond the domestic boundaries of Canada.

Achievement of the short-term objectives has forced a polarization among political leaders in Indian Government as well as polarization within the British and Canadian governments. When combined with provincial government pressures and domestic Canadian organizational pressures, this polarization has to a large extent, caused the temporary delay in the Constitutional Patriation process. By authorizing the Indigenous Provisional Government and opening channels into the international forums, indigenous leaders have forcefully introduced a new dimension to the process of Canada's independence drive. Neither Canada nor Britain can continue to argue that the patriation process is merely a domestic issue of no concern to the international community. This last point is, however, tenuous at best. The reason for this is that the IPG has only 'initially' signaled its intentions. Canada and Britain will now seek to test the seriousness of the IPG in terms of its political strength among



indigenous peoples and in terms of its political strength within the United Nations and selected supporting governments like Tanzania, Cuba, Yugoslavia and India. A further testing point is how effective the IPG will be in organizing itself politically and structurally. Needless-to-say, if the IPG does not work to build its internal structure, as well as effective external relations, then neither Canada nor the United Kingdom will take this whole effort seriously.

The immediate significance of what has been achieved is that the indigenous peoples of Canada have introduced a 'new political force' which has at least temporarily, altered the process to create an independent Canadian State. To translate these initial achievements swiftly to consolidate political forces amongst themselves; define concrete positions in terms of what territories, resources and peoples fall under the jurisdiction, of the IPG and formalize relations directly with selected supportive countries.

#### ANALYSIS OF LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS

The formal authorization of an Indigenous Provisional Government and the conduct of relations with other countries in the global community has signaled the intention of indigenous peoples of Canada to assume major responsibility for determining their own social, economic and political future. The implications of this act in terms of the global community is that the indigenous peoples of Canada are preparing to create for themselves the choice of whether they will seek to become an independent country, formalize their association with another state or dissolve and become a part of the Canadian society. Prior to the authorization of an IPG, there was no choice to be had. It would have been an accepted fact that indigenous peoples would be integrated into the Canadian society with or without their choice.

The first long-term implication, then is that by taking their own initiative the indigenous peoples of Canada have now created a choice for their political future.

By seeking international support and assistance, the Indigenous Provisional Government has begun to create the basis for international acceptance of a separate and distinct territory which is not a part of the Canadian State. The economic and political significance of such a distinct indigenous controlled territory in international strategic terms is that political control over a vast area of upper North America will fall into the hands of peoples who are not participants in any international agreements, other than treaties with the United Kingdom. Such a development will have implications for the future of the NATO Security Agreement, the international monetary system, the world energy situation and the North/South Dialogue which centers on the promotion of an equitable international economic order. The future actions of the Indigenous Provisional Government both internally and externally will either contribute to wider global instability or contribute to improved balance and stability.

By stressing the point that the First Nations are politically associated with the United Kingdom, the IPG has reaffirmed its position that the First Nations have not been politically integrated into the Canadian State. This assertion makes it clear that the First Nations are not seeking to separate from the state of Canada but rather they are clarifying that they have never formally been apart of the Canadian federation or the Canadian society. Instead of separating from the Canadian federation, the First Nations are merely reaffirming that is already true.

With the aid of the United Kingdom, Canada has been able to develop and perpetuate the myth that the First Nations and their territories (more than 40% of upper North America) are within Canada's political jurisdiction. Indeed, this myth is dispelled by simply recognizing that, as the original occupants of upper North America, the First Nations ceded only a fraction of their vast territories to the United Kingdom through treaties. No other territories were conveyed to the ownership of either the United Kingdom or Canada. Sixty-three percent of upper North America or 2,409,935 square miles of territory and waterways was never ceded by the First Nations. When the territories reserved by the First Nations, (through treaties) are added to the non-treaty area, the First Nations possess sixty-four percent of upper North America and a total of 2,467,343.9 square miles of territory. By these measures, a newly independent Canadian State would range in territory no larger than about 1.385 million square miles -- or about the size of the present Northwest Territories. Territories owned by the first nations combined would rank fourth largest among the 165 nations of the world.

#### OUTLINE OF ACTION PLAN NEEDED FOR INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT AND EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

To successfully carry out the short-term objective and fulfill the long-term objective (both of which are spelled out above), we must now look to a second phase strategy and plan of action which must take effect in some form during the month of January, 1981. This plan of action outline will focus on developments and activities to stabilize the internal affairs of the IPG and its confederated tribes and bands. The plan outline will also focus on new objectives to carry out the external affairs of the IPG.

#### Internal Affairs:

Objectives in this area are concerned with internal organization with regards to social, economic, governmental, cultural and communication needs. These needs must be identified in terms of both structure and ideology. The objectives should seek to insure a politically stable foundation for the organization of peoples and territories under the jurisdiction of the IPG. To effectively achieve both short-term and long-term objectives it is essential to build a strong and healthy

infrastructure. It is also essential to establish a consistent order among the diverse political and cultural interests within the indigenous Population so as to insure social, economic and political stability as the IPG seeks to meet the challenges posed by the Canadian State and the United Kingdom.

Goal:

To solidify the economic, social and political confederation of tribes and bands and their territories under the jurisdiction of the IPG and secure stability without disrupting the internal political and cultural independence of each confederating tribe.

Objective 1: To formalize the structure, political support and economic of the IPG before the end of January, 1981.

Task A: Gain ratification of a provisional constitution for the IPG by Indian Governments in British Columbia, Yukon, Northwest Territories, the interior of Alberta, Northern Quebec, and Nova Scotia to form the 'Iron Triangle.'

Task B: Gain commitments from the confederating Indian Governments for material and financial support to establish the legislative and administrative capabilities of the IPG.

Task C: Gain commitment from the confederating Indian Governments for technical personnel in the areas of administration, economics, social development, communications, natural resource development and management, strategic planning, public security, statistics, transportation and public welfare.

Task D: Conduct a formal meeting of the Indigenous Provisional Council to finalize internal structure and define policies.

Objective 2: Organize a natural resource cartography, economic and statistics team to prepare an "Indigenous Territory Political and Strategic Profile." This profile will define: the territories which fall under the jurisdiction of the IPG and the additional territories which may fall under the IPG jurisdiction as more Indian Governments confederate; the location of major and minor roads and highways; the location of population centers; the location of specific Indian Governments and their jurisdictions; the location of Canadian and NATO installations; the location of significant transnational and Canadian-owned business activities within Indigenous territories (active in mineral, timber, coal, uranium, oil, and construction developments); the location of underdeveloped or potential natural resources; the location of significant freshwater and saltwater ways; the location of significant fisheries

and wildlife populations; and the location of significant communications facilities.

Objective 3: Organize a social, economic, demographic and public welfare team to define an internal social and economic system to provide for the institutional, economic, food and service needs of the indigenous population by May 1981.

Objective 4: Organize a communications, education, information dissemination team to establish a territory wide communications and information system for the indigenous public. This team should also establish an internal governmental communications system within the IPG and between the IPG and confederated Indian Governments by March, 1981.

Objective 5: Organize a public security team to define a territorial security and defense system including materials, facilities, equipment and strategic plans by June 1981. An overall executive team should be established to coordinate these activities.

Objective 6: Establish a specific physical location for the IPG by February 28, 1981.

#### External Affairs:

Objectives under this designation are designed to provide for the conduct of relations with Canada and the United Kingdom, as well as with other countries and international organizations. The conduct of external affairs is largely dependent upon the success of internal organization. Even though this is the case, certain measures must be undertaken immediately to ensure the protection of indigenous interests during the fluid period from January 1981 to December 1981.

#### Goal:

To firmly establish political association between the IPG and the United Kingdom before Canada secures its independence from the United Kingdom.

Objective 1: Formalize communications and contact between the IPG and the governments of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, India, the Republic of Ireland, Iran, Vanuatu, and Cuba by designating diplomatic missions to meet with the various foreign ministries before February 6, 1981. The purpose of these missions is to formally request assistance (political and economic) to apply pressures on Canada and the United Kingdom to delay their consideration of Canadian independence. These missions must further secure diplomatic support for the establishment of the proposed Trilateral Conference on Indigenous political status. At least one, if not more, of these countries must be

agreeable to promoting the IPG's petition to the UN Secretary General through the Committee of 24. The purpose of this is to insure the UN's facilitating and supervisory role for the Trilateral conference.

- Objective 2: Establish an External Affairs Technical team, including individuals with backgrounds in political affairs, legal affairs, economics, statistics, foreign languages and customs, diplomacy, trade and commerce and international organizations. This team should be headed by an individual designated as the Chief of External Affairs. The team should prepare reports and analysis of the present and future political relations between the IPG, Canada and the United Kingdom. The team should prepare briefing papers on each of the countries to be visited as noted in Objective 1 (above) The team should prepare specific papers of response to questions raised by each of the UN missions visited in early December for immediate transmission to the appropriate officials. These materials must be prepared by or before January 15, 1980.
- Objective 3: The External Affairs Team should prepare a supplement to the recently transmitted Bill of Particulars and Petition to the Queen of England which spells out the political and legal arguments for delaying Canadian Constitution Patriation until the Indigenous political status question is resolved. This should be transmitted by an official IPG mission to the United Kingdom by or before February 6, 1981.
- Objective 4: The External Affairs Team should prepare a specific document concerning Canadian and United Kingdom violations of the Helsinki Accords to each member of the agreement attending the Madrid Conference. This document should be shared with selected non-Helsinki governments noted in Objective 1.
- Objective 5: A special External Affairs Communications Team should be established to prepare and disseminate IPG information and developments to the international media and develop a link to the Internal Communications Team.
- Objective 6: A special diplomatic and technical team should be established to undertake the role of negotiators for the IPG in preparation for the proposed Trilateral Conference. This diplomatic and technical team should be designated no later than March 31, 1981.

#### Comments and Conclusions:

The Indigenous leadership have set in motion a wide ranging internal and external process aimed at securing and protecting the

political and economic future of the indigenous peoples of Canada. By taking preliminary initiatives of both a political and legal nature, new opportunities and new responsibilities have been created. It is now the duty of the indigenous leadership to fully carry out the process which they started to ensure successful achievement of the primary goal.

There are considerable risks politically and economically if the process is carried to its logical conclusions. Those risks are now much greater because of the positive and forceful efforts recently undertaken. But even greater risks exist if there is a movement to retrench or fall back from the initial gains. Either the Indigenous leadership must accept the new responsibilities and new risks with the significant opportunity to achieve their goals, or they return to business as usual and risk total failure. Strength in leadership and courage is now essential to the preservation of indigenous rights.

The leadership must now understand that they have created a powerful force by their actions and the actions of their followers. This force is greater than the opposition which can be offered by both the Canadian State and the United Kingdom. The foundation of this powerful force is in the hearts of leaders who seek a new and free life for their peoples. No matter how small the numbers, that power is greater than anything on earth. It will sustain the people as they achieve their goals. A free and self-sufficient people is the ultimate goal. How the leaders proceed from this moment on will determine how and to what extent that goal is achieved.

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	Standard Territories	Non-Treaty Areas of Canada
Alberta	255,285 sq. mi.	
British Columbia	366,255 sq. mi.	244,182.2 sq. mi.
Manitoba	251,000 sq. mi.	
New Brunswick	27,835 sq. mi.	27,835 sq. mi.
New Foundland	156,185 sq. mi.	156,185 sq. mi.
Ontario	412,582 sq. mi.	
Prince Edward Is.	2,184 sq. mi.	2,184 sq. mi.
Quebec	594,860 sq. mi.	446,145 sq. mi.
Saskatchewan	251,700 sq. mi.	
Nova Scotia	21,425 sq. mi.	21,425 sq. mi.
NW Territories	1,253,438 sq. mi.	1,304,903 sq. mi.
Yukon Territories	205,346 sq. mi.	207,076 sq. mi.
Canada	3,560,238 sq. mi.	3,851,809 sq. mi.
Independent Canada		reduced to 1,384,465.1 sq. mi.
First Nations	(6,021,910 acres)	2,409,935 sq. mi. or 63%
Reserved Territories	57,408.95 sq. mi.	

